


RACE AND RACISM IN RUSSIA

NIKOLAY ZAKHAROV

MAPPING GLOBAL RACISMS



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Mapping Global Racisms

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
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Race and Racism in Russia

Nikolay Zakharov
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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2015 978-1-137-48119-1

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First published 2015 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN

Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Palgrave is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

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ISBN 978-1-349-50281-3 ISBN 978-1-137-48120-7 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9781137481207

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Typeset by MPS Limited, Chennai, India.

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Acknowledgements

This book is a product of years of research, and therefore it is difficult to mention here every person whose input I wish to acknowledge.

First of all, I want to express my deepest gratitude to Ian Law (University of Leeds), whose interest in the project encouraged me from its very outset. This book would not have been possible without Ian's help.

I am also indebted to Sven Hort (Seoul National University) and Vessela Misheva (Uppsala University) who have been supporting me ever since 2008, when I began to work on the new theory of racialization. I am grateful for these two academics' concern and insight.

This book could not have been published without the help by highly professional and friendly staff of Palgrave Macmillan. I wish to express my special thanks to Philippa Grand, Chris Grieves and Emily Russell.

My thanks also go to Andrew Blasko for helping me to find right words when writing in English as well as to Aleh Ivanou for his help in compiling the index. Nick Brock has followed the highest professional standards as editor of the final manuscript.

I would like to thank all my colleagues at the Sociology Institute of Södertörn University in Sweden – an institution and where I have the honor to work.

Liv's patience gave me the strength to continue with all my projects. My parents defined and nurtured my interests from my early years. The family's love and support are invaluable and mean a lot to me.

1

Global Racisms and Racism in Russia: An Introduction

The last two decades have been marked by a wide range of critical changes in Russia, the largest country of the former Soviet Union. A new name, borders, political and economic systems affirm the emergence not only of a new state, but of a new nation as well. These changes have been so profound and overarching that they affect both the social order as a whole and also the self-identity of each citizen, transforming daily practices, hopes, worldviews, and how people regard one another. Among the most striking changes is the wide dissemination of ideas of racial hierarchy, practices of racist exclusion, and racist violence. While biological conceptions of race are no longer an acceptable scholarly framework in the West for the analysis of differences, there has been a genuine renaissance in Russia of 'scientific' racism. Recent attempts to revitalize the 'science of race' that utilize proposing a new name for it, *rasologiya* (a rough analogue of Nazi Germany's *Rassenkunde*), the issuing of numerous books and other texts on the subject, and translations of certain more 'classical' scholarly works, cannot be ignored. Even though they comprise – it goes without saying – an ad hoc conflation of alarmist resentment and tendentious pseudo-scientific theories, they nevertheless have had a very strong influence on both public and intellectual discourses. For example, Alexander Tkachev, the governor of Krasnodarskiy kray in the Kuban' since 2001 and a head of the Committee of the State Duma on Nationalities Issues, declared in 2002 that 'surnames ending in "ian," "dze," "shvili" and "ogly" are as illegal as their bearers' (quoted in Shnirelman 2011(2), p. 35). Belikov (2011, pp. 38–9) estimates that the membership of skinhead racist gangs in Russia has risen to 50,000, which Arnold (2009) judges to be roughly half of the total skinhead movement in the world today.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the identification of belonging in respect to Russia found itself hovering in both economic and political terms between the so-called First World and the Third World. It is noteworthy in this regard that the notion of 'civilized country' was and remains in Russia a synonym for racial whiteness. In addition, Mikhail Gorbachev's idea of 'entering world civilization' implied that the realization of the Soviet project had led both the country and society away from the path of civilization. Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin have unreservedly defined the Russian Federation as a 'great power', but the great power image and the ongoing process of nation-building under the conditions of globalization have been accompanied by the exploitation of racial universals. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in fact, race imagery has been used as the reliable anchor keeping Russia firmly within the 'family of civilized peoples'. Against this background, the main thesis of this book identifies the discourse of race as the point of reconciliation between the understanding that Russians participate in the achievements of the West and the necessity of clinging to authenticity.

Although victims, journalists, and human rights advocates alike interpret physical and symbolic violence against individuals who are 'visually different' as racially motivated, invocations of 'race' become problematic for sociological analysis when there is little agreement about whether 'race' correlates with skin color, ethnicity, citizenship, or social status. In addition, prospects for understanding and interpretation are made more difficult by virtue of the great sensitivity of the issue of racism and the fact that much of what is discussed today in connection with race and ethnicity is in fact related more to political rhetoric or moral issues than to scholarship. John Rex (2009, p. 174) has noted that 'the problem of race and racism challenges the conscience of the sociologist in the same way as the problem of nuclear weapons challenges that of the nuclear physicist'. Scholars have thus been motivated to avoid use of the word 'race' as well as the ideas and feelings underlying it. While such avoidance can be either temporary or permanent, the goal has been to develop a new strategic vision and thereby obtain a greater capacity for and purposefulness in research.

The first step in this regard was to focus attention on the processes through which social groups have been formed, particularly the social mechanisms associated with these processes and the causes for the prominence of certain racial or ethnic attributes during a given period of time. The next step was the abandonment by the academic community of the essentialist understanding of race and of the notion

that ethnicity is an objective reality that determines belonging to a group (Brubaker 2009). Narratives according to which Russians are not a 'pure race' because they have constantly intermingled with and assimilated members of many other ethnic groups are no longer relevant in academic discussion since 'racial purity' is deemed to be an ideological construction and the interaction of ethnicities and ethnic groups is treated above all as social cognition. The idea of race as it has been shaped historically constitutes the ethnoracial imaginary through the social process of *racialization*. Racialization has, in fact, become an important problematic and an influential concept in the sociology of ethnicity and race (Barot and Bird 2001; Miles and Brown 2003; Murji and Solomos 2005; Saperstein et al. 2013). Stephen Small (1994, p. 36) notes in respect to the acceptance of this concept that

In general it is used to suggest that social structures, social ideologies and attitudes have historically become imbued with 'racial' meaning, that such meanings are contingent and contested, and that they are shaped by a multitude of other variables, economic, political, religious. It emphasizes the continuing need to see the intricate relationship between 'racial' meanings and other (economic, political, religious) meanings.

Race is re-examined in the present study as a form of practical knowledge. As such, an understanding of the relationship between 'blood' and the spiritual Russianness which is embedded in culture is driven by an interest in the preservation and reproduction of specific social traits and rules. This may include such issues as population control, discourses of the rise and decline of civilizations, progress, and the 'quality of people', including health and vigor. Racialization as a particular *process* whereby racial significance is assigned to observable differences between people will be examined through the use of an *analytic framework* that helps us 'identify the processes through which racial meaning can be ascribed to social relations, practices and groups that have been previously "unraced"' (McLaughlin 2005, p. 164).

While the idea of race is not dependent solely on social structure and historical context, the notion of racialization brings it into the area that is accessible to sociological analysis. The notion of racialization is justified as the most appropriate tool for the study of the processes of racial formation in Russia presented in this book by virtue of the fact that it acknowledges that racial discourses should be investigated in respect to how they structure social relations. This book charts the

modes of race construction in the Russian Federation by placing them into the sociohistorical contexts and institutional arrangements that give expression to forms of racial thinking and racist exclusion and violence. The analysis that unfolds will serve to develop my thesis that racism in Russia can be seen simultaneously both as a reaction of resistance to modernization processes and as an attribute of the process of attaining modernity. The globalized character of racism is linked to the entry of Russia into the world racial order. The process of civilizing so-called *Homo Sovieticus* has demanded that this former 'Second World' citizen should determine where she belonged, that is, her place in the world economic system, which, for the individual, means her place in the world division of labor, her mobility, and her patterns of consumption. Race can thus be viewed as the symbol of the era of globalization similarly to the way in which the nation was the symbol of western modernity at its peak. In this regard, racialization is an adaptation of the social system whereby national differences are arranged according to the logic of the global order.

I will provide a chapter-by-chapter outline of the contents of this book at the end of this chapter, but initially I will highlight some of the factors that make studying Russia more than just an isolated case for a sociologist of race, and clarify the methodology of the study.

From historical legacies to sociological challenges: the Russian case

The polyvalent discourse of race in Russia has passed through a range of changes that are manifested in a variety of representations – both in the historical-biological speculation found in literary fiction and political pamphlets, and in the system of everyday practices and interpretations. It must be noted, however, that it is not appropriate to merely transfer interpretative models built upon essentially different material into the field of Russian studies. Overcoming such methodological drawbacks demands that more attention be paid to the post- and transnational forms of globalized racialization processes. Moreover, no theorization of racial issues is possible without taking into consideration not only the models referred to above, but also the Russian case, which is clearly 'more than just a case'.

Studying the Russian case can play an important role in the theoretical advancement of the sociology of race because it opens up the possibility of analyzing a society which was familiar with the concept of race and had explicitly used it for anti-racist propaganda and scholarly

research – not in classification practices concerning population policies or censuses. As a result, the experience of state socialism and its legacy in the Russian Federation today provides us with unique material for reconsidering a number of our assumptions concerning racialization. The development of the Soviet model – with its transformation of the constructivist approach into the definition of race, and of anti-racism and affirmative action into its inverse – should thus doubtlessly sensitize both scholars and activists. We should remember that W. E. B. Du Bois – the key figure in the sociology of race – praised Soviet society for refusing to be white (Baldwin 2002, p. 161), while another Afro-American icon, Langston Hughes – one of the founding figures of the Harlem Renaissance – succinctly stated that ‘black and white can all be red’ (quoted in Baldwin 2002, p. 95). Today, however, Russia appears determined to become as ‘white’ as possible. Directing the reader’s attention to how race has been resonating in Russia is inevitable in the light of the rise of racism there, as themes that are almost unthinkable elsewhere were introduced literally overnight into scholarly practice and public discussion.

Examining the notion of racialization in terms of how it assigns indelible traits to particular groups of people encountered a number of difficulties regarding the adequate translation of Russian realities into the language of the sociology of race – and this was not a linguistic question. In Russia, as in many other parts of the world, people normally do not explicitly categorize each other as belonging to different races; at the very least, they apparently do not organize their social lives by means of references to distinct racial categories (Drobizheva 2011). The peculiarity of the contemporary Russian case is particularly interesting and complex because the process of nation-building took place under conditions generated by the unfolding of the socialist project. For decades racism was anathematized by the state and its leaders, who made race a legally unacceptable means for identity construction. Nevertheless, thinking in terms of race has not been merely a phenomenon typical of extremist groups insofar as constructing inequality has often followed an ambivalent logic and taken unexpected forms. It is necessary to note that culture may produce and employ a multitude of categories, and that modernity may produce a multitude of logics of difference that produce social knowledge about the Other. This is an extremely important factor that unfortunately is still unexplored in the literature, a fact which contributes to the orthodox understanding that socialist modernity holds the promise of being a non-racial or post-racial society. Such views make it possible for Hirsch (2002) to speak

of 'race without the practice of racial politics' as a form of existence of racial themes during the Soviet period. Alexei Miller (2008, p. 513) notes correctly that the negative attitude many Russians have towards the concept *rossiyskiy* or *rossiyskost'* (Russian or Russian-ness in the non-ethnic sense) is connected with the suspicion that it is an analogue of *sovetskost'* (Soviet-ness), which, in certain periods, was based largely on the suppression of *russkost'* (Russian-ness in the ethnic sense). Non-ethnic Russians, in turn, tend to view *rossiyskost'* as a continuation of *sovetskost'* understood as the Russifying pressure which existed in various periods of the Soviet nationalities policies.

Not only are interpretations of Soviet nationalities policies in today's political discourse no less controversial, notions of the 'racial other,' which were characteristic of other historical periods, are intertwined in the contemporary discourse on Russianness. There is also something fundamentally problematic about the clear definition of what 'Russian' means. This is a question of not only choosing 'Russianness' as a cultural, political, or 'ethnoracial' entity in the public discourse (Tolz 2001), but also of how to translate it accurately into English. Russian can mean *russkie*, which means Russians by ethnocultural nationality, and *rossiiane*, which refers to the concept of the civic Russian multi-ethnic nation. Even when institutions clearly offer material rewards in their welfare policies and there are incentives associated with being (or becoming) Russian nationals who are loyal to the Russian state the word race is rarely pronounced, even though the practices of racism are instrumental in nation construction. And while official political discourses have never claimed that belonging to the nation is defined biologically, a large part of Russians nevertheless accept this point of view. Legacies of racial thinking and practices continue to inform current conceptions of ethnicity and identities in the post-Soviet space. The idea that a human being of a particular physical appearance may belong to any ethnic group is taken to be a joke, and people in general firmly believe that it is possible to deduce a person's origin from her face (Krylova 2006; Matusevich 2008). At the same time if the myth of the nation's origin plays a significant role in the formation of racial knowledge in Japan and China (Dikötter 1992, 1997), the Philippines (Beer 2002), it is very weakly connected with other elements of racial discourse in Russia, which practically excludes it from the sphere of interest of the sociology of race.

Placing a changed status upon people, or upon their position in relation to capital, impacts their access to power and resources as well as their identity and self-esteem. Key nodes of racial knowledge then

began to merge with political and economical interests and became more coherent and widespread. Status and ethnicity in the Russian Federation are not merely institutional structures, but rather social and symbolic structures that have been created and reproduced through the invocation of collective ideas and meanings. Since the spatiotemporal dimensions of power have multiplied, such structures need to be examined from the perspective of intersectionality with a particular focus on racist practices. The operations of racial discourse are doubtlessly mediated by power relations, but the latter are performed within a context that demands a type of self-representation that is informed by the racial knowledge in society. The Russian case provides a unique opportunity to isolate the process of how a new conception of race emerges within the representation of a new order of inequality.

The sociologist Natalia Tikhonova (2008, pp. 128–9) summarizes the results of a series of surveys carried out between 1995 and 2007 with the observation that ‘Russianness’ is equally regarded as self-identification in terms of cultural criteria and as an identity ‘given by blood’. She sums up the practical functioning of this largely controversial definition, along with its rootedness and reproduction in the social practices of identification, in the following way:

Ethnic identity is not important for acknowledging someone as ‘our own’ (*svoy*) – the individual must instead accept the rules of the game [entrenched in the national culture] as his own because Russians think that these rules correspond to the Russian conditions and are of benefit to them. Metaphorically speaking, this is the same type of identification and discernment between our own and outsiders (*chuzhoy*) used by the jungle dwellers in Rudyard Kipling’s Mowgli stories. For them it was enough to say, ‘We be of one blood, though [you] and I’, which showed that they knew and accepted the Law of the Jungle – and they were accepted as ‘our own’.¹

This challenges the sociologist to look more closely at the rules of the game which are entrenched in Russian culture and what the ‘Law of the Jungle’ is in the Russian Federation today. What role do ‘blood’ and racism play in it? Does the idea of race provide a new ideology of social cohesion in post-Soviet Russia?

In the long-established and dynamic field of the sociology of race, the study of Russian society has received very little attention to date. Several factors have complicated using the concept of race in this regard insofar as sociologists have typically taken it from their engagement with

western narratives and sought to apply it without substantial changes to investigations of Russian society. First, sociology as a discipline held only a marginal position in Soviet Russia. It was focused strictly on applied tasks, and it simply could neither include the concept of race in its apparatus, nor construct it as an object of research. In addition, the Soviet regime declared itself immune to racism and stated that problem resided elsewhere, which rendered impossible any large-scale sociological reflexivity concerning the discourse informed by the idea of race. This led to a paradoxical situation in which the Soviet Union, the most anti-racist force in international politics, provided very few original sociological analyses of racism and the concept of race. While only physical anthropologists addressed issues connected with race, even they admitted that 'ideological struggle in racial science (*rasovedenie*) unfolded solely within the framework of academic polemics on narrow, specific issues, and that it was fully devoid of anti-racist focus' (Gerasimova and Vasilyev 2004, p. 10).

The second important factor is that studies of racism were limited, for obvious reasons, to criticism of the ideology of racism and of the political order in capitalist and colonial countries. Very rarely were they theoretically innovative and, as a rule, they never examined race as a universal sociological phenomenon generated by social functions and activated by certain mechanisms, such as by various types of ascriptive social stratification. Even though Soviet scholars after World War Two argued that it could be possible for race to acquire a social quality, they did not deny its biological reality (Efimov 1966). Nevertheless, Soviet scholarship in fact provided the first advanced Marxist theoretical text on racial issues which argued, for the first time, that race should be straightforwardly regarded as a social construction, and that 'problems of race' arise directly from the class structures of capitalist society. The work in question is Endre Sík's (Andrey Shiyk) unjustly forgotten *Rasovaya problema i marksizm* [The Racial Problem and Marxism], which was published in Moscow in 1930 – a full 18 years before Oliver Cox's (1948) seminal study.² However, Sík's work addressed neither Soviet, nor pre-Soviet Russia, and it utilized examples drawn solely from North American cases in support of its theoretical argumentation.

These two factors, coupled with the very specifics of the country's historical development, gave rise to a situation in which the relation between, on the one hand, a notion of race imported from the natural sciences and, on the other, original Russian sociohistorical concepts that constituted the conception of race in social and political life took

complex and sometimes unexpected configurations. It is important to note that the engagement of Russian intellectuals with race in the pre-Soviet period did not necessarily mean either that social and political issues were racialized during that period in a manner comparable to what occurred in Europe, or even that this engagement has had any direct impact on racialization processes in contemporary Russia. This issue provides one of the main reasons for studying the question of race in Russia – there is an evident interest in examining racial discourses within a specific time and space in light of the multitude of forms taken by contemporary racism. That is to say that only by looking more closely at historical conditions are sociologists able to understand how ideas about race may or may not structure cultural processes and social relations in particular circumstances. Balibar (2002, p. 415) is correct in stating that ‘complete understanding will only be achieved through the study of the singularity of historical situations, starting from the specificity of their contradictions and the constraints imposed on them by the global structures to which they belong’.

One of the tasks of this study is to map the processes of racialization that are now unfolding in Russia within the broader context of global racialization (Dikötter 2008) and the formation of racial states (Goldberg 2002). It is also crucial to place conceptions of race and processes of racialization within a comparative perspective in order to overcome both spatial and temporal provincialism. Much can be learnt by resituating what is now taking place in the Russian Federation within a European context rather than in respect of a ‘race relations’ paradigm which, to a large extent, was drawn from the United States. Russia is part of globalized Europe not just geographically, but also in terms of the processes that are in play, the most obvious example being the racialization of migration. In Russia, just as in Europe, colonial and post-colonial migrations have in large part comprised labor migrations (Malakhov 2013; Mukomel 2013; Osipov 2013). Only comparative analysis can indicate whether or not we should move in the direction of more general models and theories of racialization. This is important, if for no other reason, because identifying the agents and conditions that gave rise to antagonisms based on human bodily features possesses decisive significance for a sociological analysis of racism. Although conceptions of race in Russia cannot be separated from western influence and worldwide hierarchies, they cannot be reduced to any particular racial knowledge and practices that prevail elsewhere. However, such borrowings of foreign conceptions undoubtedly do exist in Russia, and sociologists need to evaluate their effects. For example, the fact that

racism is unlikely without the structures of modernity does not detract from the ability of modern society to discover its own innate problems and contradictions, which have often become evident in conflicts between national states that represented and promoted alternative versions of modernity. Consequently, no study of racialization processes can justifiably be limited to analyzing exclusively Western European and American contexts.

Mapping the previous research

Although it is widely accepted that racist violence is one of the main problems now plaguing Russian society (Laryš and Mareš 2011; Worger 2012), there is little existing sociological scholarship on racial issues in the Russian context. In general, sociological works concerning racism in Russia either limit themselves to monitoring racist violence and legal prosecutions (see, for example, Verkhovsky 2005, 2007), or focus on analyzing and criticizing political and scientific programs as well as quasi-scientific pamphlets containing racist themes (Voronkov et al. 2002, 2008; Shnirelman 2005, 2007a, 2007b; Malakhov 2007). Much useful work concerning racism in Russia has been conducted by the SOVA Center under the direction of Alexander Verkhovsky. The Center regularly publishes reports in English and Russian that are available online,³ and Verkhovsky himself has edited a number of volumes since 2002 that address problems of xenophobia, racism, and public manifestations of ethnic and religious intolerance. This research provides both references to empirical material and analytical overviews as well as scholarly studies authored by individuals cooperating with the Center that provide a possible point of departure for theoretical generalizations.

Two persistent traits characterize the sociology of race in respect to Russia and determine its directions and limitations. The first limitation of existing studies is their clear tendency to regard racial issues as either something extreme and abnormal, or a disease infecting certain political figures and subcultures. Ian Law (2012, p. 36) sums these views up as follows:

Now the racial character of governance in the Russia Federation is also seen as without racism. The raceless Soviet state parallels the raceless post-communist Russian state, although now racism is also positioned as within, in the extremes and in the margins, not solely without.

The character of sociological criticism implies not only self-referential answers on the part of the sociologist concerning the truth or falsehood of supposed knowledge, but also the localization of the subject in respect to factors that do not depend solely on self-reference. Racisms and racial formations are, in general, viewed as resulting primarily from deliberate strategies on the part of 'infected' actors and political groups, rather than as 'historically situated projects in which human bodies and social structures are represented and organized' (Omi and Winant 1994, pp. 55–6). But overlooked in the debates about such matters is the fact that every intended action has unintended side effects, a prominent example being the fact that although the Soviet Union was not planned as a colonial empire, many people regarded it as having become one by the end of its existence. The perception of racism only as a 'problem of the heart' (Garcia 2004) may lead to a denial of the social problems and hinder analysis of the roles played in this regard by socio-economic structures of domination, ascriptive identities, and the deprivation of autonomy. Victor Shnirelman's (2011) pioneering and highly informative study of racism in Russia tends to wish away the entire issue of objective differences rather than admitting that they result from processes and practices of exclusion. But if biological 'racial distinctiveness' cannot be made responsible for differences in group behavior and the individual strategies of the agent, then we must seek explanations elsewhere. Furthermore, if 'cultural (social) difference' is not recognized to be either a cause of difference, or the reflection of underlying structures of inequality, then it is difficult to proceed with an analysis of racialization. And when no clear definitions of race and racism are provided, these notions reify the very stereotypes they are meant to unpack.

While acknowledging the significance of current efforts to uncover manifestations of racist extremism in the political process and in Russia's academic community, it is essential to devote greater attention to the process in society by which racial discourse is formed and then normalized. This study maintains in this regard that it is the racialization of public discourse and of mainstream political discourse – whether it be left, right, or liberal – which encourages the formation of racial identity, leading to racist hostility. Although the operation of the powers of racial discourse has been discussed at length, there is still relatively little understanding of the conditions that make it easier for such discourse to take root. This book will look for answers to these questions in Russian historical experience, which includes both the common European imperial and capitalist backgrounds as well as unique attempts to realize a socialist project of modernity.

The second limitation of the existing studies of racism and racialization processes in Russia is that they have a strongly state-centered perspective, informed by methodological nationalism in combination with an unequivocal subordination of racial discourse to nationalist, anti-Semitic and anti-liberal discourse. This is evident in the works of, for example, Shenfield (2001), Likhachyov (1999, 2002) and Rossman (2013). Nationalism in Russia forms part of the present official doctrine of conservatism, and it highlights the instrumental and populist character that the latter possesses in the hands of interested groups (Malakhov 2008). Scholarship on this topic has identified anti-western sentiments, anti-Semitism, and anti-migrant stances as the few more or less constant and essential elements of nationalist discourse in Russia. At the same time, however, much of the rhetoric of race is correctly seen to be the result of globalization and westernization (Parland 2005; Pilkington et al. 2010). While the spheres of politics, culture, and the economy constituted territorially bounded and almost autarchic social structures during the Soviet period, the entry of contemporary Russia into the processes of globalization has forced us to revise the view that Russian society is a territorially bounded entity. Ali Rattansi (2005, p. 293) remarks that

One might ask about the degree to which it is possible to talk about national patterns of variation and to what degree differentiations have to be made in more varied and complex ways, especially in a rapidly globalizing and post-national age where the forms of racism may have myriad interconnections with events and agencies that only in the recent past would have been regarded as geographically too distant to be immediately relevant.

By indicating how the processes of globalization and racialization are interrelated, this book demonstrates the roles they play in the new nationhood project in Russia. At the same time, acknowledging the great importance of racialization in the social practices of Russian nationalism must not in any way lead to the identification of the two. The attempt to go beyond the state-centered analysis which is currently prevalent in the field does not mean, however, that racialization processes, including the production of knowledge and the constitution of racialized identity, are not mediated by state interventions.

The affect of globalization processes upon local systems of cultural codes and social institutions should be examined within the context of agency. Neither Soviet nor post-Soviet societies have been merely

political regimes that can be more or less arbitrarily changed from above. An analysis of racism in the contemporary Russian context reveals that the notion of 'race' possesses a concrete content that is specific to that context. The agents of racialization have utilized this specific content in their attempt to decouple Russianness from ethnicity and nation in order to overcome the disenchantment that has been brought about by the social changes of the last twenty years. Moreover, these processes of racialization presume, among other things, motives as well as modes of translation that are familiar to people from childhood, whereby racial narratives and classifications are introduced into the everyday practices of Russians. Although we recognize the significant role that the state, its institutions, and political elites play in influencing the processes of social change in Russia, we must nevertheless not underestimate the society-centered perspective. There are numerous accounts on racism in Russia but there is very little understanding why people are racist. Public sentiments and reactions to them on the part of both intellectuals and ruling elites are at the center of this book. They are particularly relevant in connection with the *de jure* absence of racial politics in Russia even though institutions exist that are designed to implement so-called 'nationality policies'. Serguei Oushakine (2009, pp. 83–4) correctly suggests that 'the post-Soviet edition of biopolitics was used first of all by various communities of loss as a 'maintenance mechanism' with which they could uphold the borders of their public space'. However, while Oushakine has emphasized the role of ethnotrauma in the affective production of the suffering subject, this book endeavors to chart the more current transition whereby Russianness is understood as a privileged whiteness.

Neither the search for racial 'Russianness' on the part of scholars nor official proclamations of state-bearing nationality should be conflated with the advent of a sense of grassroots identity that only takes shape after the establishment of the necessary social institutions. There is a connection between, on the one hand, the very possibility of the development of the social order and individual reflexivity centered upon racial representations with, on the other, the development of all-embracing institutions of education and the emergence of a common media space. Social scientists now have a *unique* opportunity to study the emergence of the ideas and practices of racism in a society where they are being imbued with these new meanings literally before our eyes. It is only in the last twenty years that the processes of racialization have gained the form and intensity necessary to comprise some of the most pressing social problems in Russian society today.

The most obvious reason for the role played – or not played – during previous periods by racial discourse is the absence within the Russian historical context of what the social sciences have formally classified as the category of race – census records and other institutionalized uses of race – which would have developed the subjective dimensions of racial consciousness. This absence complicates the presentation of race as indicative of a distinct social group who possess a particular identity and interests – a condition necessary for the emergence of social conflict. Collective action, which is a key concept in the social sciences for understanding social and political dynamics, implies that there is a coincidence between individual interests and group identity (Baldassarri 2009, p. 394). This was a major element in analyses of race in the social sciences, which were dominated for decades by the paradigm of *race relations* (Park 1950; Rex 1980; Banton 1983, 1998). In the North American case, the one which has been the most studied, it was possible for groups bounded by racial identity to be analyzed as, for example, important participants in the political process.

The difference between this situation and the Russian case inevitably shifted researchers' focus to the functioning of state classification systems (Sokolovsky 2001, pp. 41–83), in which the categories of *natsional'nost'* (nationality), class, faith, gender, and estate were regarded as both reflecting and formulating cultural difference and representations of the other. Class, which was the most significant view during the 1920s and 1930s, was later replaced by *natsional'nost'* (nationality) in the determination of who should receive preference (Baiburin 2012). My study follows the tradition which analytically distinguishes race from ethnicity and nationality (Bonilla-Silva 1999, pp. 902–3; Jenkins 2008, pp. 77–86), but which nevertheless recognizes that there is a very intimate connection between them. For instance, the Soviet Union is perhaps the clearest example of the primordial understanding of ethnicity on the level of folk concepts and everyday interactions. The degree of naturalization of ethnicity, which led to the launching of the scholarly term *ethnos*, forced scholars to identify the concepts of ethnicity and race within the Soviet context in respect to their *functions* in social processes, even though they acknowledged that the two were clearly separated in scholarly discourse. Victor Shnirelman (2011 (1), p. 207), in comments concerning the western discussion of the relationship between ethnicity and experiences of race, argues that it was the ethnic experience itself that was for decades linked in Russia to forms of discrimination reminiscent of racial discrimination. In this regard, Ian Law (2012,

pp. 147–8) states in his examination of the Soviet racialization of Roma that

[The] Soviet logic of anti-Roma racism was driven by the logic of national domination, subservience to the state, assimilation and the destruction and outlawing of Roma culture and language... [C]omplex, multi-faceted linkages constructed key ideological linkages between the central elements: a genetic inferiority, a foreign asocial group in need of nationalizing, a pre-modern backward culture in need of nationalizing, a pre-modern backward culture in need of Soviet modernization, a parasitic group that fed on 'real' workers, a population out of control and in need of sterilization, a criminal group in need of the prison or the labor camp, inveterate drunks who needed sobering up and overall a 'brown', 'dark' presence that needed managing, regulating and controlling.

It is apparent that the cognitive frameworks and material and institutional legacies inherited from the previous Soviet regime, which had universalist pretenses, can not only shape habits and values, but also serve as either constraints or models to be imitated in the search for a new society (Elster et. al. 1998, pp. 60–2). The past and an appeal to the past are integral parts of the construction of new social arrangements, not least of all as a strategy for actors to mask their interest-based motives and legitimize their choices. The image of the past is social by definition in the sense that it transforms historical reality into a cultural construction. The special attention given to history is also dictated by the fact that many contemporary statements about race are de facto repetitions of centuries-old arguments which fill them with new content using new connotations and then seek to link them with discourses that were in fact absent from a previous period. This may lead to misinterpretations and blurred reconstructions connected with the difficulties that arise from attempting to translate the term 'race' into the language of a given social reality that in fact may or may not have existed. For example, interrelations between the discourses of race and maturity of civilizations in fin de siècle Russia are clearly different from interrelations between the discourses of 'human material' (*chelovecheskiy material*) and the 'Third World', which are some of the key elements of racial discourse in modern Russia.

The need to study the type of 'race' which has supplied the material of Russian society gives rise to a number of important questions. For example, who were the agents of the process of racialization? If the

policies of purges and discrimination were not implemented for the discursively formulated benefit of the Russian 'race', then who were the beneficiaries? Why were the ideas and practices of race employed in reinforcing these policies – and were they indeed employed? Is it possible that history is racialized by contemporary scholars for the sake of normative evaluations of certain political figures as well as historical situations and periods insofar as emancipatory aspirations have been among the forces driving the interest in race research in Russia? The answers we find for such questions provide insight into the uncertain position of racial discourse in the contemporary discourses and practices of identity construction and in policies for organizing difference in the Russian Federation today.

Outline of the book

This study undertakes an investigation of racialization processes at two interrelated analytical levels. First, it relates historical and structural change to individual beliefs and motives in an effort to give consideration to both micro and macro dimensions of racialization processes. Memory and representations of history function as an important but ambivalent cultural horizon and signifier of identity in contemporary Russia. This is something from which one would wish to distance him-/herself, and yet, at the same time, elements of it are appropriated, recycled, and articulated with new sets of discourses and practices. In addition, it demonstrates how sociopsychological mechanisms are involved in the emergence of racial self-understanding and in the involvement of emotions in the internalization of the consequences of restructuring in all spheres of life after the end of Soviet socialism.

Second, this book charts how racial discourses are reconfigured and negotiated within the domains of the market and the legal system, politics and academia, which results in a changing logic of social differentiation. The main ambition is not to provide a catalogue of racist attacks in Russian society, but rather to make available evidence for the efforts now unfolding to initiate practices of racial signification and self-understanding in combination with the mobilization of resources and the articulation of economical and political claims.

The *macro*-level of this research focuses on the sociohistorical analysis of how racial categories are created. At the *micro*-level, it examines the process of racialization as a performative act of boundary creation. Who is marked and who is unmarked, who occupies specific racial categories and makes use of the central nodes of the racial knowledge that will

be outlined in my theoretical model. The creativity of racialization is revealed when performative signs that indicate connection or causality establish new relations or terms of interaction. This study also illustrates the way in which the interpretation of disparities in the development of different societies has reinforced the idea that race is crucial for interpreting supposedly biological predispositions for successful development. This will reveal the mutual links between the subjectivity of personal interpretations on the micro-level and the materiality and historicity of macro-processes. The *meso*-level of this research captures certain effects generated by the institutional and social contexts. In this regard, it illustrates how racisms are used to alienate those who do not appear to fit into the rules of different institutional arrangements.

Let us now consider the contents of the chapters in more detail.

Chapter 1 states the scope, central research questions, and primary goals of the study; indicates the main limitations of existing studies; and positioning the research in respect to the literature on the sociology of race and research on racial issues in the Russian Federation today. It argues that a better understanding of racialization in Russia goes well beyond the interests of the area studies specialist. Why should reading western genealogies of race into the Russian context make this case particularly interesting? Could doing so possibly open up new theoretical venues? The chapter argues that studying the Russian case can play an important role in the theoretical advancement of the sociology of race because it opens up the possibility of analyzing a society which was familiar with the concept of race and had explicitly used it for anti-racist propaganda and scholarly research – not in classification practices concerning population policies or censuses. As a result, the experience of state socialism and its legacy in the Russian Federation today, as well as the absence of racialized slavery, provide us with unique material for reconsidering a number of our assumptions concerning racialization.

Chapter 2 comprises an analysis of the insights as well as limitations of existing studies of how race has resonated in Russian history. This is a necessary contribution to the attempt to acquire a better understanding of recent developments in Russian society. This main research concern is to define the changing basis for identifying various themes, structures, and exclusions as 'racial'. Race categories are analyzed in scientific and elite discourse, although these are seen as relatively marginal in Tsarist and Soviet Russia due to the absence of state racial categorization, but at another level unnamed racist practices are discussed as spreading in politics and culture. The chapter identifies the forms that discourses and practices of race took in the Soviet Union and the continuities and

disruptions in the transformation to the Russian Federation. The Soviet project is identified in this chapter as one seeking to be civilized, or 'white', without becoming European, or racist. The development of the Soviet model – with its dialectical transformation of the constructivist approach into the definition of race, and of anti-racism and affirmative action into its inverse – should thus doubtlessly sensitize both scholars and activists. The chapter enables a reframing of theories of global racialization as racism is seen not solely as a product of western modernity, but rather as a product of multiple modernities – an approach which counters mainstream theory and literature in this field. There is a critique here of the current status of theory regarding the relation between post-Soviet racisms and earlier racisms and mistaken scholarship that posits a simple inheriting of contemporary racism from the Soviet and pre-Soviet past which is challenged.

Chapter 3 presents a new theoretical framework for the study of racialization and provides the definitions of certain concepts which are regarded as instrumental in the sociology of race. It distinguishes between the concepts of racism, race, and racialization while at the same time establishing how they are related to each other. It argues that racialization can be regarded both as comprising 'objective' processes in society and as a concept that assists in framing classical social issues, such as inequality, through the lens of race. A new threefold theoretical elaboration of racialization is employed here which includes: firstly *making*, an intentional scholarly activity linking racial meanings to groups and relations; secondly *doing*, the construction of racial boundaries in the everyday; and finally *becoming*, the formation of racial identities through internalizing the racial knowledge. Furthermore, the chapter engages with the theoretical discussion concerning the nature of the project of modernity, particularly the place held within it by racial discourse.

Chapter 4 describes how the racial discourse is formulated in the Russian Federation today by, among others, sociologists, biologists, historians, and ethnologists. It illustrates how the sociological analysis of racialization constitutes the intentional *making* of race by the major agents within academia. The chapter charts how tropes of self, hybridity, and maturity constitute important symbolic vehicles for applying the idea of race to the drawing of differences. It demonstrates how a struggle over the pre-Soviet and Soviet academic heritages is unfolding in contemporary Russia between proponents of racist views and physical anthropologists. The latter seek to overturn the conclusions of racist pamphlets while simultaneously defending their own scientific findings

and their own research discipline – physical anthropology, which includes racial studies or raciology (*rasovedenie*).

Chapter 5 claims that immigration is a key issue in forming the ideological framework for complex Russian racist movements, with the key events analyzed being the Manezhnaya (2010) and Biryulevo (2013) race riots in Moscow. It demonstrates how the subcultures of skinheads and football fans, which, in certain conditions, constructs their identity around ‘whiteness’ and a struggle against visible migrants, may be theorized as a social movement and as the agent of racialization. These subcultures lose their former status of a mere lifestyle as they ‘do race’ through events and interacts with the targets of its movement, which serves to strengthen the importance of racial discourse in the beliefs and practices of its members. This movement in turn also becomes racialized by its opponents within the framework of a strategy that seeks to minimize the political threat it represents. The chapter argues that, nevertheless, the racist movements can be very successful in normalizing views previously regarded as abnormal as it negotiates its agenda and identity, and it can drive institutions and power elites into making racist practices more distinct and structured. The chapter moves beyond traditional approaches that emphasize the lack of mobilization in Russia and concentrates more on the actual or relative successes of organizations or groups in either mobilizing people or influencing policies and society. In addition, it demonstrate how sociopsychological mechanisms are involved in the emergence of racial self-understanding and in the involvement of emotions in the internalization of the consequences of restructuring in all spheres of life after the end of Soviet socialism.

In Chapter 6 racism is identified as being at the heart of new Russian capitalism with racial discourse being formed and normalized with widespread negative attitudes to visible migrants, who are constructed as a security problem which threatens the ‘survival of the white race’. The chapter draws particular attention to the racialization of labor migrants in Moscow and will isolate those practices which lead to the formation of racialized groups and racialized social relations in post-Soviet Russia. This analysis sets off from the explicit claim that the discursive level is reinforced by persistent inequalities in the access which different groups, classified by the state as nationalities, have to various resources. The chapter shows how the economic situation itself has also been racialized in terms of a ‘white [legal] salary’ that enables one to afford the lifestyle of a ‘white man’ instead of having to ‘work like a Negro’ to get by. Those who have not been ‘integrated into the market’ are represented as being ‘off-white’, but they can set off on

the path of 'doing' race and 'becoming' white by racializing labor migrants as 'black'.

The chapter shows that ethnic minorities also employ racial knowledge to construct myths of lineage and unity in condition of growing racial discrimination and victimization. Ethnic elites in the Russian Federation often utilize the idea of race in the search for roots, to justify their ethnic primordiality, to emphasize the 'genetic' character of cultural traditions, to legitimize their ethnic identity, and to safeguard and reproduce their ethnic community.

Chapter 7 looks closer at the new Russian project of nation-building. It locates the post-Soviet systems of institutionalized multinationality, which include both territories and collectivities, within the context formed by the discourses of peoplehood and rootedness. Racial discourse construct Russians as having a different cultural code and *human material* which needs nourishing and protecting through employing colonial modes of government and strengthening symbolic barriers. Against this background, the main thesis of this chapter identifies the discourse of race as the point of reconciliation between the understanding that Russians participate in the achievements of the West and the necessity of clinging to authenticity. The assertion of racial privilege can nuance the post-colonial gaze insofar as the Russian leadership seeks to elaborate an 'authentic' strategy to challenge western domination. This does not constitute simply an inversion of the symbolical instruments of domination. It is instead an attempt to reconstruct the Russian nation as 'true Europe', as a 'true' civilizational center that will boldly dare to carry the 'white man's burden'.

The concluding chapter draws the various lines of argumentation together and presents the major findings of the study.

2

Race and Racism in the Russian Past

Can we claim that the process of racialization played a central role in the process of nation-building in either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union? Did the construction of markers for differences result in the manufacturing of race? And if the answer is yes to any such questions, then precisely how and why were visible differences given a social meaning referring to the idea of race? The absence of racialized slavery in Russian history, which has long served as the key institution assisting the development of racist theories and practices elsewhere, has forced researchers to look for traces of racism in repressive Soviet population policies and in the intellectual history of Imperial Russia. What if Soviet characterizations of their 'oppressed brothers' in the 'Third World' are linked to racialized premises, just as they were in the countries of the 'First World'? Was an imperial domination hidden behind the Soviet internationalist and emancipatory rhetoric? Was the civilizing mission of 'state-sponsored evolutionism' informed by racial themes, with socio-historical backwardness regarded as a symptom of biological inferiority?

This chapter provides an overview of the current debates and some important material that help to come closer to finding answers to these questions. Furthermore, any answers found to such questions within the framework of the contemporary discussion concerning the formation of racial discourse in the Russian Federation are then closely connected with questions concerning causes for the failure of the socialist anti-racist project and also with questions concerning racism and anti-racism in Russia today. The contemporary debates are informed by references both to historical experiences in identifying 'the norm' and 'otherness' beyond racial hierarchies, and to attempts to evaluate the 'Second World' through an emphasis on its special contribution to the re-engineering of society and individual. It is also important to

understand the underlying premises that have enabled scholars to portray contemporary Russia as a continuation of the Soviet Union, which in its turn is presented as an extravagant continuation of the colonial project of Imperial Russia, in light of the peculiarity of sociological views concerning the problems of race and the rise of the neo-conservative advocacy of empire as a model of uneven globalization.

Also this chapter seeks to examine why the effects that ideas of race had on social structures and interactions were relatively limited. This will assist the reader to gain a better understanding of why the full-fledged transformation of the discourse of collective identity by means of the coded language of race coincided with *perestroika* and the disintegration of the Soviet socialist system. These lines of argumentation serve to support and develop the thesis of Karim Murji and John Solomos (2005, p. 6) that 'there is not a linear process where racialization is followed by deracialization or reracialization; rather, these moments or phases can often occur simultaneously and even in the "wrong order"'.

Racism in Russian history, or racialization of the past?

The majority of today's studies on how racial issues have resonated in Russian history fall into two groups. The first of these involves the study of theories, concepts, and practices which have explicitly used the term race (Mogilner 2008; Hall 2012; Tolz 2012). This approach reflects a certain aspect of *Begriffsgeschichte* regarding how concepts constituted scientific discourse, which gained a life of its own in Russian and came to be used in public instruction and education. The establishment of scientific fields in Russia was based largely on transfers, borrowings, and imports from Western Europe that led to the creation of institutions and the education of scholars. Against this background, the creation of scientific language within the various disciplines is of particular interest, although it remains largely unexplored.

Such studies have linked the concept of race to a broader web of intellectual discourse – philosophical, sociological, literary, or historical – and revealed many instances in which race served to naturalize Russian approaches to the problem of human diversity in Imperial Russia. Vera Tolz (2012, p. 146) rejects the *Sonderweg* argument in respect to the Russians' pre-revolutionary engagement with race. While she proposes that there was no distinct and cohesive European discourse about race, this position in fact weakens her main argument, namely, that the chronology of changes in how this category has been perceived in the

Western European intellectual tradition can be mapped directly onto the situation in Russia. It is significant that Karl Hall (2012, pp. 239–40) acknowledges that there was a disconnection between ideas and policies in late Imperial Russia, and he straightforwardly states that he is unable to offer any example of the concept of being rendered operative in Russian ministerial practice. Lydia Black (1977) also highlights the problem of the interrelatedness of scientific and sociocultural paradigms in respect to race in Russia. This does bring to the fore the issue of *Sonderweg* concerning the Soviet concept of race and serves to illustrate that the concept of race was not a preferred taxonomic category, and that ‘race’ and ‘type’ as taxonomic categories were viewed as heuristic devices that physical anthropologists themselves acknowledged were imposed from the outside (Black 1977, p. 20). In addition, using the concept of race outside of scholarly discourse was largely reserved for what we may refer to as point-scoring in ideological warfare with western imperialism. This leads Lieberman et al. (2004, p. 916) to propose that the Russian concept of race was in fact shaped in the struggle against racism.

However, it is clear that Soviet anti-colonialism was centralized and subordinated to the aims of the socialist project and geopolitical influence. This constituted an obstacle to any grassroots anti-colonial mobilization and deprived the subaltern of their voices. The civilizing mission conducted by the Soviet state has led certain sociologists to regard socialist modernization as internal colonization (Gouldner 1977), whereby both colonialism and anti-colonialism can both be regarded as important logics within the Soviet project. Liah Greenfeld (1990, p. 588) claims, for example, that ‘Ressentiment, not social concerns, fueled Russian national consciousness’. She adds (1990, p. 590) that

Russian nationalism was racial and collectivistic authoritarian. Constructed in this manner, Russian national identity provided the ground for individual self-esteem; on the face of it, the comparison with the West was moved to a new plane where Russia, by definition, was in no way inferior.

Marxist doctrine itself had very ambivalent and often competing interpretations of nature, varying from environmental determinism and expansionism in the spirit of geopolitical utopias, to the representation of nature as ‘nothing’ or as the mere object of ongoing ‘conquest’ by Soviet man (Bassin 1996). It goes without saying that all above mentioned differences complicate sociological generalizations.

The second approach has been motivated, in the words of Eric Weitz (2002a, p. 65), by the 'need to deconstruct the Soviet's own definition of such charged terms as *nation*, *nationality*, and *race*'. This implies that such scholars evidently consider that it is not sufficient to base their analyses solely upon the self-definitions of the social actors involved. For example, the term 'democratic election' in Stalin's rhetoric cannot be analyzed in the same way as elections in contemporary Europe. Furthermore, the change whereby race has come to be viewed as a social construction, along with the understanding that race as a form of categorizing the human species exists only in conjunction and conflict with other forms of categorization, makes it possible to excavate the hidden racism in the Russian past. After the dissolution of the communist narrative, which located racial issues elsewhere, it became possible for scholars to reveal the workings of racial thinking and the mechanics of racialized exclusions. The exploration of topics connected with the historical construction and social conditioning of the differences that underlie systems of classification, as well as their changing character, has thus acquired a greater degree of legitimacy in Russian studies. In all such cases, researchers use the term 'race' and its derivatives, such as racism and racialization, as analytic tools in order to reveal and identify social processes of exclusion, the assignment of identity, the construction of hierarchies, and the conduct of purges. Such research has revealed a very telling discrepancy between official rhetoric and actual practices on both the institutional level and the everyday micro-level of interactions between people. Moreover, scholars often note significant differences between, on the one hand, interpretations of the concepts of race, nation, and nationality, and, on the other, mainstream orientations in population politics during different periods of Russian history. Weitz (2002, p. 5) states in this respect that

At the more open and tolerant end of the spectrum, the Soviets allowed people to choose their nationality upon reaching age sixteen. In its most exclusive and racialized articulation of the meaning of nationality, the Soviet Union rounded up and deported every single member of targeted populations, bar none, stamping every purported member of the group with racial stigmas.

Victor Shnirelman (2011(1), pp. 251–91) discusses at length the substantial differences in views between Soviet philosophers, historians, experts on the 'nationalities question', and physical anthropologists in this regard. Ambivalence in the study of racial discourse and racism

also arose from the analytical intersection of a notion of race that was borrowed from American social science and the notion of nationality (*natsional'nost'*) that was in widespread use within the context of Soviet policies. This type of construction of the object of criticism and study may be explained by the primordial understanding of nationality in Russia together with the fact that the founders of the Soviet state did not distinguish between these notions. For example, Lenin described anti-Semitism as a 'vile inflation of a racial feature of the nationalities question' (Lenin (6), p. 426) and spoke of it as 'national racial hatred' (Lenin (8), p. 178). Furthermore, both Lenin (1956) and Stalin (1938) argued that the Bolsheviks' own modernizing policies should result in the temporary reinforcement of national identity and particularism. Terry Martin (2000, pp. 166–7) rightly summarizes the logic behind these political views as follows:

Nationalism is a masking ideology that leads legitimate class interests to be expressed, not in appropriate class-based socialist movement, but rather in the form of an above-class national movement. National identity is not a primordial quality but rather an unavoidable by-product of the modern capitalist and early socialist world, that must be passed through before a mature international socialist world can come into being... Some national claims – those confined to the realm of national forms – are in fact legitimate and must be granted in order to split the above-class national alliance. This policy will speed the emergence of class cleavages, and so allow the Party to recruit non-Russian proletarian and peasant support for its socialist agenda. Nationalism will be disarmed by granting the form of nationhood.

As we now know, the primordality expressed in the Soviet case in respect to *natsionalnost'* did not fade away during the development of socialist society. Soviet citizens obviously defined themselves as Soviet people and internationalists and identified themselves with the socialist Soviet State. However, the ambiguous character of the socialist project of modernity and nation-building led to the naturalization of social classifications. A prominent example is the policy of *korenizatsiya* in the 1920s and 1930s – supporting national forms in culture, language, political representation, and so forth – which relied upon assigning ethnicity and served to indoctrinate Soviet people with the understanding that nations were primordial (Slezkine 1994; Martin 2001). The political argument was reinforced by the fact that the forcible introduction of a

universal system of education in the USSR occurred in the 1920s, precisely when racial science in the West had reached its culmination. This allowed Bonnet (2002, p. 458) to draw the conclusion that 'the creation of 'Soviet man' was itself an ethnicized and ethnicizing project' that helped to spread 'the message of modernity into the 'backward' reaches of the Soviet empire'.

Weitz (2002, p. 3) argues that attempts to present race not only as a significant element in scholarly discourse, but also as a practice that included racial politics, crept steadily into Soviet nationalities policies, particularly in the period between 1937 and 1953. Such views have found a wide response among scholars of Stalin's nationalities politics. This response generated an interesting discussion on the pages of *Slavic Review* that emphasized the importance of the notion of racialization for any analysis of race-related topics. This forced Russian studies scholars to go beyond the narrow legal definitions that might, in fact, have given way to the much broader informal usage of such classificatory terms as *inorodtsy* (aliens) (Bobrovnikov 2012), which by the early twentieth century, as Slocum maintains (1998, p. 174), 'carried the connotation of the non-assimilable peoples of all borderlands'. During the Soviet era, the terms *otstalye narody* (backward peoples) (Martin 2001), *malye narody Severa* (small peoples of the North) (Slezkine 1994), indigenous peoples (Sokolovsky 2001), and *bezrodnye kosmopolity* (Jews stigmatized as 'rootless cosmopolitans') (Kostyrchenko 2009, 2012) all bore the taint, if not the stigma, of 'aliens'. The 'fifth line' – *natsional'nost'* – on the forms that a Soviet citizen had to fill in for any official procedure made it a social fact for everyone that ethnonational belonging was inherited and, consequently, close in character to folk conceptions of the racial.

Sheila Fitzpatrick (2005, p. 9) has noted that the closest equivalent in Soviet discourse of the term 'identity' was 'face' (*litso*). In this sense the term 'face' was almost always used with two qualifiers – namely, *klassovoe* (class) and *politicheskoe* (political). Surveys and discourse analyses conducted in the 2000s demonstrate that the notion of *litso kavkazskoy (slavyanskoy, aziatskoy) natsional'nosti* (a face of Caucasian/Slavic/Asian nationality) became a lexeme in the media, in everyday language, and even in the formal context (Malkova 2007, p. 17). These terms, along with the expression 'suspicious faces' (*podozritel'nye litsa*), a formula used to indicate a terrorist threat, constituted new qualifiers of identity. This provides an example of how racialization furthers the process of reducing social identity to personal identity.

Insofar as scholarship concerning race is neither a mere servant of political power, nor a universal ahistorical enterprise, it needs to be

examined in respect to the context of contemporary society, which both structures and is structured by the system of racial knowledge. The intersection of scholarly and everyday discourses, together with their mutual feedback, leads to a discursive distortion whereby public media translate meaning, which makes it possible for actors to use a variety of structures of reasoning. In addition, Alexander Kozintsev (2009) and Nathaniel Knight (2012) maintains that such a troubled interrelatedness between sociocultural and scientific paradigms, particularly physical anthropology and especially raciology, has inevitably led to a number of significant shortcomings in existing research concerning race-related issues in Russia. At times this has involved grotesque distortions in the evaluations and contributions on the part of scholars.

Marxists and scholars involved in post-colonial studies emphasize that all classification practices imply asymmetrical power relations, and they always present subjects of power relations in terms of such classification categories. This results in concepts pointing at objects that are encompassed by a category, and these objects receive their names as terms, such as class, race, and so forth. It is thereby implied that any social categorization in respect to social relations is evil, and that any 'groupism' is nothing other than a social construction which needs to be deconstructed, even though the 'unmasking' of processes always results in new constellation of groups, categories, and relations. When scholars are involved in developing rather complex models of 'categorical inequality' (Tilly 1999, 2004), they rarely question *why* the reproduction of the social order or the triggering of social change in any particular situation is accompanied by *certain* categories – and not others – in public discourse. However, today's re-racialized scholarly discourse concerning differences in Imperial and Soviet Russia runs the danger of conflating the Russian experience and context with experiences elsewhere.

The influence of Foucault's ideas is obvious in the works of those authors who analyze power relations in a given society as relations between two 'races' within that society. This is relevant to Etkind's (2011) idea of Russia's 'internal colonization', to Slezkine's (2004) distinction between Mercurians and Apollonians, and to Solovey and Solovey's (2009) struggle of imperialists with nationalists. Foucault (2003) maintains that the transfer of colonial models to the West led to the possibility of self-colonization by the West, which he termed 'internal colonization'. Russian studies specialists typically employ Foucault's internal colony model instead of the concept of internal colonialism, which was proposed as an alternative to race-relation approaches that

overlook the structures of dominance and seek the roots of racism in the faulty attitudes of individuals (Blauner 1969). Frank Parkin (1978, p. 624) correctly remarks that 'it has thus been the American rather than the European experience which has inspired a fundamental restatement of the relationship between class and ethnicity by use of the colonial analogy, even though on the face of it the analogy seems more applicable to the European context'. However, although internal colonization did not presuppose the self-racialization of the ruling elite (Healey 2012, p. 695), it nevertheless gave rise to cultural distance and alienation between the two. This led Gouldner (1977, p. 41) to equate the experiences of and policies towards Soviet peasants with those associated with Native Americans.

Alaister Bonnet (2002, p. 440) states that although applying the concept of racialized modernity to the socialist project that was implemented in the Soviet Union would reveal certain truths, the latter 'would be marginal in comparison with the greater error of attempting to squeeze Soviet society into an inappropriate model'. He argues that a new type of colonialism and 'ethnicized modernity' unfolded after the revolution, and that this ethnopolitical form of modernity was premised on the simultaneous ethnicization and politicization of identity. From this it would follow that the 'transition from ethnopolitics to racialization is causally related to the transition from communism to capitalism' (Bonnet 2002, p. 457). While Bonnet's article is pioneering in many respects, it does not aim to reveal the mechanism and character of this 'transition', even though it does imply that the transition itself may lead to a new understanding of race. Insofar as the present study is sympathetic to the introduction of the concept of modernity as an explanatory category that facilitates tracing the logic of the mutual formation of race discourse in the West and Russia, it proposes a refinement of Bonnet's theoretical argument by providing an account of the *forms* in which the discourse of race did take root to a certain extent in the seemingly 'raceless' Soviet Union. What is missing in existing research is any closer examination of how the practices and narratives of race in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union became transformed into the full-scale racialization process that is unfolding in the Russian Federation today. When such an examination is provided, it will be possible to reveal the continuity and disruptions between those earlier practices and narratives and the processes of racialization now taking place in Russia. This will comprise nothing less than identifying the logic inherent in using and abusing Soviet schemata under new historical conditions. Furthermore, since racism is understood as

making racial distinctions and evaluations, they are regarded as comprising both cognitive and normative activities. Many researchers concerned with the historical manifestations of racism have undoubtedly been motivated by the current political situation and social tensions. Nevertheless, when scholars analyze images taken from the past outside of their original context, attempting to use them as either concrete causes or particular products of supposedly underlying chains of events, they risk reifying the process of memory, objectivizing its content, and solidifying its significance in a substantialist manner. The danger of chronocentrism, or extrapolating our current perceptions into the past, pervades a large part of the works published by historians of racism, and it goes hand in hand with mistakenly representing today's racial discourses and popular understandings of race as having been inherited from the Soviet or pre-Soviet past.

Maxim Matusevich (2009, p. 19), for example, argues that the ideas of race and racial difference entertained by many modern-day Russians were, to a large extent, formed through their encounters with both official and popular representations of Africans residing in the Soviet Union. Most of these individuals were young men who, beginning in 1957, came to the USSR in order to pursue higher educations. By means of the convincing thesis that these students' interactions with both the Soviet system and Soviet citizens made an impact upon common perceptions of racial difference that still resonates across the former Soviet spaces, Matusevich appears to make a rather seamless transition from Soviet to post-Soviet society. But it would be a grave mistake to view racialization processes as somehow 'inherited' from the past simply because the foundation of the new Russian society may include elements which are not specific to a particular spatiotemporal dimension. Historical and theoretical analysis reveals that certain elements of both past and contemporary Russian society are present in other societies as well, and that other elements are the results of historical process that have taken place within Russian society and utilize its symbolical material.

Race and racism in Imperial Russia

The racial discourses were already articulated in Russia during the nineteenth century, but the picture of race was clearly a good deal less tainted by moral culpability in the Russian Empire than it was elsewhere in Europe. For example, Petr Chaadayev (1989, p. 185), a very important figure for the understanding of Russian intellectual history and development in general, wrote in 1840 that

The question of human races has become topical for us since we began to create a new nation [*narodnost'*]... And like all ideas, however much they might seem a distraction, today they [ideas of race] have absorbed a certain material relevance, respond to certain needs, and entered to a degree the arena of politics... No one doubts that races exist; no one would dispute that the various races have entered the necessity of their origins into the body of knowledge accumulated on Earth... But as soon as this is made clear, another issue arises. It is now a question of discovering whether it is necessary that races be preserved forever. Should we strive for a common fusion of all nations, or, on the contrary, should Mongols remain Mongols, Malaysians – Malaysians, Negroes – Negroes, Slavs – Slavs?... The truth is that all this ivory tower philosophy, which occupies itself with drawing distinctions between peoples on the basis of phrenology and philology, feeds national enmity, and creates discord between countries, is striving for something completely different than to make of the human race one nation of brothers.

Russian public intellectuals traditionally placed more emphasis than their European colleagues upon the impact of the social milieu in the Nurture/Nature debates that typical of the second half of the nineteenth century. The school of subjective sociology, which was one of the major contributions to the social sciences in pre-revolutionary Russia, opposed impersonal Spencerian evolutionism and Social Darwinism, instead emphasizing the role of normative ideals and human agency. In the political sphere, socialists opposed biological determinism because they regarded economic forces as defining the 'struggle for existence' and ultimately characterizing the level of development in any given society. Marina Mogilner (2008, pp. 272–3) notes that 'even the most educated Russian nationalists who were oriented towards western standards of nationalism... were extremely careful with the race-nation idea'.

Researchers in the history of ideas typically emphasize the dominance of anti-rationalism in Russian intellectual thought and repeat representations of a contrast between supposedly 'spiritual' Russia and the 'materialistic' West (Walicki 1979; Groys 1992; Slezkine 1997; Riasanovsky 2005). According to this position, the development of racial imagination was impeded by both religious fundamentalism and an apocalyptic vision of modernity characterized by resentment towards the industrial West, which at times resulted in a generalized anthropological pessimism. In addition, interpretations of social development taken from the paradigm of natural sciences, whether

Evolutionism or Social Darwinism, were viewed with aversion by a wide circle of the most influential Russian thinkers (Vucinich 1988; Bohun 2002). This was, above all, not aversion to the idea of race, but rather aversion towards 'Anglo-Saxon morality', that is, English Empiricism rather than Kantian views of morality. Nikolay Berdyaev (1938, p. 8), perhaps the internationally best-known Russian philosopher, wrote that

Not only racial anti-semitism, but racialism pure and simple does not bear criticism from three points of view: religious, moral and scientific... Racialism is really founded upon mythology rather than upon science... The category of race depends not at all upon anthropology and history, but upon zoology and prehistory.

Nikolay Berdyaev (1938, p. 17) took the issue of race in his discussion of anti-Semitism and morality in clearly social direction:

There have always been, and there always will be, two races in the world, and the boundary between them is more important than any other; crucifiers and crucified, oppressors and oppressed, persecutors and persecuted.

Semen Kozlov (1982, p. 54), a Soviet and post-Soviet critic of racism, acknowledged that racial discourse was not widespread in the Russian Empire, even though the empire 'knew both the great power (*velikoderzhavnyi*) chauvinism of exploiting classes and the oppression of peoples at the margins of the nation'. He explained this situation in the functionalist manner typical of the Marxist understanding of racism, namely, that the ruling class did not need to address racist concepts because the ideology of Great Power chauvinism served domestic nationalities politics as well. It is interesting that Kozlov did not equate chauvinism and racism in spite of the evident proximity in respect to their social functions. This explanation can be contrasted with Banton's analysis of the genesis of racism in Western Europe. According to his study by the middle of the nineteenth century 'some people sought new justifications for maintaining the subordination of those who had earlier been exploited by being counted as property' (Banton 1970, p. 19). Why was the Russian Empire so different from other European empires, if it really was?

The presence of the virtually impenetrable borders between social estates, which existed for many centuries and largely defined the historical specificity of Eastern Europe (Berend 2005), are often regarded as

having impeded the process of representing the population as consisting of distinct races (Etkind 2011). However, shortly after the upheavals of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution the same Berdyaev (1990, p. 133) had stated that

Culture exists in our blood. Culture is a question of race and racial selection. 'Enlightenment' and 'revolutionary' consciousness... obscure the meaning of race for scientific knowledge. But objective and disinterested science should recognize that nobility exists in the world not only as a social class with particular interests, but as a qualitative spiritual and physical type, as a millennium-old culture of the spirit and the body. The existence of 'blue blood' is not simply a class prejudice, it is an irrefutable and inextinguishable anthropological fact.

Elena Vishlenkova (2011, pp. 231–5) shows that the notion of the 'Russian people' (*russkiy narod*) was visually displayed as early as 1816 in engravings that united the various social strata within Russia and contrasted them with 'external' and 'domestic' others. However, the mere fact that 'Russian intellectuals began learning to 'read' exterior appearances and interiorize them as signs of something more essential' (Hall 2012, p. 196) did not indicate the launching of racist policies. For example, Karl Hall (2012, p. 242) maintains that the literate Russian public was familiar with the notion of race by 1860, and he notes that by the 1880s 'Russian ethnographers and anthropologists hesitantly began drawing consistent distinctions between race-as-anatomy and people- (*narod*) as-ethnicity'. In contrast, environmental explanations of racial difference instead led to the limited popularity of polygenism.

Semen Kozlov's (1982, p. 55) formulates his main argument, which is fairly essentialist (objectivist) in character, within a basically racist framework. He points to the 'miscegenation' of the population, the wide presence of European-Mongoloid mixed types, and the inclusion of elites from the national margins in the Imperial ruling class, such as through mixed marriages, as main obstacles to the development of racism. In a similar objectivist pattern, Eli Weinerman (1994, p. 448) remarks in respect to self-identification that even in late Imperial Russia, when at least the elites generally aware of western racial theories, that the Russian soul and spirit remained the main criteria of 'Russianness'. Weinerman (1994, p. 442) also states that the development of racism was hindered by the fact that Russians had a very good understanding of their mixed origins. Jeff Sahadeo (2007, p. 85–7) emphasizes that the

sense of self-perceived marginality in respect to Western Europe which was widespread among Russians was the chief reason for their limited use of racial vocabulary. That is to say that the lower standing of Slavs within the master narrative of European history prevented Russians from subscribing to the notion of racial hierarchies that had evolved in Northern Europe. Many authors also point to the strong influence that assimilation (sometimes forced) had upon Russification, and later upon Sovietization, within the mainstream identification processes that took place on Russian territory (Yakovenko 1996; Rancour-Laferriere 2000; Kappeler 2001). The popular understanding of such views is reflected in the Russian saying, '*Papa – turok, mama – grek, a ya – russkii chelovek*' (My dad is Turkish, my mom is Greek, and I'm Russian). At the same time, however, Vera Tolz (2012, p. 192) suggests that uncertainty on the part of Russians concerning their own identity, as well as their awareness of the existence of a huge gap between upper and lower social groups, has facilitated their engagement with racial theories, exactly as was previously the case in Western Europe.

What is needed is a more nuanced view of the relationship between the ideas of academics and public policies in Imperial Russia. On the basis of the theoretical argument elaborated in this study, the widespread thesis that distinguishes between 'racialism', which is a term reserved for 'doctrines', and racism, which is typically regarded as the physical enforcement of racialism (Todorov 1993, p. 213) is challenged. The concept of racialization serves to bridge the gap between ideas and social action.

Racial knowledge is meaningful not only because it is *shared* by isolated individuals, but also because it is *consensual*. The concept of racialization reflects the process through which such consensus, which is the precondition for collective action as an attempt to either carry out or resist social change, is attained. Even abstract systems of scientific knowledge that are not dependent on social structures are culturally embedded within the social conditions of the time, and this is the case, to an even larger degree, in respect to the discourses that constitute racial knowledge insofar as such ideas may both constrain and support institutional as well as normative frameworks. Parallels in research do not necessarily imply parallels in the historical and social conditions in which the research in question has been conducted. Although it is easy to identify the existence of racial discourse in the late Imperial Russia, it was not sufficiently cultivated to be of consequence in society within the objective historical conditions, including the general level of education, and the interests of the elite.

The late development of the Russian Empire inevitably had an impact upon the development of racial discourse in the country and ensured that it possessed some unique qualities discussed above. However, a radically new way of looking at the race problematic was proposed in the Soviet Union. Insofar as the Soviet project of modernity was conceived as the only correct implementation of such Enlightenment ideals as equality and freedom, the Soviets utilized the antinomies of western capitalist modernity in order to 'score points' in the competition between the two models.

Soviet representations of otherness and discourses of race

According to the official position of the academic community and politicians in the Soviet Union, racial discourse was reserved for western countries. Physical anthropology supposedly provided ordinary people with a 'knowledge of races without prejudice' through school textbooks, children's encyclopedias, and so forth. The Soviet Union was the most vocal opponent of western imperialism. It implemented not only various political, military, cultural, and economic programs in order to further the process of decolonization, but even created scientific institutions for the same purpose, from which arose the orthodox anti-racist image of the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, racialized practices, usually without the use of the concept of 'race', were gradually spreading throughout the country. Russians of the late Soviet period became conscious of their 'civilizing mission' as a nation-forming people who were to enlighten and set free not only their 'younger brothers' on the national periphery and in the more remote republics of the Union, but also the colonized and oppressed peoples of Africa and Asia. This could be regarded as part of the folk interpretation of the Marxist theory concerning the various stages of development. These issues were utilized both in the external arena – in active support for anti-imperialistic movements in Third World countries – and in internal work concerning the formation of national identity. How far this latter work had progressed is evidenced by a report in *Pravda* in 1991 that a single genetic code had supposedly been discovered which united all the peoples of the USSR (Shnirelman 2005, p. 57).

However, the attempt to define Soviet history as having been fully penetrated by racial themes and racist practices faces serious difficulties. Those who research the issue of socialist modernity point out that, in contrast to Western and Central Europe, where nation was a

cornerstone of the growth of the modern state, social practices in the Soviet Union were organized predominantly around the notion of class (Arnason 1993; Fitzpatrick 1999). It is useful to keep in mind in this regard that the subject matter of ethnography was defined in the late 1920s as social-economic formations in their concrete variants, and that the notion of 'ethnicity' (*ethnos*) returned to theoretical discussion only in mid-1960s (Hirsch 2005; Filippov 2010). Vladimir Lenin bluntly stated that 'the application of biological ideas in general to the domain of the social sciences is meaningless' (as quoted in Rogers 1973, p. 289). Stalin (1938, pp. 6–8) emphasized that a shared psychic composition is a basic term in the definition of nation, and he opposed any more elementary and primitive understanding of the latter, declaring that 'National character is not something given forever. It instead changes with the conditions of life... [and] the mass of impressions received from the surrounding environment.'¹ Nevertheless, Stalin clearly recognized the reality of race in respect to the role played by communities and tribes in nation-building. After World War Two, Russian nationalism was formed around the discourse of the people-victors (*narod-pobeditel'*) in the war against fascism, which also served to limit the legitimacy of any appeal towards race in post-war Europe. After World War Two, the official 'nationalism' of the Soviet state, or of what may be termed Soviet statism (Brandenberger 2002), was based upon the rhetoric of 'brotherly help' to countries that had 'chosen the path of liberation from the colonial yoke', which represented the Soviet people as a role model in building socialist nations.

Within the academic sphere, anthropologists who preserved race as a concept but not as a key research object or analytical tool usually avoided the more focused and innovative treatment of race as a social phenomenon that was so typical of Soviet scholars during the first 15 years following the October Revolution. Later scholars regarded race as analogous to a skeleton unearthed from the ground that helped identify our evolutionary past or as a concept of analytical usefulness in biological anthropology (Black 1977; Godina et al. 1993). As Victor Bunak wrote in his influential 1938 article *Race as a Historical Concept*, racial variability became limited to the level of the population and the individual ceased to be regarded in Soviet physical anthropology as reflecting the features of the race to which she belonged. However, this did not prevent the same author from writing in 1959 that 'the experienced scholar can often determine the ethnicity of an individual with a great deal of accuracy by studying how he is depicted in a photograph' (Bunak 1959).

The use of the category of race in sociohistorical analysis was, in fact, extremely limited until quite recently, although Soviet scholars had understood very well that 'race can play a tremendous role as a phenomenon reflected by the mind'. As the physical anthropologist Yakov Roginsky put it in his remarks on the important article *Ethnos and Endogamy* by Yulian Bromley (1976, p. 272), the Director of the Institute of Ethnography and one of the authors of the Soviet theory of ethnos, perhaps we should 'ask a Negro whether skin color affects his state of mind when he enters certain institutions in the United States'. Roginsky eloquently added that 'I am a physical anthropologist, however, and am unable to discuss specific questions pertaining to ethnos and endogamy with specialists' (ibid.). Such a statement, along with the growing specialization of scientific knowledge, might well have reflected the desire to shield oneself from ideological pressure and retreat into the less morally compromised world of life sciences during the Brezhnev Stagnation (*zastoy*). There were nevertheless certain periods, above all the time of active decolonization in the 1960s, when researchers and critics of racism prominently addressed issues of race, and physical anthropologists, including Roginsky, took part in these discussions. A number of important works were published between 1966 and 1970 in the series 'Racism in the Nations of the "Free World" and the New Stage of Struggle Against It' by *Nauka*, the leading academic press in Russia, which has been owned and operated for decades by the Academy of Sciences. The leading Soviet anthropologist and archaeologist Valeriy Alekseev also presented a popular overview of such questions, along with anti-racist interpretations of radiology and anthropogenesis and his own research (Alekseev 1972).

But the unmistakable lack of interest during the Soviet period concerning the reception and application of the concept of race may be explained by the general conviction on the part of scholars that it was a topic of marginal significance. Researchers who maintained that race is not an objective biological reality but rather a social phenomenon or a form of group identity that cannot be unambiguously separated from ethnicity and nationality quite understandably preferred to use analytical tools that reflected the dominant worldview in a given society. In addition, as I have noted above, political and other official institutions did not, and still do not use the category of race in classifications of the population of Russia. The most influential position in Soviet scholarship of that period belonged to Bromley (1976), who summed up the most important contributions in soviet ethnology and claimed that each historical type of social formation had its own intrinsic 'ethnosocial divisions', such as tribe (*plemya*), folk (*narodnost'*), and nation (*natsiya*).

Furthermore, Soviet science clearly demonstrated the ambivalent mixture of the Darwinian and Lamarckian evolutionary principles that had been invoked in the 'production' of difference (Kolchinsky 2006; Beer 2008). The particularities of Russian historical development, in which the nation-building and empire-building projects took place simultaneously and were interconnected, contributed to the fact that the ideas and practices of race could have played a special role as derivatives of the policy of segregation and of the civilizing mission. However, as Knight (2012, p. 680) argues 'detached from the lived experience of diversity in the Soviet Union, the anthropological concept of race was effectively marginalized, opening a space for the resurgence of virulent racism in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse'.

Marlène Laruelle (2009, p. 38) discusses a 2003 survey conducted in the Russian Federation which revealed that a substantial portion of the Russian population explicitly stated on the questionnaire they received that they 'want to maintain the purity of the race' even though they also believed that nationalism was something bad. She provides the following illuminating example:

Anton Pereira, 15, related how 'In the autumn we went to collect signatures against fascist symbols with some dark-skinned students from Riazan University. Passers-by began calling us niggers (*chernomazyi*), and for some reason the senior citizens and the WWII veterans were the worst. "We didn't fight Hitler because of you." Not a single elderly person signed the petition against fascism – there were just a few dozen signatures for the whole day. And after we finished petitioning some skinheads caught three guys and beat them up.'

In spite of all the anti-racist propaganda in the Soviet Union and the condemnation of racism within the framework of presenting fascism as an absolute evil, racism was paradoxically not presented as a social problem in public discourse. This became the main reason for the alleged 'absence' of racism in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. It is interesting to note that Du Bois had come to the conclusion during his extended visits to the Soviet Union in 1926 and 1959 that Russians were *unconscious of race* (Baldwin 2002). Ali Nassor comments concerning his Soviet experience of race that

Somebody could hit you simply because you were different – different skin colour, different views. But subconsciously he did not know what he was doing. He did not understand it was racism. The word

'racism' did not exist in everyday speech, only in the speeches of Soviet propaganda. (interviewed in Beresnev 2005)

The non-separation of the public and private spheres in the project of socialist modernity, which has been noted by scholars of everyday Soviet practices (Kharkhordin 1999), had a range of consequences that are significant for the logic of racism. For example, it hindered the articulation of anti-racist programs that could have proposed different points of emphasis in policies directed towards commonality and diversity in the public and private spheres. The encouragement of diversity in the private sphere and of commonality and solidarity in the public sphere, which was advocated in the West, faced obstacles in Russia that were directly caused by the later social changes themselves. Times of dramatic social change generate social activities by groups that previously were not involved in the public sphere, and a perception of external threat initiates a dialogue between political elites and intellectual entrepreneurs and the common man. When such issues are multiplied by the availability of new elements to be used in the construction of identity, and by the weakening of normative and oppressive-legal pressure from society, then the pace of processes of collective self-identification accelerates.

Neither nationality (*natsionalnost'*) – freely chosen between 1926 and 1938 and afterwards assigned, and which largely determined opportunities in life for Soviet citizens – nor class – which in the early Soviet years played an important role in legitimizing the new order and in its practices – constituted a key denominator in determining social practices within the framework of the Soviet project. *Partiynost'* (partisan-ship) instead comprised the essence of the Soviet worldview in both official discourse and in how that discourse was received among the population at large. *Partiynost'* did not merely mean formally being a member of the Bolshevik and, later, Communist Party, nor activist-like loyalty to the political regime. It rather comprised the principle of people's behavior and of social organization – it was the innate quality of the 'new man' in the terms of 24-hours-a-day Party membership, or 'partymindedness'. The principle of *partiynost'*, in fact, became a universal principle in the analysis and evaluation of social processes, political events, and scholarly texts. Literature and art had to become, according to a famous formula, 'national in form and socialist [in fact 'partisan'] in content'. Class could be changed, class conscience could be overcome, and nationalities would die out, but *partiynost'* was the human essence that could not be imposed from the outside. Georgiy Smirnov (1975), who became director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and later an

adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev, made the following comment concerning partisanship in the official Soviet Encyclopedia:

Trying by all means to compromise the socialist way of life – employing libel, disinformation, and subversive activity – imperialist propaganda disseminates the view that the differences between the socialist and capitalist forms of societal life automatically grow smaller as the revolution moves forward scientifically, and that principles and ideological differences thereby lose their former meaning. In other words, societal life, in which the principles of partisanship are presented as simply imposed from the outside, thus supposedly becomes deideologized.

Stalin spoke of the special material from what the ‘real us’ are made: ‘We Bolsheviks are people of a special cut’ (Montefiore 2003, p. 89) Montefiore (ibid.) describes how ‘They [Bolsheviks] regarded themselves as special “noble-blooded” people. When Stalin asked General Zhukov if the capital might fall in 1941, he said “Can we hold Moscow, tell me as a Bolshevik?” as an 18th century Englishman might say, “Tell me as a Gentleman!”.’ Moshe Lewin (1995, p. 225) remarks that

Stalin’s essential drive had nothing to do with racialism or racial superiority, with the deindustrialization of ‘inferior’ nations and the wiping out of their intelligentsia, or with war. The regime’s pathologies were reserved for the internal ‘front’, which was dominated – with well-known ups and downs – by a vicious, terroristic, large-scale war against presumed enemies, who happened to be the country’s peasants, many members of its officialdom, and the best of the military, the party, and the management.

Any systematic policy of purges was destined to fail because the very logic of partisanship did not envisage any clear criteria for identifying the enemy, from which arose the extraordinary instrumentality of symbolically representing the enemy as ‘saboteur’ and ‘accomplice’. If Soviet culture was represented as ‘national in form and socialist in content’, then Soviet man had to be able to discern those who were ‘partisan in form, but werewolves in content’. Stalin’s purges fought invisible saboteurs and turncoats who reveal themselves under torture.

‘Hail the reconstruction of human material, the universal engineering of the new world!’ writes Yurii Olesha in his 1928 story ‘Human

Material' [Olesha 1999, p. 249]. The name of the story emphasizes the question of material – its quality and specifics.... Soviet culture offered a rich choice of various human 'compositions' – people of clay, porcelain, glass, metal, wood, solid or hollow, filled with cotton or sawdust. But they consistently ignored one 'material' – the one from which a human being is in fact made. A subject made of flesh and blood is not relevant in this world. (Kulyapin and Skubach 2008, pp. 280–5)

Only much later would the notion of 'human material' be filled with a new content and become in Russia what Goldberg (1993, p. 155) termed 'conceptual schemata hegemonic in the production of contemporary racialized knowledge that now define and order popular conceptions of people racially conceived'.

Lenin declared that the cinema was the 'most important of all arts' insofar as it united the three channels of propaganda – image, story, and language. Because of the semi-literate nature of the population and the leaflet system for circulating the printed word, the distribution of racial narratives as well as anti-racist pamphlets was limited to the intellectual stratum. The cinema, however, was able to not only describe an enemy, such as a foreign spy working as a circus clown (*High Award* (1939), directed by Evgeny Schneider), but also display him to all strata of society. The mask (in a real sense) that attracted the still 'immature' Soviet boy concealed in reality an enemy of Soviet power.² The fact that it was impossible to see that a simple and common man had become a turncoat was presented in the popular 1945 film *Joust*, in which the enemy chose fake workers, fake intelligentsia, fake peasants, and fake Komsomol members to send into the Soviet hinterlands.

Sheila Fitzpatrick (1999, pp. 191–2) comments in this regard that

The Great Purges introduced a new definition of the target of terror: 'enemies of the people'. In one sense, this was simply a code term indicating that in this terror, in contrast to previous ones, the hunt for enemies should focus particularly on the Communist elite. But in another sense, it marked a destruction of the previous conceptual boundaries of terror. 'Enemies' no longer had any specific attributes like class; anyone could turn out to be an enemy, Soviet terror was random.

The *Harvard Interview Project*, a well-known study of post-war immigrants from the Soviet Union (Inkeles et al. 1959, pp. 321–9), revealed

that Soviet society was always described in terms of the two categories of 'us' and 'them'. 'We' represented the oppressed Soviet citizen who was typically not classified by either ethnicity, nor gender, while 'they' were the *nomenklatura* who represented the party and state and exercised power on their behalf. Although certain respondents expressed anti-Semitic feelings, this could be explained by the fact that many Soviet emigrants to the United States after World War Two had been Nazi collaborators. But no one spoke of oppression at the hands of the Russian majority. This unique empirical study of Stalin's *Homo Sovieticus* served to reveal that the low level of differentiation between how the respondents viewed society had limited the spread of ideas about ethnic and racial discord. Although the phrase 'equal in their lack of rights' became a defining formula of how the Soviet people subjectively characterized the egalitarianism of Soviet society, equality as a moral value in fact often had positive connotations and was also used as a figure of speech targeted against discipline and coercion.

The system of power relations penetrates society as a whole and envelops the entire population. It draws a distinction between people and power that is so relative and mobile that it becomes impossible to initiate processes of racialization and of the formation of racial self-identity if they are based solely upon this distinction. A given citizen always regards power and authority as 'they' and 'other' even if she is in a privileged power position him/herself. In this regard, Fitzpatrick (1999, p. 222) makes the following remark concerning the Soviet case:

The antithesis of 'us' and 'them' was basic to Soviet subaltern mentality in the 1930s. 'They' were the people who ran things, the people at the top, the ones with power and privilege. 'We' were the ones at the bottom, little people without power or privilege whom 'they' pushed around, exploited, deceived, and betrayed. Of course, the dividing line shifted according to the speaker's own position. Just as no Soviet professional of the Brezhnev period ever admitted to being a 'bureaucrat', so no Soviet citizen of the 1930s was likely to identify himself as one of 'them', either with respect to power or privilege. 'They' – the ones with *real* power and privilege – always existed in a higher sphere than the speaker.

The formation of racial discourse is clearly revealed in the dynamics of how the very important category in Russia of the 'other' – the category of the 'foreigner' – was interpreted. The 1957 World Festival of Youth and Students, held in Moscow, launched a very slow transition

from the unambiguous representation of foreigners in public discourse as spies to their depiction as exotic and attractive people from the other five-sixths of the world. Foreigners thus came to be typically presented as sympathizers with leftist parties or fighters against the forces of reaction, particularly colonialism. A foreigner might be racialized as a Negro, as a member of the Mongoloid race, or as an object of racism – and she sometimes in fact became an object of racism himself in Russia. A foreigner could also be the object of the Soviet people's internationalist support – a recipient of aid in order to study in some of the best universities in the world, or one who came to share with them the advanced technologies they had developed within a framework of cooperation associated with the construction of a new factory. Regardless of the country of origin, however, a foreigner nevertheless remained a foreigner, albeit at times with more freedom in terms of consumption and mobility than a Soviet citizen. Sometimes he was an enemy, but more often a friend; at times there was contact with him in real life, but he was more frequently known as the hero in a motion picture. It is noteworthy that Soviet cinema had its own foreigners – Baltic actors masterfully performed both as wily foreign spies and as brave Soviet intelligence officers on the streets of Tallinn and Riga, which served as the 'abroad' of the cinema stage. But both the roles and the stage changed with the collapse of the Socialist system.

While the world had been divided during the Soviet years into foreigners and Soviets, and the foreigners were divided into those who were friendly and those who were not, such identifications changed during the Gorbachev years, which proclaimed the entry of Russia into the 'family of civilized peoples'. Gorbachev maintained that the supposedly privileged status of western normality – which incidentally included a 'natural racial order' – could be secured by beginning the return to European civilization. Estonians and Latvians were slowly but steadily being transformed into foreigners, while the natives of China, Turkey, and Egypt were almost instantaneously transformed from foreigners into Chinese, Turks, and Arabs. It is also true that the intersection of class and nationality was clearly revealed in the late Soviet years through the saying that 'Finn (or Swede, or Frenchman) is not a nationality, but a profession'.

Gorbachev himself was presented in the western media as an open and humane politician who cherished family values – he was always accompanied by his wife, Raisa. He was never represented against the backdrop of blatant racist imaginaries, but rather always in terms of the imaginary of civilization. Gorbachev was not portrayed as having

a privileged racial status in comparison with former Soviet leaders – Lenin, with his allegedly Mongoloid features, and Stalin, a brutal Asian barbarian – as would have been the case during the interwar period (Bonnet 2002, p. 442). He was rather presented as made of flesh and blood in contrast to the typical Cold War depictions of dehumanized, zombie-like, brain-washed communists.

However, the building of ‘Russianness’ or ‘Sovietness’ in everyday discourse can be significantly different from the centralized process of constructing a coherent discourse of classification and evaluation that is promoted by official ideology. Outhwaite and Ray (2005, p. 104) emphasize that there was ‘considerable evidence of the chaotic disorganization of Soviet systems and their extensive dependence on informal methods of integration, beneath the official appearance of planning and discipline’. That is to say that structures were perceived in a very different way and creatively reconstructed with very different consequences than what was described in the official discourse and originally intended by planners. The observable policies of authorities and systems of power often belied both background symbols and foreground scripts, which resulted in a complex and internally contradictory striving after identity in each specific social setting. Obvious discontinuities in the reproduction of structures and institutions, such as occurred in respect to Komsomol meetings or organizations in support of Africa development, even led to the emergence of what Russians called *steb*, which was a specific form of cynical irony (Yurchak 2006). Such factors gave rise to a situation in which doublethink, or a dissociation between what people openly stated and what they actually believed, became the hallmark of the late Soviet period. In respect to the Soviet experience of race, the curious combination of mutually contradictory elements in the discursive solipsism of official speeches and slogans has led only to dissonance within the system of collective representations of Soviet identity. The manner in which the population, activists, and intellectuals perceived the specifics of how difference was organized was especially important.

Neither should we overlook the significance of the institutional legacies of the Soviet project in contemporary Russia. Rogers Brubaker (1996, p. 54) observes that ‘the Soviet nationality regime with its distinctive and pervasive manner of institutionalizing nationhood and nationality, has transmitted to successor states a set of deeply structured and powerfully conflicting expectations of belonging’.

For Russians, not only was ‘Sovietness’ an organic form of expression of their ethno-marginality, it also involved their identification with the state (*derzhava*) (Rancour-Laferrriere 2000; Hosking 2006). Such

identification generated an original Russian nationalism whereby a truly Soviet Russian felt that she was the 'most Soviet of all Soviets'. In addition, the Soviet semi-official xenophobia should be regarded as, among other things, a mechanism for reassuring identity under conditions that hindered the formation of a nationalistic self-image within the multinational socialist empire. Yitzhak Brudny (1998, p. 7) comes to the conclusion in his study of Russian nationalism that

The Russian population in general, and Russian nationalists, in particular, viewed the USSR as essentially a Russian nation-state rather than an empire. The problem with the USSR, they insisted, was that it was not Russian enough.

What components of previous discourses are to be utilized and applied again? Why, and in what contexts? Finding answers to such questions is one goal of the sociological analysis offered in the following chapters. Contemporary representations of 'Russianness' and Empire, albeit informed by reflections on the past, differ from those of 30 years ago. Today's official discourse increasingly employs the ideas of Eurasianism, and the reactions of certain important intellectuals to the collapse of the Soviet Union, discussed below in Chapter 4, rely explicitly on ideas borrowed from the *Rassenkunde* of Nazi Germany. Furthermore, both official and competing discourses actively use Soviet history in attempts to reconstruct the 'degree of backwardness' of the country and to localize the 'true West'. In addition, the notion of the 'Second World' as a trope for the self-perception and self-description of the Soviet version of modernity also informs racial discourse in the Russian Federation. Finally, Soviet modernity, which is often represented as a distinct civilization (Kotkin 2005), challenges the norm of western modernity, emphasizes the antimonies within western modernity, and secures its own position in a world of multiple modernities.

Ambivalences connected with the adoption of racial conventions in Russia that do not account for their genealogy and internal controversies have also left their mark on the process of racialization in Russia today. It is necessary to interpret and analyze the ideas, representations, and practices that constitute and inform racism insofar as the unity of racialized discourse is not given simply through reliance upon the word 'race'. An analysis of Soviet experience spurs further development of Goldberg's (1993, p. 45) thesis that 'racialized discourse accordingly emerged only with the displacement of the premodern discursive order and the accompanying epistemic transformations'.

As it is already indicated, the notion of race has been seldom employed explicitly in Russian public discourse. However, race as a broad social and cultural phenomenon cannot be properly designated by a single semiotic label. Bruno Latour (1993) has demonstrated that scholars and scientists construct a fusion of nature and society. Race as a way in which to categorize the human species – one of the results of such a fusion – has only functioned in history in both juxtaposition to and consolidation with other forms of categorization. A prominent example in this regard is the uses of racial and ethnic self-identification in genetic research, which highlights the convergence of social and biological orderings (Whitmarsh and Jones 2010). But is it possible for racialization to unfold in any other manner if it is itself presumed to be a process that represents any relations whatsoever as racial in nature? What can hinder using the concept of race when even more radical ideas exist?

It is clear that the conventional view of racism as an idiosyncratic cover for something else, above all power relations, is not sufficient. Ascribing any specific meaning, such as race, to differences can indeed be a relatively autonomous process whereby a new self-understanding, a new order, or a new set of ideas emerges. In order to be able to address these questions, the notions 'racism', 'racialization' and 'race' should be examined more closely. Are they essences or analytical tools, concepts and theories or normative evaluations? The following chapter endeavors to provide answers to these questions.

3

Race, Racialization and Racism: A New Theoretical Framework

The uneasiness sociology experiences with all concepts that stem from race has led to the growth of a number of competing and overlapping conceptions. In trying to preserve the issues of racism and 'social race' as objects of study, scholars studying racialization constantly deny the reality of differences which, in racist discourse, are regarded as stemming from the existence of several human races. This view is fostered by the dominant – and credible – argument that the term 'race' is nothing but a socially determined construct. The use of the term 'racialization' thus allows one to avoid the use of the term 'race'. However, the dubious scientific meaning of the concept of 'race' does not in itself make the term 'racialization' a more appropriate analytical tool in sociological analysis. The term 'racialization' is itself deficient if there is no possibility to chart the results of the process of racialization, namely, race as a lived experience, along with the ideas that inform the process of race formation – or racial knowledge.

One of the reasons why the term 'racialization' was introduced into the sociological lexicon is that during the nineteenth century 'race' became part of the terminology of both historians and sociologists (Banton 1977; Conze 1984). It was used initially as a concept in the natural sciences, but then, as was also the case with the concept of evolution, it came to be applied analogously within the realm of sciences concerned with society and culture. The history of identity exclusions was, and continues to be, played out within the project of modernity that was inspired and conceived by the culture of the Enlightenment, which introduced the idea of 'race' into public discourse (Goldberg 1993; Eze 2008).

The correct use of a theory or concept involves establishing the limits of its applicability – the limits of how to use the theory, preclude

changes in the modality of its application, and not misapply the theory to improper research object (Zakharov 2012). Those sociologists who do use the concept of racialization in their analyses are motivated by the fact that they do not consider the study of races to be justifiable insofar as they do not believe that races are something real. Nevertheless, they do often presume that social groups, racial identities, and racisms are real. As Brubaker (2009, p. 28) notes, the great mass of sociological scholarship on the subject of race is still informed by 'substantialist' or 'groupist' assumptions, a finding that is even more obvious in respect to the activist position of anti-racism in general.

Banton (1998, p. 13) proposes that the sociology of race should engage with an 'analysis of processes of the creation and dissolution of group boundaries, of inclusive and exclusive processes in group maintenance, and the concepts associated with them'. Foucault (2003, p. 258) regards race as resulting from the population being targeted by biopower, with racism being the mechanism that allows biopower to work. This means that race cannot exist without racism, and that the existence of the state depends upon technologies which are bound up with racism. Race is thus not linked with some stable biological meaning, but rather 'designates a certain historic-political divide'. Foucault (2003, p. 77) adds that 'we can say that two races exist when there are two groups which, although they coexist, have not become mixed because of the differences, dissymmetries, and barriers created by privileges, customs and rights, the distribution of wealth, or the way in which power is exercised'. Foucault's definition, however, erodes both the notion of class and the notion of race as long as the former is also defined through biopower. It also presumes the notion of distinct pure races and ignores the notion of hybridity, which is seminal to the idea and practices of racism.

Goldberg (1993) is sceptical with regard to the concept of racialization because of what he perceives to be its inability to serve as a diagnostic tool in determining what is and what is not racism. But he provides us with rather unconvincing interpretation of racism in respect to his critique of the concept of racialization as an analytical tool. He states (1990, p. 296) in this regard that

Racism will be characterized here in terms of a model for picking out racists on the basis of the kinds of beliefs they hold. Racists are those who explicitly or implicitly ascribe racial characteristics that they take to differ from their own and those they take to be like them. These characteristics may be biological or social.

The concept of racialization is, in fact, redundant in this model since it is a tautological equivalent of racist acts. But if we accept Hesse's thesis (2007, p. 643) that there is no other modernity than racialized modernity, and that it is important 'to conceptualize race without any residual reliance on a biological referent to guarantee the object of critique', we come to the contrasting conclusion that all modern societies are racist and are populated exclusively by racists – which means that we run the risk of losing the object of our critique.

Such definitions are inadequate since they stem neither from a clearly defined object of research, nor from a special methodology characteristic only of the sociology of race. On this basis it is impossible to define the relations between ethnicity and ethnic group, and race and race relations. As Yuval-Davis (1997, p. 53) has demonstrated in her study of the intersections of nationhood and gender, the 'racialization of difference, even if prevalent, is by no means the only way in which cultural differences are managed in society'. All ideologies are born as a result of deliberate human activity, not as consequences of human biological peculiarities. But if biological peculiarities cannot provide causal explanations for human behavior, and if stratification and social movements are not informed by racial distinctiveness, then the following questions arise: How do we study racism? Is it different from other mechanisms of exclusion? Since any symbolic representation of differences is racial in this interpretation, can we develop any purposeful strategies to address or counter racialization and racism?

Another interconnected problem was isolated by John Rex (2009, p. 174), who remarked that

[R]ace was a category based upon some sort of false consciousness, and it was a duty of sociologists to reduce all statements about racial difference to statements about some other kind of socially differentiated structure, such as class. Only recently has the question been raised as to whether class really does have some kind of superior ontological status to race.

It is true that class, along with race, cannot be regarded as a fixed location, but rather should be viewed as 'something in constant formation, determined by a complex configuration of ideological and structural factors over historical time' (Omi and Winant 2002, p. 456). Nevertheless, class defined in this manner risks being made the equivalent of, for example, race or gender. In fact, no one normally limits herself with this type of a definition, but rather emphasizes the objective

character of both the consequences and the criteria of class belonging, such as by noting that the latter is determined by the prevailing mode of production, asymmetrical power relations (Burawoy 1981).

If racism cannot be derived from the supposedly objective existence of primary biological essences called races, then its sources must be sought elsewhere. Actually the social mechanisms which underlie racialized exclusions (racisms) are not something cardinally different from the mechanisms which facilitate other types of exclusion. As a result, a research focus that demands a substantially new object of study in the sociology of race should be directed towards establishing a sociological analysis of racial discourses since this is the essential element which makes our understanding of racism autonomous. Insofar as sociologists deal with institutional arrangements that construct social order, the sociology of race needs to address the question *why* people employ certain categories (race/blackness/whiteness), under which historical situations these categories are relevant, and under which institutional circumstances ideas of race generate social effects. Racialization, or forming race(s), 'involves the structural composition and determination of groups into racialized forms, the imparting of racial significance and connotation at specific socio-structural sites to relationships previously lacking them' (Goldberg 1993, p. 82). Consequently, the 'compositional mechanisms' of racialization, to use the term developed by Knowles (2003, p. 202), reflect both the context and the content of race-formation processes. Symbols cannot do without reality, but, as Castoriadis (1984, p. 118) has shown, their nature does not emerge from this reference to society. Ideas and symbolic systems cannot be interpreted simply as a 'straightforward outcome of earlier attempts of manipulation' (Joas and Knöbl 2009, p. 195). It is not enough to examine only how they are legitimized within the political process – we must also take into consideration the genesis of ideas and values. Sociologists have to investigate both the substance and the intellectual-historical context of the ideas they seek to explain.

The possibilities for formulating a general theory of racism are limited since the historical specifics of each individual situation compel us to recognize the dispersed character of racism specificity and to be sensitive to the differences of structural features in different societies. This does not question, however, the *non-specificity* of the mechanisms of classification, identification, boundary construction, and maintenance regarding racialization (Brubaker 2009, pp. 34–5).

In summary, the sociology of race should study the historical role of conceptions of race and racialized exclusions (racisms) in the formation

of identity and racial order, as well as the social structures that begot and reproduce them. Drawing from the Russian case this chapter argues that there is no such thing as cultural, or new racism. Rather we witness the constantly changing sociocultural evaluations of biological concepts. This chapter argues that there is a single (universal) and relatively stable racial relational system that is implemented in various ways at different times and in different societies by means of productive racialization processes.

Racism as the contested attribute of modernity

The study of the social problems related to racism can be separated, to a certain extent, from the study of racialization processes. Social problems stemming from the racial character of modernity may be defined differently not only by different individuals or social groups, but also by adherents of different sociological theories. It is important, therefore, to set out not simply how sociology guides empirical inquiry into racialized social relations, but also the great variety of ways in which social theorists can uncover the racialization problematic in the process of constructing social problems. As Spector and Kitsuse (2001, p. 5) have pointed out, 'there is a reciprocal relation between moral consciousness in the society and the perceived existence of social problems'. The intellectual ideas of the Enlightenment that form the foundations of the project of modernity posit a steady growth in moral consciousness as part of the process of social development. However, modernity has uncovered significant antinomies within itself, and the theory of linear progressive development has been called into question. The connection between technological and moral development no longer seems as obvious as it did in Hegel's time, and the alternative project of socialist modernity has failed to blur the difference between self-interest and morality, between the individual and society, as Marx predicted it would.

Discourses about 'us' and 'them' can be identified easily even in ancient societies, but it was modernity that formulated the concept of race. Race is, in fact, crucial to modernity insofar as the dialectics of Enlightenment presuppose, on the one hand, a belief in the need to eliminate any boundaries that still exist between archaic groups and universality, and, on the other hand, racialization as a process that constitutes a type of belonging that supposedly transcends pre-modern particularities by employing the impartial language of science. In general, the formation of modernity can be viewed as resulting from processes of

mutually conditioning political and economic transformations as well as intellectual changes, which are not of the least importance (Delanty 1999). Laura Desfor Edles (2002, pp. 108–9) reflects the influence of Jeffrey Alexander's cultural sociology when she argues that

If we explore racialization as a symbolic process in and of itself (and not simply as a derivative of a particular social structure), we see the complex ways in which new ideas become embedded in old structures, and vice versa. We see the ways in which effervescent symbols and ideas evolve and change (but in essence remain the same) in accordance with new historical situations. The point is not that there are never any new ideas but that we must not naively assume that complex, embedded, and historically provocative ethnic and racial notions will simply evaporate because we have new structural conditions.

The idea of race has always been situated in particular sociohistorical contexts, with its own foundations in material relationships and conditions, and it has undoubtedly undergone significant changes over time (Poliakov 1974; Banton 1977; Geiss 1988). However, it has been one of the key and universal notions in reasoning about nature and nurture, biology and culture, man and history since the era of the Enlightenment. Banton (1998, pp. 234–5), among others, has also shown that conceptualizations of race have been put forward in efforts to explain both physical and cultural differences between people, including their status and group belonging. In light of such views, the analysis that follows posits from the proposition that the sociological study of racialization is possible only if sociology acknowledges that the idea of biological race has been fundamental to racial discourse, even though racial identification is a social process. Racialization, as a specific sociological concept, then denotes the social process of attaching racial meaning to social personhood, relations, and somatic features.

Theories of race were formulated by, among others, such 'founding fathers' of the Enlightenment as Hume and Kant, and racial terms have become a part of modern scientific discourse. The important figures of the Enlightenment have developed schematics of race, or a kind of racial grammar, whose use has led to the reinforcement of social divisions between individuals and groups along racial lines. But it is necessary to emphasize that the phenomena of exclusion, discrimination, and violence which are described as racism by both

the victim and public opinion need not involve explicit manifestations of the idea of biological race. Although the latter is not what race is, it is what it is supposed to be according to the experts that have formulated concepts of race. It is what has also become a part of our culture. While essentialist group beliefs are central to racism, the processes of the essentialization and naturalization of social relations do not necessarily rely upon direct references to the well-known works of Blumenbach, von Linné, and Kant on this issue for support. For example, Maykel Verkuyten (2005, p. 126) states in his overview of literature concerning essentialist thinking in social psychology that 'people are inclined to treat many social categories as natural kinds, assuming these to have an underlying essence that is responsible for the many observable differences in appearance and behaviour'. He adds (pp. 127–8) that essentialist ideas concerning social groups may be regarded as discursive acts 'that can perform a variety of social functions, each with different ideological consequences' – which is to say that they can justifiably be regarded as social practices. And insofar as essentialist ideas are social practices, it is possible to make use of them in both racist and liberating ways, which is why it is so important to uncover and trace the genealogy of the idea of race in a discourse that no longer needs to use the 'race-word'. The task of sociology in this respect is to indicate how ideas can be symbols of group membership and thereby affect specifically social processes of interaction. In other words, this involves demonstrating the ways in which ideas are externalized in society and internalized within the system of norms and dispositions and in people's attitudes. Thus, it is misleading to use the concept of 'cultural racism'; the notion of the 'culture of racism' should be used instead as capturing the logic of interconnections of race and culture.

Examining individuals and groups through the lens of race has become such a commonplace activity in everyday life that racial schemata are activated unconsciously for those living in western societies (Hurwitz and Peffley 1997). While it was not at all obvious at the end of the eighteenth century to think in terms of nature and culture, genes and inheritance (Zack 2002), even though it had already become a topic of 'scientific' discussion, it would now be remarkable if we did not do so. Buffon went the furthest in his day in trying to establish subgroupings for the human race. In contrast to Linnaeus, he was comparatively more inclined to reason on the basis of genealogy than morphology, that is, he regarded *espèce* not as a problem of taxonomic abstraction, but rather as a purely genealogical issue (Sloan 1979).

The history of racial thought, in fact, displays arguments that now characterize contemporary debates on the issue. Kant (2001 [1790], p. 40) writes that

What is a race? The word certainly does not belong in a systematic description of nature, so presumably the thing itself is nowhere to be found in nature. However, the concept which this expression designates is nevertheless well established in the reason of every observer of nature.

Modernity constituted the formation of race, the debates concerning it, and the necessary associated concepts. These notions are crucial to modernity because the dialectic of the Enlightenment presupposes, on the one hand, a belief in universalization and in the possibility that the boundaries between archaic groups can be eliminated, and, on the other, a belief in classification as a process that constitutes a type of 'scientifically approved' belonging that should transcend pre-modern particularities. Insofar as modernity was constituted by its intrinsic relation to the Cartesian project, racialization should be considered in terms of rationalization and differentiation. The main idea of the Enlightenment and modernity is universalism, but the source and agent of this universalism is the rational westerner who, by enlightening the non-western 'Other', modernizes him, or, in other words, makes him mature, self-aware, and free (Memmi 2000). Chronotope 'modernity' can exist only with the existence of two 'Others', namely, the 'other' in time – pre-modern and traditional – and the 'other' in space – the non-western. Moreover, it was during the era of the Enlightenment that 'the distinction between the republican artifice of citizenship's consensus and "natural" insiderness/membership/belonging' was formulated (Bauman 2004, p. 59).

This ambivalence of the Enlightenment is particularly clear in the works of Kant – the most influential proponent of eternal peace between nations and the cosmopolitan stance (Kleingeld 2007; Bernasconi 2009). When one reads the anthropological studies of Kant – a paradigmatic thinker for, among others, the project of Soviet communist modernity – one sees ever more clearly that an all-inclusive community was never on the agenda (Louden 2000, pp. 93–107; Bauman 2004, p 80). Virtually all of the themes which will later compose the racial discourse of modernity can be seen in his *Of the Different Races of Man, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, and Physical Geography*.¹ Many scholars in fact regard Kant as having initially developed the scientific

concept of race (Eze 2008; Bernasconi 2009). In the light of basic themes in his work, Kant should be regarded as the first scholar who sought to address the question of genetic inheritance, which he sees as operating in respect to racial differences.

If we find that the altered character of these individuals becomes hereditary and is taken up into their generative force, then the only proper way to judge it is as the development, on occasion, of a purposive predisposition that was originally present in the species and that serves the preservation of the kind (Kant 1987 [1790], pp. 305–6).

In this way, Kant makes the question of race key to any scholarly investigation concerning the era of modernity.

Insofar as Kant first formulated the scientific idea of race, his legacy as it affects the question of race gives compelling force to a certain logic. That is to say that Kant's racial ideas, and the arguments he puts forward in support of them, present us with certain options and compel us to make certain choices. This logic, following Foucault, is not only a set of given themes and theories, but also a discursive practice and a clearly defined set of ways in which one can use statements that are meaningful within the context of racial theory. Like Foucault in his classic works, scholars are dealing here with a way of producing the 'truth about races' – a way that is supposedly scientific and accepted as completely legitimate in our society.

The first orientation taken in thinking about race arises from the Kantian conceptualization of the process of racial mixing. Kant's definition of race is based upon difference between it and other non-racial inherited traits, which is that racial characteristics are invariably inherited from both parents. From this point onward hybridity and, consequently, the fear of pollution always lies at the center of thinking about race (Young 1995). Pierre-André Taguieff (2001, p. 203) observes in this respect that 'In the nationalist imaginary, the self-racialization of the nation contains a supplementary trait: the presumption of the homogeneity of the social body.' Secondly, it is in Kant that we first see race as an existential category, which arises from his sense of racial essentialism. Kant argues that every human being is born with what he calls *Keime* (seeds) and *Anlagen* (natural predispositions). If one compares this position with the modern discussion of genes and memes, it is clear that Kantian teleological argumentation persists to a certain degree in our 'anti-racist' modern biology. Louden (2000, p. 97) notes

that 'according to this teleological view, racial characteristics are present in the human species because they help us reach our collective destiny'. Thirdly, the focus of scholarly interest shifts with Kant from the question of the origin of races to the question of their production (Conze 1984; Hannaford 1996). The success of the speech acts of those scholars of race whose names are now forgotten by the wider public is confirmed by the fact that our perception of social reality has been changed to include something new – race. Racialization as the process of giving social meaning to certain patterns of variation in appearance has thereby become a research subject for social scientists.

Racism is the reason for the growth in interest in race, including the entire panoply of concomitant theoretical intersections. Pragmatic, cognitive, and constructivist turns in social theory have ensured a move away from the essentialist understanding of race and its social derivative of 'race relations' towards process-focused definitions (Miles 1993, pp. 74–7; Omi and Winant 1994, p. 55). Racism is defined in this study in respect to racialization. Racism should be understood as a system of racialized exclusions and aversions. Racism is, then, among other things, a reduction of the understanding and explanation of human agency to racial characteristics, which is possible only under the conditions of modernity. Thus, the problems of modern racism did not exist in 'non-agency-focused' pre-modern societies. Nevertheless, in light of the importance of the idea of race, this is not to say that the exploitation of the colonized in Africa, the extermination of Native Americans, and the many instances of anti-Semitism in Europe are not racist-like – it is rather that they were not sustained by a 'scientific' notion of race (Bernasconi 2009, p. 83).

There clearly were exclusions and classifications in the pre-modern period that resemble today's racial practices. Moreover, the endowment of social meaning to differences in phenotype is typical even of such rather isolated communities as the Wampar tribe in Papua New Guinea, as Bettina Beer (2002) demonstrates in her important *Körperkonzepte, interethnische Beziehungen und Rassismustheorien*. But this does not mean that such everyday classifications can justifiably be defined as racial in sociological terms. It is possible to talk of racism as a social problem and race as a social construction only in those societies where equality is promised to everyone, in which the emancipated subject has supposedly been freed from forced ascriptions of belonging. Kant is particularly important for understanding the logic and ambivalences of Enlightenment and western modernity since he elaborated the theory of cosmopolitanism and eternal peace.

The fact that the scientific concept of race was developed initially in Germany rather than in Britain or America suggests that it was not specifically the interests of slave-owners that led to its introduction but rather, as Kant's essays themselves confirm, an interest in classification and above all the attempt to provide the theoretical defence of monogenesis. (Bernasconi 2009, p. 91)

Scholars usually agree that the idea of the existence of racial differences was later accepted and transmitted around the globe by those whose interests it served for the purposes of domination, regulation, and exploitation. It is the processes of the adoption, negotiation, and implementation of the racial discourse to which we refer when we speak of the racialization processes in contemporary Russia. This clarification, which anchors racialization to the idea of race, is crucial for the analysis of racialization processes in Russia, which is conceptualized in this study as an internally contradictory process of attaining modernity. The perception of modernity as a 'field of tension', which emphasizes the fact that integration and solidarity is only a possibility whereas deviance and anomies already exist, is a kind of self-criticism that has been initiated by Enlightenment views themselves (Joas and Zakharov 2011). The arguments and instruments of this type of reflexivity are needed by scholars of racialization in order to obtain a more empathetic view of the Enlightenment project and its consequences. As Christian Delacampagne (1990, p. 87) has stated in this respect, 'recognizing the links between racism and reason in no way implies that the condemnation of the former redounds on the latter'.

There are a number of explanations for the fact that contemporary western societies consider their supposedly anti-racist character to be constitutive of their nature (Lentin 2008), in spite of all the horrific evidence to the contrary. Some of these explanations point to the ambiguous character of the postulates of the Enlightenment, along with the anti-racist project of the Soviet Union, the new socialist state, and the world communist movement that it supported. Communist propaganda efforts to unmask the 'ulcers of capitalism', in fact, considerably influenced both the anticolonial freedom movement and western public opinion. Kenan Malik (1996, pp. 211–12) observes in this regard that:

[T]he onset of the Cold War in the late forties helped transform the relationship between the West and the Third World. The support that the Soviet Union gave to the ideas of racial equality and national

self-determination won Moscow wide-spread support in the former Western colonies. Terrified that the newly emergent nations of Africa and Asia would be drawn into the Soviet block, the Western powers were forced publicly to adopt the same ideals and to acquiesce to the process of decolonization.... [I]f the onset of the Cold War gave the Third World a voice on the world stage, the end of the Cold War rolled back the political terrain of the postwar years.

At this venture it is interesting to note the position that was adopted by Iosif Grigulevich, the legendary Soviet spy of the World War Two era who later pursued a scholarly career at the Institute of Ethnography and Anthropology of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Grigulevich (1976, p. 20) wrote that 'The anthropologist using his knowledge for the enslavement of peoples is akin to a medical doctor participating in criminal experiments in the Nazi camps.' When views of this type were presented on the world stage, western governments could not but modify their policies concerning racism and colonialism in their struggle to limit and contain the influence of the Soviet Union in international politics.

The recognition of racism as a social problem presupposes that societies who espouse it in fact value equality, although they use racism to justify any existing inequalities. Rex (1980, p. 131) maintains that 'the doctrine of equality of economic opportunity and that of racial superiority and inferiority are complements of one another'. The latter doctrine serves this purpose by defining specific groups as being of another race and then using this difference to justify not applying the principle of equality to them, often by portraying them as inherently incapable of enjoying equal rights with everyone else because they are, for example, less intelligent. The antinomies of modernity can thus be quite easily analyzed within the terminology of the discourse that lies at its foundations. For instance, if the sociological tradition of social change is regarded as increasing differentiation and, in some versions, fragmentation, then scholars of racism are in a position to view modernity as something other than a universal totality. They may even celebrate this social fragmentation, in accordance with the pluralistic stance of postmodernism, as a way of giving voice to those who have previously been excluded.

The strongest element in the postmodernist critique of Marxism is undoubtedly its unmasking of the fact that alternative modernities constructed on the postulates of Marxism appeal to the same Enlightenment systems of knowledge as the modernities that are

embedded in the capitalist and racist system they sought to replace. However, the weakness of the project of modernity is that it is confronted with the impossibility of combining the legacies of the Greco-Roman tradition, with its emphasis on finding differences through the use of the logical method, and the Judaeo-Christian tradition, which is based on universalism and prophecy. The former has led to the development of science and to the rationalistic concept of race, while the latter has led to anti-racist humanism. Habermas (1996) proposes a subtle approach to this issue in his discussion of the rational foundation of morality and the unfinished state of the project of modernity. But regardless of the apparently inclusive humanism of such an approach, it may nevertheless conceal serious dangers in relation to social policies based upon it. For example, the clear current consensus that race and racism is undesirable is easily displaced, morally non-autonomous, and dependent on the intervention of natural science (Gates 1997; Eze 2001; St Louis 2005; Carter 2007). Moreover, Glenn Loury (2002, p. 23) rightly claims that 'whatever the *scientific* status of the race concept, the *social convention* of classifying people on the basis of their bodily markings will typically have profound, enduring, and all too real consequences'. In the light of the given arguments the proposed theoretical approach regards the sociologist's task as residing not in arguments about essences with natural scientists, but rather in the investigation of the system of communications through which these processes are negotiated.

Black asses and bright souls: ontologies of race

According to a widely accepted position, concern with the ontological status of race is misleading, and the sociology of race should instead be concerned with how 'racial logics and racial frames of reference are articulated and deployed' (Donald and Rattansi 1992, p. 3). From this follows the 'reluctance of sociologists within the sociology of race and race relations to confront what they mean by the term race' (Carter 2000, p. 20). Tamas Pataki (2004, p. 184) has remarked, however, that 'without some minimal conception of race, one cannot target someone as a representative of a race'. The danger here is that scholars who insist either that race is a result of racism, or that any asymmetrical relations of power may be viewed as a race relationship, may unconsciously transform or translate a system of symbols into supposedly biological hereditary traits that are embodied in the flesh and blood which realizes these traits in the actions they determine.

Critical Race Theory claims that race acquires its own existence after being brought into human interrelationships through racialization processes (Delgado and Stefancic 2001). Whether or not agents themselves endowed their social actions with any racial or racist sense, they would in any case either benefit from their position if they belonged to the racial majority, or be disadvantaged if they belonged to racialized minorities. This position denies, therefore, that actual human motives and the mechanisms of reproduction of inequality are interconnected, which thereby limits the possibility for a theoretical analysis of racialization. However, regarding race as a set of cultural choices that are unrelated to power relations, the idea of race, and visual differences is analogous to treating class merely as a lifestyle and in terms of consumption choices.

Joshua Glasgow (2009, p. 10) argues in this respect that

According to the most plausible, empirically informed analysis, folk racial concepts (and conceptions) are composed of biological and sometimes also social elements.... [T]here are no biological races; and purely social 'races' aren't races in the relevant sense. Thus, race, in the relative sense is not real.

Since social race would then be not real, or at least since race was not supposed to be social but rather biological, there would be little sense in studying race as a social fact. Stated otherwise, it would apparently make much more sense to study class, gender, and ethnicity as social facts since biological race, regardless of whether or not it is real, could not be investigated by the sociology of race. In such a case, it would be mainly the practices of racial classification, racism, and the social contexts and pretexts of racial thinking and exclusion that would be available to the student of race in the social sciences.

However, as Carter (2000, p. 160) rightly points out, the concept of racialization usually refers both to 'the structuring of social relations and to the structuring of ideas about social relations', and he instead proposes a narrowing of the concept of 'racialization'. Carter (2000, p. 91) states that

Regarding race ideas as partially autonomous cultural system items allows us to explore the links between their take-up by current actors and their status as the outcome of historical agency, of what previous social actors have done. Racialization, in this modified version, rests on race ideas, is posterior to them and is a description of their

popularity as items within the cultural system. Its effects on social structures and social relations is a matter of the analysis of social interaction and it is unhelpful to argue that structures and relations too can be racialized, except in the sense of coming to be interpreted by social actors in terms of race ideas.

But for what purpose do researchers themselves racialize their object of research and thereby, at least on certain occasions, reproduce racial discourse if they do not admit the social existence of racialization. The majority of scientists who study race do not believe that, for example, population genetics may explain social relations between people on the basis of their biological characteristics. Furthermore, not only do the life sciences normally not even attempt to deal with cultural inheritance, but they are also much less inclined to propose any explanations of race on their own. The entire enterprise is, in fact, meaningless in the eyes of those who deny the postulates of the so-called scientific racism that was so widespread in the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. If the ontological status of race supposedly does not permit a researcher to consider it as influencing our innate dispositions, if race could not serve as an analytical concept with an explanatory power, and if race were not so widely used in everyday language, as it is elsewhere, as a name for categories constituted in reference to biology, then how could 'racial studies' be justified in the Russian context? It is obvious that this is a question involving the construction of the social problem of race, and – insofar as historical material is often examined in this regard – that normative post factum evaluations frequently become the main task of research.

Racialism and racism should be seen as social in character – because they can only be represented in symbolic terms – and also as always 'material' – because exclusion always appeals to an objective, typically biological essence that is chosen and reconstructed on the basis of the particular racial knowledge that is dominant in a given society. In the majority of cases, the appeal to difference in culture on the part of contemporary racists is easily identifiable as informed by biological racialism in that they point to physical origins and phenotypes as the source of difference. When cultural differences have no such biological references, as, for example, in the case of 'working-class culture' or 'consumerist culture', then sociologists are not justified in speaking of racism.

If the contemporary sociology of science usually removes the division between the social and the biological in order to reveal how the results of all scientific and scholarly research are constructed and value-laden,

then the apologists in Russian political life for *rasologiya*, the contemporary Russian equivalent of *Rassenkunde*, claim that 'there is no distinction between the biological and the social – one is determined by the other' (Savelyev 2005, p. 5). For example, the main popularizer of racist ideas in contemporary Russia, Vladimir Avdeev (2005, p. 380), argues in his influential work *Rasologia* that 'the main conclusion of contemporary evolutionary theory that shocks all 'humanists' is that although there is no clear division between a human being and an animal, there is nevertheless a clear division between races'. He adds (2005, p. 408) that 'One is born with a disposition for racial theory just as it is for Marxism-Leninism. It is impossible to teach culture – one can only correspond to culture because culture is a biological phenomenon'. Avdeev (2005, p. 402), in fact, proposes that a preference for racial doctrines is itself a race-based mental trait since 'the main function of culture is to signalize the environment about the racial origins of its creators'. It is important to note, however, that historically we have had to deal not only with the imposition of political and social views onto scientific research. As Todorov (1993, p. 145) has emphasized, there has also been an evident tendency to 'transpose onto culture the prejudices that are commonly attached to race'. Lydia Black (1977, p. 3) observes in this regard that

It is a relation of mutual feedback, the social paradigm structuring the scientific one and 'error, myth and superstition' readily entering the socio-cultural paradigm from the scientific base, through the filter of the cross-paradigmatic communication barrier.

Thus, while it is possible to theorize race as an opposition to culture (nature versus nurture), culture should not be understood as being opposed to race, since the concept of race is inscribed into the concept of culture.

Without addressing whether it might be desirable to eliminate the term race from scientific research, it is the tradition of its use in so-called 'scientific' discourse, formulated by the Enlightenment, that gives us the key to a clearer understanding of racialization processes. Independently of whether one's race is understood as an aristocratic lineage or as membership in an oppressed minority, the common feature is the requirement there be recognizable bodily markers. That is to say that the victim of racism is recognizable because of visible markers, and her possible strategy to not be so marked is to pass as someone else. This type of delimitation allows race to be operationally

determined, along with gender, ethnicity, nation, and class, in each particular historical situation. This does not mean that race-markers are not constructed. On the contrary, our understandings and interpretations of race, class, gender, differences, dominations, and classifications are influenced fundamentally by the social context and, as such, they are social constructions. Race thus refers to what is 'determined' (geographical origin, appearance) in accordance with folk conceptions. The determinate role of appearance in folk biologies reflects the role that body plays in the racial knowledge that is prevalent in society. For example, 'ethnic Cubans' can be either light-skinned or dark-skinned, while racialized 'Hispanics' can represent themselves as having different ethnicities (Graham 1990). In the Russian context, 'black' includes people of Asian descent as well as those from the Caucasian republics or Africa. Black is not a question of pigmentation; rather it is a cultural category. However, the symbolic system of difference functions only if you can classify an individual at every given moment as belonging to a particular category. As Seshadri-Crooks (2000, p. 21) rightly claims, 'race is a regime of visibility that secures our investment in racial identity... [w]hat guarantees Whiteness its place as master signifier is visual difference'. This does not mean, however, that a person is identified as persistently belonging only to one particular, clearly bounded group – on the contrary, racial classifications and identities are negotiable. Both the ambivalence of racial categories and their changed interpretations in various historical conditions, as well as the contingent nature of their very existence, have often been emphasized. For example, Blumenbach regarded the inhabitants of the Caucasus region as the standard of beauty for the white race, while today those from central Russia use the derogatory term 'blacks' to describe them (Baum 2006). In Brazil, one and the same person will be racialized in different ways as she moves from one Brazilian state to another, depending on the parameters and terms used in each specific culture and in the differing systems of official records (Loveman 1999). The consequences of such constructed natures are as real as the differences between classes and gender.

Elena Vishlenkova (2011, p. 265) argues that the creation of graphic descriptions of the differing peoples of the Russian Empire, and the various criteria used to distinguish between them, made it necessary to find ways in which to categorize them. Valeriy Tishkov (2003, p. 106), the Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the most avid advocate in Russia of analyzing nations and ethnicities as social constructions, acknowledges

that 'phenotypical differences were and remain the basis of cultural differentiation to a much larger degree than, say, linguistic ones'. Tishkov (2003, p. 445) also observes that Kalmyks, a Mongol people who to a certain extent physically resemble Japanese, have often sought to pass as Japanese in the hope that this will upgrade their status in social and personal interactions. Bettina Beer (2002) has shown that the body provides the key argument for claiming some essential otherness in the different societies she has studied, and she has demonstrated that different categories of description for visual bodily differences are defined and used in different cultures and situations. In addition, Harold Isaacs (1967, p. 364) maintains that 'the white imperialists did raise the value of white over dark, but they rarely created the value in the first place. They exploited antagonisms based on differences of color and kind; they did not originate them.'

The delineated characteristics of corporeality form the distinguishing capacity of the social actor. In a manner analogous to the body builder who constructs herself in respect to her muscle development, one who constructs her identity around the notion of race locates the bodily features of the other in reference to her own models of perception. One who possesses racial knowledge can always understand the code of racial communication and thereby reproduce racial discourse. This code is structured by relations between the sacred and the profane in the bodily canon that is regulated by the symbolical mechanism of desecration. In *Telesnyi kod russkoy kul'tury* (The Somatic Code of Russian Culture), the linguists Gudkov and Kovshova (2007, pp. 60–1) reveal how words which indicate the body (somatic terms) in Russian possess symbolic meaning in that they are elements of the cultural code that forms particular semantic fields. The unity of these fields is also conditioned by the oppositions that structure them, which may acquire different material embodiments. Gudkov and Kovshova (2007, p. 52) also distinguish between associations and connotations, and they define the latter as the non-notional differential features of the idea that are located beyond the linguistic character assigned to it. If associations can be individual and occasional, then the connotative meaning is conventionally conditioned and formed through the mechanisms of metaphorization. The role of the linguistic symbol resides in the change of a given meaning into a symbolic function, such as happens when the meaning of a word – blood, for example – acquires a racial significance beyond the reality that it directly indicates. Racialization as the ascription of a particular significance to a given difference implies the endowment of a meaning that indicates a concept which is not directly

associated with the straightforward meaning of that difference. This constitutes a process of symbolization.

For great many years discourses of Russianness have maintained that Russians are identified as a group not by the body, but by their universal soul located in the metaphorical heart. The purity of Russian culture was felt to relate to moral notions that were reflected in such phraseological constructions as 'purity of design' and 'radiant [or bright] soul', and in this way 'pure' communities of Russians were represented as possessing stable and constant cultural and psychological qualities. The racial science of the Enlightenment added supposedly scientific categories to the ethical category which were reflected in the metaphoric construction 'purity of blood', whereby communities 'pure by blood' had to possess the unified anthropological type that would serve to unify notions about the group. Ideas concerning such unification 'by blood', that is, ideas about 'pure Russians', only appeared rather recently in the system of notions about a typical Russian – ideas about 'purity of heart and soul' were absolutely dominant until very recently. A Russian proverb states that if you 'scratch' a Russian, you find a Tartar, but now there no longer is any need to scratch or unmask anyone – the most important criterion in the racialization project is belief in the ability to recognize the Other through the help of science. The emergence of new historical meanings and new somatic phraseology reflect the logic and spread of the formation of supposedly 'scientific' racial knowledge. The lowest corporal rank is now ascribed to those who are darker than Russians, who have been given the humiliating label of 'black asses'.

The concepts of race and racialization are primarily applicable to discourses and practices that make use of human phenotypes, that is, visible and observable physical characteristics and traits – those interviewed in Arutyunyan's (2011, p. 16) study remark that the racialized body even seems to be a different type of body. While Karl Hall (2012, p. 196) emphasizes the 'need to understand where Russian intellectuals began learning to 'read' exterior appearances and interiorize them as signs of something more essential', this chapter argues that scholars need to reveal the logic of this type of 'reading' whereby they are or are not permitted to theorize it as racial. The use of differences in phenotypes is influenced by both external and internal forces in relation to every particular situation of racialization. For example, there might very well be no inevitable gender binaries prescribed by nature that are analogous to the divisions between the working class and capitalists prescribed by relations to the means of production, but only different

cultural gender constructions. References to nature in the sense of pre-determinations independent of human choice may serve a moral justification – ‘homosexuals are like that by nature, so they are not guilty’ is the main thesis of defenders of sexual minorities in Russia. When something is represented as an absolute evil, such as pedophilia, similar references are used with the opposite logic in order to demonstrate that people are, in fact, responsible for their actions. It is only when such ideas are transferred to the field of social theory that we are able to reflect upon them and ‘deconstruct’ the notion that social differences descend from differences according to nature. In this respect, the task of the sociology of race is to scrutinize the import of knowledge, practices, and the negotiations that shape both of these.

Racialization as making, doing, and becoming

When race is analyzed solely as a stable organizing principle of certain social arrangements, a sociologist risks reducing it to the description of various forms and cases of discrimination and racist violence. But a variable-centered type of theorizing does not contribute significantly to the study of racialization processes since categorical units, including race, are not themselves causal agents. Race can be viewed within this context as a constructed aggregation of various social positions, while racialization, in contrast, can be regarded as a social process that has consequences for certain domains of the social structure. Individuals and groups, organization and communities, form new institutional domains in response to the pressures of new conditions. These domains then create categorical units and stratification systems centered on race, which in turn circumscribe agency. These domains, or institutions, should not be regarded simply as coercive external structures insofar as they are also assemblages of background experiences and ideational resources that both shape and are shaped by society. Many institutions can create stratification systems, kinship being one of the most obvious. Many of them may use idea of race. What is decisive, however, within the context of the present discussion is what we may refer to in Luhmanian terms as generalized symbolic media that generate a cultural domain. Culture in this sense may be understood as ‘generated from the symbolic media, texts, ideologies and norms... and the symbols... that are used to legitimate or challenge the unequal distribution of resources’ (Turner 2010, p. 38). Resources should be understood in a broad sense, and symbolic media and domains are not as distinctive and autonomous as they are in Luhmann’s (1995) theory.

But it is obvious that both terms – race and racialization – have a reflexive property that leads inevitably to their reification. Charles Tilly (1999) is among those writers to have emphasized the performative character of categories of ethno-political practice in respect to the categorical cognition of inequality. Efforts to ‘naturalize’ a community that intellectuals and politicians define as an ethnic group or nation within particular geographical boundaries often employ the idea of race and rely upon racist exclusion. In this respect, Alexander Osipov (2010) warns that importing the term “race” into discourses now circulating in Russia can foster the reification that facilitates racist violence, which is a problem addressed above in epistemological terms as we discussed the connection between theory and empirically observed reality.

Power may transcend place, but it does not necessarily mean that social relations cannot be subjected to power. Although racialization as the ascription of meaning presupposes the subject’s capacity to take action – which will be demonstrated below in Chapter 5 in the discussion of racist collective action – much of the enigma of racial symbolism nevertheless resides within the geopolitical relations between states. Randall Collins, who insists on the need for a macrohistorical analysis of group formation, argues (1999, p. 78) that the notion of ethnicity structures society and gains the status of a social reality only in the ‘larger, looser metacommunities’ that are located within geopolitical contexts. The commonality of identity is thereby set in contrast to the internalized markers of competing groups. Collins (1999, p. 74) identifies language and what he terms ‘somatotype’ as two crucial geopolitical markers that are ‘inscribed on the bodies of human beings’. Somatic differences determined by social interaction, which become durable markers of categorization and identification through their acquisition of meaning within the given historical context, constitute what I term the ontology of race.

Depending on the particular characteristics of the society being studied, the accessibility of empirical materials, and the particular tasks facing the scholar, she may prioritize either institutionally formalized categorization practices within the given historical perspective, or ‘micro-interactionist studies of the unofficial, informal, ‘everyday’ classification and categorization practices of ordinary people’ (Brubaker 2004, p. 66). Current analyses of everyday racism, however, are deficient in that they view people’s everyday racializing practices only as the reproduction of the racial discourse that has been imposed on them, which thereby reinforce structural racialization. Sociology must instead examine how those practices are creatively produced, not merely how

they are blindly reproduced, which makes it necessary to use actor-centered approaches.

It has become commonplace to assert that people create their own social worlds, although they do not choose the circumstances in which they do so. Understanding structure as a resource (Giddens 1984) helps us to take into account, in a somewhat phenomenological manner, the practices which are available to a social actor. Previous experience determines the processes of racialization in many ways, serving to articulate the latter as a kind of path dependency during a re-examination of the boundaries of the communities signified. For example, the racialization of the Jews as a social group during the Soviet period was based in part on the imaginary boundaries of a religious community that existed in pre-revolutionary Russia. However, the later attempt to define the Russian people as Orthodox Christians was unsuccessful. In spite of a painful history of Islamophobia efforts to unequivocally racialize members of Russia's Muslim communities apparently being equally problematic (Hutchings and Tolz 2012, p. 875). In the latter case, a more crucial role is played by the consequences of previous forcible processes of ethnicization, such as the ascription of ethnic belonging during the Soviet era, dislocation processes, intercultural interactions, and the system of the division of labor. But we can speak of full-fledged racialization in respect to the Jews only when their stigmatization in particular segments of the public discourse sprang from what was claimed to be an 'innate otherness' that was allegedly passed on through their blood lines – not from their supposedly mistaken pro-western beliefs, non-loyalty to the Soviet state, economic role, or their supposed closure as a social group.

Scholars of racialization are thus trapped between, on the one hand, a conception of the agent as able to change the racial character of modernity by adequately reflecting it in consciousness and then subsequently debunking and deconstructing it, and, on the other, a deterministic position which dissolves the category of agency in the integrity of the social. This situation should be analyzed from two perspectives – the agency perspective and the structural perspective – instead of searching for some type of synthesis of structure and agency. Not only is such an approach more productive from the policy point of view, but it will also permit us to avoid the simplified idea that agency is necessarily something good. Agency, with its accompanying reflexivity, has come to be almost always viewed as something emancipating, creative, and productive of change – in other words, something progressive – but clearly this has not always been the case.

It is impossible to identify a single ahistorical agent of racialization. The capitalist system, colonial oppressors, the state, 'Whites', ethnic and status groups involved in competition, anonymous discourses, interpersonal interactions – none of these can be isolated as a universal agent of racialization because the concrete sociohistorical context must always be taken into consideration. Racialization can be explained, therefore, both as an intentional activity that has been determined by social norms, and as an instrumental action defined in its relation to individual ends. It must be both convincing and functional in every particular situation and historical context if it is to obtain the symbolic autonomy and coerciveness needed to stipulate change in the social order. No racial meaning can be understood, accepted, and reproduced if it is not related to the norms and rules that provide the significance, plausibility, and stability of racial knowledge in a social context. Moreover, it is impossible to even identify the act of giving meaning if we do not relate it to the institutions that provide its predictability and, thus, make it possible to observe it. Nevertheless, it is precisely new structural conditions and new agents of the constantly changing social landscapes that define the particularities of racial knowledge and the ways in which ideas operate.

Three modalities of the operation of racialization can be isolated for the purposes of the present discussion. First, racialization can be defined as intentional scholarly activity with the aim of attaching racial meaning to social groups and relations – it is thus the 'making' of race. This 'making' is one of the modes of racial formation that unfolds through the formalized production of knowledge in the Russian social sciences and humanities, the case that is examined in the next chapter. To 'make' race is to make people racial through the creative reproduction and dissemination of racial knowledge. Ideas of race, which can be categorized as either cognitive or normative, should be regarded as the substantive content of racial knowledge. Discourse is the interactive process of conveying these ideas, and it exists at the levels of policies, scholarly programs, and everyday interactions. It also appears as the communicative discourse between intellectuals, politicians, and the public.

Secondly, racialization can be examined as the process in which racial identities are formed as a result of acquiring and internalizing racial knowledge – it is thus 'becoming' racial. Racial identity can be negotiated in respect to the situation and the set of codes available at a given moment. A man is not born with a certain identity, and an identity once acquired does not last forever. An individual throughout her life is instead involved in a process of multiple and interdependent

identifications which is closely linked with the social environment. Racialization as becoming is a social psychological process of the identification of self and others in racial terms, and it should be understood as a stream and fusion of cognitions rather than as a series of separate acts.

The problematic nature of race – as distinct from ethnicity, for example – is typically interpreted as connected with the compulsory ascribing – or ‘making’ – of race. But this would mean that we could not speak of a voluntary adherence to some racial entity at either the micro or macro levels (Banton 1983, pp. 9–10). On the other hand, the inevitability of processes of racialization – or racialization as ‘becoming’ – could be explained by the idea that exclusion is inevitable for some aspect of the individual. This could be understood as the price one must pay for the very creation of the idea of the individual in differentiated modernity – which is a position close to that of Foucault. Searching for identities as ‘points of temporary attachment to the subject positions which discursive practices construct for us’ (Hall 1996, p. 6) would then be crucial in framing the relationship between subjects and practices.

Identification and identity formation as an element of collective action operates as a drawing of boundaries and thus demands a narrative about ‘us and them’. Insofar as the notion of identity draws attention to the relationship between the psychic and social dimensions, it points to the need for a social psychological theory capable of explaining the mechanisms of identity construction. Analyses of the mental states of subjects involved in asymmetrical power relations take an important place in any attempt to push forward the agenda of the sociology of race and post-colonial studies (Clarke 2003). Notions of domination and ideology recognize the importance of subjectivity in terms of a combination of the psychological and social dimensions, and giving meaning, which is a central process in the construction of identity, is itself an act of interpretation. Sociohistorical contexts, together with their retrospective reconstructions by subjects, constitute both a resource and a social positioning concerning which subjects have differing interpretations. People may not be aware of the various positions they take up in the discursive production of selves even though this process is always related to the socially available codes and symbols. This renders the process of identification contradictory in respect to its positioning in relation to race, but it is nevertheless intelligible in terms of sociological analysis.

Thirdly, racialization operates as the reproduction and manifestation of identities and symbolic boundaries in and through the everyday ‘doing’ of race. Racialization is constantly driven by actors who, either

consciously or unconsciously, participate in a process of self-formation, and racialization thus operates through the ways in which people perform and negotiate race in everyday life.

The construction of new identities during the last twenty years of large-scale changes in Russia was an element in the process of becoming racial, which refers to racial formation on the micro-level. Vron Ware (2005, p. 125), for example, calls this mode of self-fashioning 'becoming racialized', which means 'learning to think and act both within, and especially in defiance of, racial terms'. The mobilization of blackness and whiteness has also been a widely studied subject in the United States. Ruth Frankenberg (1993) focuses, in her pioneering study of the racial structuring of white experience, on how her female interviewees have constructed their identities in relation to people of color. The difference between such investigations and the study of racism in Russia is that they have examined the existing forms of societies that have been *organized* upon the principles of white supremacy, racism, and the color line, while the present study analyzes instead the fragility and lack of an obvious character concerning racial identifications. Furthermore, a greater importance is placed upon the sociohistorical context, and consequently it is maintained that the process of racialization is not simply imposed by such easily identifiable agents as classes, intellectuals, or the 'logic of capitalism', but rather is largely contingent, involving psychological mechanisms and the available symbolic systems. The actors in this specific market of 'self-formation' construct what may be called 'racist values', and, in addition, this newly emerged market distributes the status of the various identities in respect to the interactions between producers and consumers. It is important to note that the motives, actions, and results of a given defined racial order may be viewed as three facets of racial order taken as an event. The agent introduces racial order into the structure of the motive, and the individual participating in the event may well be unaware of the racial order she is reproducing.

Racial knowledge in Russia: hybridity, the Third World, and human material

Being racist 'necessarily implies being in possession of racial conceptions' (Pataki 2004, p. 7). A commonsense understanding of race is not self-evident, and it goes without saying that different folk notions of race can make use of one and the same concept of race. The banal nature of manifestations of racial discourse, along with the intimate

connection of such discourse with the practices of power, makes it more difficult for the scholar to transcend the boundaries of her habitual systems of categories and classifications that have been imposed from the outside. It is necessary to make an analytical division between 'race' and 'racial knowledge'. Goldberg (1993, p. 149) argues that racial knowledge, which is defined by a 'dual movement', 'appropriates as its own mode of expression, its premises, and the limits of its determinations – those of the established scientific fields of the day, especially anthropology, natural history', while at the same time it exercises power due to the 'definitive importance of difference in modernity's development of knowledge'.

Racial knowledge consists of how various conceptions of race are utilized in current mainstream discourse. While the logics of racisms charted in this study were predominantly formed during the last 25 years, differences have long played a significant role in the formation of the network of concepts in social interactions in Russia. Karl Hall (2012, pp. 202–3) remarks that

While the Russian case does not track perfectly to the others, this was not due to the supposed absence of *rasa* [race] from the early-modern pairing: *poroda* played that role. In Russian *poroda* included the senses of *espèce* (in French poorly differentiating *kind* and *species*), *Geschlecht* or *Art* (German), *kind* or *species* (English). Just as with its European analogues, *poroda* retained the meaning of family origin ('from a renowned princely line') and the meaning relative to the three kingdoms of Nature (type of animal, vegetable, or mineral).

Olga Belova (2005, pp. 48–64) states that Jews and Roma, who were viewed as having a different appearance, were the primary aliens for the Eastern Slavs, whose folk classifications of peoples were characterized by grades of difference, ranging from 'alien' to 'other' to 'our own'. For example, Turks, Tartars, and Jews were united in the minds of those living in Northern Russia during the late nineteenth century by the fact that they did not eat pork. Both the basis and explanation of difference changed with modernization and the spread of 'scientific' racial knowledge. An informant born in 1910 explained the 'smell of the other' by a legend connected with the Biblical Exodus as a punishment for greed – Jews tried to save the partridges God had sent them as food, and they came to smell of the birds that subsequently rotted. An informant born in 1969 instead speaks of the smell of sweat as a racial marker – 'Jews come from nomads, and that is given in their genes' (Belova 2005,

p. 59). Informants also single out the racial character of smell through a comparison of Jews with – ‘Gypsies are dirty, but they don’t smell; Jews are clean and well-dressed, but they smell’ (Belova 2005, p. 60). The trope of dirtiness was also widely used in Russian colonial discourses, but did it serve to racialize the relation of power domination? Was it dirt that could be washed off, or was it instead a quality of the self that was somehow opposed to the ‘radiant’ spirituality of Russianness? As was the case concerning the racialization of Jews in Russia, dirtiness has to be constructed as an innate immutable quality in order to be qualified as racial, as something that can only be hidden behind the white mask of civilization.

Slezkine (2004, pp. 297–8) makes the following comment concerning the political context that spurred on the process of racialization:

All Stalinist purges were about creeping penetration by invisible aliens – and here was a race that was both ubiquitous and camouflaged; an ethnic group that was so good at becoming invisible that it had become visible as an elite (perhaps *the* Soviet elite). Here was a nationality that did not possess its own territory (or rather, possessed one but refused to live there), a nationality that did not have its own language (or rather had one but refused to speak it), a nationality that consisted almost entirely of intelligentsia (or rather refused to engage in proletarian pursuits); a nationality that used pseudonyms instead of names.

Jews as a group became racialized in the Soviet Union after a certain set of conditions were fulfilled. These include the dissemination of racial knowledge into a wide segment of the population through the media and the educational system; the formation and spread of the popular representations of a Jewish phenotype, allowing one to ‘guess’ who was a representative of the Jewish ‘race’; the institutionalization of Jewishness by the state, which became a stigma under the conditions of the state-promoted Soviet anti-Semitic discrimination and emigration policies; and the promotion of kinship, not cultural affinity, as the dominant principle fostering the process of becoming ethnic. Any ethnic group may rely upon the myth of the unity of origins – but this makes it a ‘race’ neither in the eyes of society, nor its own. In addition, discrimination against any given group may be an instance of inter-ethnic or other group conflict that is not specifically racial in character. Racialization requires a link with an idea of race that has become realized in concrete social circumstances.

Weinstein and Stehr (1999, p. 5) point out how this same logic applies to the Western European case:

By the turn of the twentieth century, however, natural science's growing distancing from and challenges to Church doctrine, which began centuries earlier and had more recently been expressed in biological enquiry via the quickly popularized Darwinian Revolution, was extended to the relations between Christians and Jews. Thus, these intellectual transformations ultimately contributed to a kind of secularization (or, more accurately, 'scientification') of the relations between Jews and Christians.

Racial theories today try to speak the language of science, not myth, and it now follows from the concept of race that supposedly more 'objective' and 'scientific' criteria differentiate between human groups. Since the unpleasant ways of the Jews are then allegedly rooted in their blood, they as a group would be beyond repair by means of mere cultural therapies. As Slezkine (2004, p. 298) remarks, 'Being Jewish became a crime: those who claimed a separate Yiddish culture were "bourgeois nationalists"; those who identified with Russian culture were "rootless cosmopolitans".' Before the Enlightenment, distinguishing between 'us' and 'them' did not attempt to reside upon the universal principles of reason, but instead relied, as a rule, on the legends of religious communities. Such legends, ethnic prejudices, and state-sponsored xenophobia constituted the 'pre-racial knowledge' that had been the basis of classifications and representations until the modern period. However, in the early twentieth century pseudo-scientific racial theories came to influence political journalism and literature, which led to what Sergey Zenkin (2008, p. 9) has described as the 'creation of new myths – semi-scientific, semi-artistic' in accordance with the 'more or less falsely interpreted program of German romanticism'. Given the world's *Entzauberung*, these myths were altered through attempts at biological explanations coupled with the notion of race. While the complex of explanations of difference and the process of categorization are closely linked, this clearly does not mean that only those differences which can be unambiguously explained through correlations with tradition may be inscribed into the system of symbolic representation as significant markers.

The production of social knowledge is informed by social milieus and historical contexts, and the sociological perspective requires us to trace the continuities in racialization over time. This type of analysis

permits us to rethink the justification for the temporal succession and delimitation between 'cultural racism' and 'biological racism' (Barker 1981; Taguieff 2001). The proposed comparison of the trajectory of race in western societies and in Russia does not mean that the former were based upon ideas of 'scientific' racism while the latter appealed exclusively to culture. On the contrary, both reflect the view that a human being is 'primarily a biological being, embedded in nature and governed by biological laws' (Stepan 1982, p. 4). However, the presentation of cultural incompatibilities is an important aspect of all 'classical' racist pamphlets, while 'old-fashioned' biological racialism still flourishes in our preoccupation with 'genetic' explanations for alcoholism, crime, and other social ills. Biological and cultural notions of race are intimately entwined insofar as any given racial discourse or process of racialization that is available to sociological interpretation and explanation is symbolic and, consequently, cultural. Any particular racism and idea of race always refers to the materiality of difference symbolically interpreted within the system of racial knowledge. Attempts by today's sociology of race to juxtapose the 'new racisms' supposedly rooted in culture to the 'purer' and earlier racist theories and practices supposedly rooted in biology are misleading. First, they contradict the research agenda of social constructivism shared by a majority of contemporary scholars who are confident that, to use Ann Stoler's (2002, p. 418) words, 'nothing about racism was written in biology or stone'. The rootedness of race in the discourses of nature and in the materiality of difference is performed through references to somatic types in everyday practices and through the utilization of racial knowledge that may encompass references to biology. Focusing on the 'semiotic codes' of racial knowledge makes it possible to shift the level of sociological attention from individual to impersonal discourse, while an emphasis on visual differences, which are essential to appeals to race, appear to be connected directly with the world of nature and not structured in accordance with the world of culture. And although sociopsychological studies of ethnicity claim that 'cultural essentialism is not a coherent form of essentialism because cultural characteristics can change and have interactive, reflexive and conflicting features' (Verkuyten 2005, p. 147), the same is also true for 'race'. Moreover, this also holds true for the racial notions embedded in everyday description of differences since any endowment of meaning to difference leads to the use of symbols and signs.

Racialized differences in phenotypes are usually structured and interpreted through binary oppositions (Beer 2002), but combinations of 'racial types' may be analyzed in terms of a multitude of oppositions.

A social categorization may or may not contain the trait 'black' or 'white' depending on the symbolic system of representation that is available. For example, Sergey Zenkin (2008, p. 30) notes in his analysis of racial themes in Theophile Gautier's *Voyage en Russie* (1867) that the 'comparison of the Russian racial type with other races populating Russia, in the view of Gautier, is interpreted less through the opposition 'wilderness-civilization' than through the opposition "Romantic-Classic"'. He adds (2008, p. 35) that the system of structural relations – such as norm/anomaly, rule/exception, opposition/neutralization – is 'included in the game of mutual inversions: what on the one level was the initial, primary element ("soft" features of European faces), on the other level becomes a result of the neutralization of differences (Russian faces stand out against the Asian races of Russia)'. The point thus lies more in the differences in value loadings, the connection with the practices of exclusion, and in the domains or spheres for the reproduction of discourses. It is thus possible to single out the lowest common denominator of the idea of race and isolate the elements of reality lying beyond consciousness and communication that can be racialized and act as 'race' precisely through a comparison of notions of race with the extremely primordial ideas concerning ethnicities and nationalities typical of the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia. In the words of David McCrone (1998, p. 26), 'What people see is not race but the phenotypical variations to which they attribute social meaning.' Corporeal differences are neither a necessary, nor a decisive factor in the construction of ethnicity, whereby the latter is distinct from race as a practice (Beer 2002, p. 40).

Ideas of race in Russia have developed and coalesced with specific cultural, economic, and political incentives. This has resulted in a distinctive racial knowledge in contemporary Russian society that is centered on the three interconnected nodes of hybridity, 'the Third World', and 'human material' (*chelovecheskiy material*).

'Human material' constitutes a body, and the image of people as a body cannot be unambiguously linked to ethnocentric nationalism. In the Russian context, the formal translation of the concept of fatherland – understood as the 'body made of various families which together form one single political family' (Yanovsky 1806, p. 278, as quoted in Vishlenkova 2011, p. 128) – was dominant from the early nineteenth century. Furthermore, the ideal son of the fatherland 'should be born as a result of selection of the best qualities extracted from different peoples' (Vishlenkova 2011, p. 128). However, the metaphor of a body came to acquire a racial significance in association with a dominant

scientific discourse that claimed authority and had a mass representation. Hall (2012, p. 242) argues in this regard that 'the mixing once celebrated by Shchapov became an even trickier virtue to sustain in the 1880s, as Russian ethnographers and anthropologists hesitantly began making consistent distinctions between race-as-anatomy and *narod*-as-ethnicity'.

Danger supposedly sprang from the tainted blood of racialized groups, which were claimed to be a product of miscegenation. Contact with such groups would then 'pollute' the superior group not merely symbolically, but also genetically – not only collectively, but also individually in a very real sense. For example, the expression 'mixed marriage' (*smeshannyi brak*) implies the marriage of two representatives of different genetic origins even if the given individuals had been raised in the same culture. This clearly refers to a discourse of racial hybridity which, when projected onto others, raises the issue of a type of contamination that lowers an individual's status and affects her social agency. Hybridity has generated intense debates concerning the notions of norms and deviance, which lie at the basis of racial hierarchies. The state's ascribing ethnic belonging to every person without exception led in Russia to the ethnicization of social relations both at the macro-level of population policies, and at the micro-level of everyday interactions. In addition, the biologization of ethnic differences meant that claims to social membership gradually became justified by 'blood', and the registration of the ethnic identity assigned to both parents explicitly referenced the racial discourse of hybridity. Legacies of these processes are prominent today in the notoriously persistent everyday debates about how to calculate the percentage of 'non-Russian blood' or 'Jewish blood' various actors possess and the manner in which it will affect their agency (Rossman 2013).

The issue of rootedness in the Third World, or geographical otherness, plays a powerful role in the discourse of exclusion together with hybridity, making the notion of human material closely connected with spatial inequality. Sergey Brin, the founder of Google who was born in Moscow and emigrated from the Soviet Union in 1979 at the age of six, has been also critical of Russia in a way that refers to Third World membership. He bluntly dubbed the country 'Nigeria with snow' (Iosebashvili 2010) in a 2002 interview with the California-based *Red Herring*. This statement contrasts, in a suggestive fashion, with the fact that the Third World schema was actively used in the Soviet Union when Brin was still a child. Matusevich (2009, p. 31) notes, for example, that by the 1980s in the Soviet media 'the very word Africa was often

supplanted by *cherny kontinent* (black continent), the place of danger and wasted opportunities, and a proverbial black hole devouring scant Soviet resources’.

Both the radical right and the ultraliberal critics of Putin’s political regime often speak of the Russian majority as an ‘inferior race’, particularly in comparison with the so-called Nordic race. It is characteristic that both the nationalist Andrey Savelyev and the pro-western Valeriya Novodvorskaya use the notion of ‘human material’ – and not in a positive sense – when speaking of the failure of their own political projects. Savelyev (2007, p. 14) says that ‘it is simply impossible to consider the present despicable population of Russia as Russians. These “Russians” (*rossiyane*) are the waste of ages upon ages’. Novodvorskaya (2008), who represents those opposed to the nationalists, notoriously states in the same vein that

We are Russia. Russians do not surrender like the Soviets (*sovki*) did, who simply raised their hands in the air. Five percent of Russia are Russians – Varangians, Vikings, Europeans, bearers of the Scandinavian tradition. The rest are amoebas and protozoa. Dinosaurs from the CPSU, the AKM [the Red Youth Avant-garde], or the NBP [National Bolshevik Party]. Pterodactyls from the KGB.

Being called a *sovok* today – a dismissive term for the Soviet people means you are both backward and too weak to compete in today’s harsh reality. It also means you share a Soviet xenophobic patriotism that marks you as rigid, parochial, and without modern racial views.

Racial knowledge as a faculty for action depends on conditions and contexts, and it may either remain latent, or motivate the most unexpected actions. It is thus crucial for racialization researchers to focus on both the content and context of racial knowledge. The use of racialization as an analytic tool should not be regarded merely as a change in research emphasis from content to process. It is useful in this respect to note Tajfel’s (1981) argument that stereotypical content reflects a correlation between personality attributes and social categories insofar as the functions served by stereotypes are important in determining the criteria for how we divide people into groups. Racial discourse presumes not only the determination of the social by the biological, but also the possibility to reconstruct groups on the basis of phenotypical similarities and differences. Race as cognition organizes social representations, shaping them into a single unity through the use of a particular schema, and it is necessary for us to keep in mind that these representations

reflect how the social group defines itself, not how any given individual reflects himself. Since 'race is all about embodied social signification' (Loury 2002, p. 21), racial knowledge as the representation of differences in outward appearance – which Banton (1998, p. 13) maintains are best described as 'phenotypical variations' – serves as: (a) a cognitive instrument in that it is a category for describing the world; (b) a means to mediate interaction through its relation to ideas which bear within themselves particular values and hierarchies; and (c) a means to preserve and reproduce the given view of the world that has been formed.

4

Making Race in the Russian Academia

This chapter looks more closely at the process of the rewriting and redeployment of the idea of race in post-Soviet academia. In the theoretical discussion of racialization in the previous chapter certain modalities of its operation are isolated. Racialization can be defined, for example, as scholarly activity with the goal of ascribing racial meaning to social groups and relations, that is, 'make' race. Such 'making race' is, as it is proposed in the previous chapter, one of the modes of racial formation that unfolds through the formalized production of knowledge in the case analyzed here – that is, the social sciences and humanities in Russia today.

There are considerable differences in the aims of scholarly projects to construct race in contemporary Russia, the post-colonial 'Third World', and the 'West'. For instance, the term 'race' is used almost exclusively in western academia as a socially, rather than biologically, informed concept. As such, it permits scholars to unmask the societal relations of power and the enduring inequality that resides in the persistence of everyday classifications and categorical boundaries. Within this context, racialization represents a theoretical investment in the position that race only has a social existence. In the 'Third World', the scholarly racialization of disparities within global political and economical processes often serves the purpose of articulating the interests of those who live in former European colonies and mobilizing them in the struggle to challenge the asymmetric power relations in the globalized world, foster the redistribution of resources, and protect their interests. There is a different logic behind the racialization practices of scholars in Russia insofar as it is informed by debates conducted elsewhere that have been translated into and renegotiated within the local discourse, which also contains indigenous racial themes. Attempts to understand this logic

are impossible without a sociological analysis of the conditions which underlie the processes of the new coming of race to Russia and the re-emergence of the idea of race over the past twenty years.

One important reason why it is crucial to look more closely at the process of the racialization of scholarly discourse involves the intimate link between the scientific, the ideological, and the everyday use of the concept of race in any given society. The coexistence in Soviet and post-Soviet society of, on the one hand, a state-promoted ideological discourse that was focused on criticizing racism and, on the other, the development of the discipline of physical anthropology, which actively utilized the concepts of 'race' and 'racial type', led to the formation of a peculiar everyday racial discourse. Since that discourse has become rooted in the individual worldviews, we may speak of a folk concept of race explainable by, among other reasons, the all-encompassing system of propaganda and education.

The 'idea of race' has long been the object of attention of interested actors, and no analysis of the 'struggle for discourse' in this respect is possible without an attempt to reconstruct the complex of opinions and motivations of the intellectuals who participate in it. The new 'racial science', as Weinstein and Stehr (1999, p. 7) remark, 'always aspires to be practical; it is almost driven to engage practical contemporary problems and it desires to formulate public policies'. In what follows the chapter briefly reviews several works by the sociologist, philosopher and writer Alexander Zinoviev, the historian Valeriy Solovey, the ethnologist Victor Kozlov, and the writer Vladimir Avdeev, placing them within the general context of sociopolitical change and the debates around how to understand and define 'Russianness'. The leaders and theoreticians of the nationalist movement themselves have noted the trend of moving away from sharply anti-intellectual 'plumber' nationalism to 'professor' nationalism, that is, a nationalism which has a more developed theoretical basis.

The texts reviewed in this chapter represent one the most significant attempts to racialize scientific discourse in post-Soviet Russia to date. Although the authors addressed belong to different generations and disciplines and have differing academic status, they have all enjoyed considerable recognition in society either as the main apologists and developers of the ideas of racialism in contemporary Russia (Avdeev, Solovey), or as intellectual mavericks who 'went beyond the taboos' (Zinoviev, Kozlov). This study not only examines their ideas as elements of racial knowledge, but also maps them on the ideological landscape of contemporary Russia and explores directions in which they extend

beyond the anti-western resentment and imperialism of mainstream Russian nationalism in the past. The reactions of the representatives of the formal academic discipline of biological anthropology are analyzed, locating them in respect to the crisis of legitimacy that academic institutions underwent following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The producers of discourse, who sought to tie their audiences to their 'essential nature' and 'true being' through processes of racialization, have capitalized as entrepreneurs through representing it in new, previously non-racialized domains. The research questions posed in the texts discussed in this chapter have been shaped by the self-perception of their authors as the advocates and creators of racial optics.

Against 'political correctness': racial knowledge in the works of Alexander Zinoviev and Victor Kozlov

The tragic everyday routine of Russian citizens after the 1917 Revolution and through the 1950s, when individuality was leveled by the force of the historical situation, was the best illustration of the consequences of the Soviet doctrine of sociodeterminism. Human emancipation from the fetters of the project of socialist modernity was – and is – often discussed in terms of escape to 'normal' conditions, which may be understood as allowing a person to keep his authenticity in conditions provided by nature. The first authors to articulate their denial of sociodeterminism, by comparing it with western 'political correctness', were two emigrants of 1970s, the sociologists Vladimir Shlapentokh and Alexander Zinoviev. Even though their views differed greatly, they both agreed that western political correctness – of which anti-racism, feminism, and affirmative action are considered to be the main elements – in fact resembled the Soviet unity of knowledge and morality.

Western concepts that minimized, in one way or another, the role of the social in the 'nature versus nurture' controversy were actively criticized in the initial stages of this domestic Soviet protest against sociodeterminism and political correctness. This critique was also accompanied by attempts to develop homegrown models that would have creatively reinterpreted the Marxist-Leninist heritage such that inherited traits would receive priority over acquired traits. It is significant, however, that ritual criticism of the western determinism of nature and race was no longer required during the last years of Soviet rule. Shnirelman (2011 (1), p. 501) cites an illustrative example in this regard. In 1982, N. P. Dubinin, I. I. Karpets, and V. N. Kudryavtsev published a book with the revealing title *Genetika*,

povedenie, otvetstvennost': o prirode antiobshchestvennykh postupkov i putyakh ih preduprezhdeniya (Genetics, Behavior, Responsibility: On the Nature of Antisocial Acts and How to prevent Them), and it was de rigueur that they include an accusation of racism against the famous psychologist Arthur Jensen. By 1989, however, following the changes that resulted from several years of *Perestroika* and *Glasnost'*, they could allow themselves the liberty of removing it from the second edition.

Alexander Zinoviev (1995, p. 42), who was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1978 but has become one of the most influential Russian social thinkers, wrote that

The West has its taboos... [A]ttempts to speak at the level of scholarly objectivity about the people who created the West as a social-historical phenomenon always beget accusations of racism... Also, the phenomenon of *zapadnizm* (Westernism) cannot be understood objectively and scientifically without taking into consideration the basic building material from which Western society is constructed, namely, human material.

Zinoviev (1995, p. 43) also argues that the West, as any society, is a 'sociobiological being', and that the people comprise a 'living organism'. Darwinian evolutionism was integrated into the Soviet ideology, but it took the form of Enlightenment rationalism, depicting social evolution as progress identified with the minds of the most enlightened, who were also the most morally perfect (Kovalev 1998, p. 305). With the fall of Socialism, many Russian intellectuals adopted another tradition of evolutionism, associated with the conservatism of Edmund Burke, that interpreted evolution as rootedness in tradition and as a naturally developing historical process (Nisbet 1986; Shamshurin 2000). This strain of evolutionism, which was also closely linked to Social Darwinism, generated possibilities for various eccentric combination of ideas, such as the 'monarchical socialism' of Konstantin Leontiev, the Panslavism of Nikolay Danilevskiy, the sociopolitical ideas of Ivan Il'in, as well as Eurasianism within the framework of a new ideological platform of Russian conservatism, or so-called Putinism (van Herpen 2013). In their paternalism, elitism, celebration of inequality, appeal to tradition, these *mélanges* accord with the ideas of such contemporary western right of center social thinkers as Alain de Benoist. It is important to note that if racial discourse took shape in the last decades of the Russian Empire against the background of pessimism and a general perception of social evolution as degradation, often proposing a return

to pre-modern past, then contemporary Russian intellectuals – agents of racialization processes – do not always insist on the restoration of traditional values and institutions. In certain respects this view of tradition approaches Soviet interpretations, which distinguish between progressive and reactionary or conservative traditions. This has contributed to the elaboration of various concepts of scholarly nationalism and racism that have been constructed from the elements of Soviet and pre-revolutionary social thought. The works of authors analyzed below clearly formulate and disseminate what I have defined as the three key elements of racial knowledge, namely, human material (*chelovecheskiy material*), hybridity, and the Third World.

For example, what Zinoviev terms *zapadoid* ('Occidentide') is not merely an ideal type coined to describe an individual formed by the peculiarities of the social system and historical conditions, similar to *Homo Sovieticus* (another term coined by Zinoviev), but also 'characteristics of the human material of the West'. Zinoviev (1995, pp. 45–6) distinguishes between universal human qualities, which take a concrete form in respect to the type of social constitution, and human material (*chelovecheskiy material*), which comprises the particular qualities of a people as a whole, not those of any separate individual. The reproduction of *zapadoid* became possible during natural selection in a manner similar to artificial selection in the breeding of plants and animals (1995, p. 49). Moreover, since 'no other human material is able to reproduce the West', it 'remains the basis and guarantor of the existence of the United States of America in perpetuity' (1995, p. 46).

Zinoviev himself quite literally reproduces the ideas of the popularizers of racial theory in interwar Germany as he outlines crucial elements of the idea of race. A prominent example is H. F. K. Gunther, who sought to explain the supposed domination of the Nordic race within the German nation, which consisted of people classified as belonging to a number of differing anthropological types. He endeavored to specify the location of the materiality of the *Anlage*. Zinoviev (1995, p. 48) claims in this regard that

In my understanding, *zapadoid* is not a certain typical or commonly encountered type of human being. My description is an abstract summary of the characteristics of the human material of the West as a multitude and mass of people. The qualities of *zapadoid* are dissolved in this mass and distributed in various proportions, combinations, and quantities among a multitude of persons. But the 'solution' of *Zapadoid*-ness is so strong here that, in the interest of

scientific simplification, the entire mass of people may be viewed as a multitude of typical *zapadoids*.

Zinoviev describes a westerner as in part the result of biological evolution and in part an 'artificially bred super-human', and he offers a plausible and detailed analysis and critique of modern society that relies upon the Marxist tradition, avoiding the race-word. Moreover, he (Zinoviev 1994, pp. 335–77) repeatedly emphasizes that nationality problems and racism are essentially social problems that are 'extremely primitive from the scientific point of view'. Zinoviev (1995, p. 162) maintains that the West was 'lucky' insofar as many problems took a racial form – this made it possible to conceal their class essence, which has been constitutive of western society. However, in a manner typical for post-Soviet social scientists, he combines elements of Marxism, the civilization approach, and ideas of racial hierarchy when dealing with migration and intercultural contacts:

The influence of the social milieu upon people is large but not limitless. Non-*zapadoids* might to a certain extent imitate *zapadoids*, they may even collaborate with them, but they cannot be transformed into *zapadoids* on a mass scale to such an extent that their incompatibility with the demands of *zapadnizm* (Westernism) will totally disappear. But the counter-influence of non-*zapadoids* on *zapadoids*, which results in a diminishing level of *zapadoid*-ness in the latter, is irreversible. To fall down is easier than to climb up. (Zinoviev 1995, p. 359)

Formal knowledge of the Other who was racialized by references to the notion of hybridity develops from and is rooted in those works which have investigated the interaction of ethnic groups. For example, Gumilev's theory of ethnogenesis has become in this regard a mainstream issue following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Bassin 2009). In a somewhat unusual way, it has also become successfully integrated into popular knowledge along with the Soviet idea of *ethnos*, sharing with the latter the conception that *ethnos* is something which has a biological reference and is self-replicating. At this venture, the following section will endeavor to briefly describe the logic of the process in which racial meaning became ascribed to Gumilev's theory in a way that emphasizes environmental factors rather than racial determinism.

Gumilev (2004) argues that when energetic forces are brought to bear on certain persons, their activity is accelerated to a level he refers to as 'passion-ness' (*passionarnost*). If the proportion of such 'passionate'

individuals in the population is sufficiently high, then a new ethnos is born. Furthermore, a group of ethnosés affected in this way by powerful forces forms an enclosed system of super-ethnos. Inside such systems, which pass their cycles of existence as living organisms, ethnosés complement each other, each filling a different ecological niche, and it is very important to avoid miscegenation since this leads to the premature decline of the organism. Gumilev's reception of the official Soviet theory of ethnos may have served to nourish and foster the initially embryonic racist component in such notions. Today's popular Russian essentialist conception of ethnicity is an amalgam of Gumilev's half-mystical theory of ethnogenesis and a 'scientific' conception of race that has not changed since late Soviet times. This does not mean that ethnos and race are indistinguishable from each other in scholarly discourse, but rather that ethnicity can easily become an object of racialization. However, while racial knowledge contains a set of guiding ideas and principles about immutable Otherness, ethnicity refers to certain culturally defined groups which, given the absence of historically fixed communities that are termed races, are the primary (but not the sole) targets of racialization practices. In addition, we should not forget the responses of the academic community as we examine the common understanding of race and ethnicity.

Serguei Oushakine (2009, pp. 79–130) presents an interesting case study of the intertwining of biological metaphors and sociological analysis in the quasi-academic narratives structured around perceived ethnic and national discrimination in the provincial Russian city of Barnaul. Oushakine (2009, p. 106) has also analyzed Victor Kozlov's *Russkii vopros* (The Russian Question), arguing that it represents a genre of academic nationalism which narrates a history of supposed ethnotrauma and '[u]sually addresses Russia's current problems by rewriting the country's past in order to demonstrate the non-Russian character of its state institutions'. While Oushakine shows how Kozlov has reproduced Lev Gumilev's logic in this narrative, I instead emphasize that Kozlov, while being an opponent of Gumilev, has developed a position concerning racial issues that is very important for understanding the logic of transition from anti-Gumilevian sociodeterminism to the racist outlook in Russian academia. Gumilev is the key link between 'old' and 'new' Eurasianism, and his theories of ethnogenesis are generally accepted in the Russian educational system (Laruelle 2008).

Victor Kozlov, along with Yulian Bromley, was one of the developers of the official theory of ethnos in the Soviet Union. Not only was he a critic of Gumilev's biological-geographic conception of ethnos,

but he was the theoretician of ethnology who personified for Gumilev the official theory of ethnos that he (Gumilev 1971) sought to attack. Kozlov placed less emphasis on the concept of 'psychic composition' and 'national character' than Bromley, who was more eager to reproduce Stalin's formula (Shnirelman 2011 (1), p. 268). It should be noted that Gumilev (2003, p. 244) claimed that Bromley had plagiarized his (Gumilev's) works in building up his own theory.

As recently as 1999, Kozlov attacked the theories of ethnic identity set out by Shirokogoroff and Gumilev, which he view as unjustifiably biologicistic. Kozlov (1999, p. 21) stated that he regarded ethnos as a 'community of people that has come together by natural and historical routes and which to this day occupies a prominent place among other communities of people with which it interacts'. Kozlov's views are paradigmatic in understanding the trajectory of development of the idea of race from the late Soviet period to the present. How could an anti-racist, World War Two veteran, and a professional Soviet ethnologist come to be branded as a neo-Nazi sympathizer in 1995, both in Russia and abroad? The answer to this question helps provide a better understanding of how a country with an explicitly anti-racist propaganda and ideology was rapidly transformed into the country with the highest level of racist violence in Europe.

In 2010 Kozlov published *Jews in the USSR-Russia*, which was heralded on neo-Nazi websites as 'our response to Tishkov and the various Shnirelmans'.¹ He remains a well-known figure among ethnologists in Russia, a sort of living patriarch of Soviet science, but he is also a deeply respected figure among Russian nationalists. The anti-Semitic character of many of his works written in the post-Soviet period, as well as his infamous expert reports on the texts of Russian neo-Nazis accused of stirring up hatred between nationalities, have received considerable publicity in both national and international academic circles (Dragadze 1995; An Appeal from Russia 1996). In what follows I will endeavor to analyze some works of Kozlov that touch on the concept of race and racism and briefly chart the evolution of his views.

Any analysis of Kozlov's works must take into account the events in his personal life, which both give us a picture of a certain trajectory that has been typical for many Soviet intellectuals, and also help to explain his particular position in the environment of those who adhere to the Russian nationalist movement. Kozlov (1996, p. 9) himself gives us a brief autobiography at the beginning of his *Russkii vopros: Istoriya tragedii velikogo naroda* (The Russian Question: The History of the Tragedy of a Great People).

I was mobilized into the army in the August of 1942... I was severely wounded and awarded the medal for 'Glory'. I received my Ph.D. in 1956 and my doctoral degree in 1969. In more than 40 years of scholarly work I have published over 350 works... [and] laid the foundations of two scientific disciplines – ethnic demographics and ethnic ecology – where the excesses of the Marxist-Leninist ideology could be avoided. I never joined the Communist Party, preferring to be somewhat in opposition and to have contacts with dissidents, mostly Jews. But I never became an anti-Soviet person. I became acquainted with the 'Jewish question' while studying the ethnography of Europe and the USSR, co-authored the article 'Jews' in the *Large Historical Soviet Encyclopedia*, and wrote the article 'Anti-Semitism'.

Two other significant points should be noted. First, as indicated above, Kozlov is considered to be one of the developers, along with Bromley, of the Soviet theory of ethnos and ethnogenesis. He received the State Award (*Gosudarstvennaya Premiia*), the highest possible academic award in the Soviet Union, for such work. Secondly, Kozlov has long been an active member of the international academic community, and he is acquainted with many European scholarly specialists in the fields of ethnicity and nationalism, as is revealed in the reminiscences of Teodor Shanin (2008).

Kozlov spent one month in the United Kingdom in 1978 and two months in 1983 in order to collect materials for a monograph entitled *Immigranty i etnorasovye problemy v Britanii* (Immigrants and Ethnoracial Problems in Britain), which was published in 1987. Pointing to the existing discrimination against immigrants in both the British labor and housing markets, Kozlov is, in general, extremely well disposed towards the efforts of the British government to integrate immigrants. Moreover, he indicates that the main obstacle to societal inclusion for immigrants is not only 'their desire to preserve their ethnocultural specificity in their new environment', but especially the fact that their 'phenotype', which is different from the English 'phenotype', prevents the indigenous population from ceasing to 'regard them as foreign actors who, for some reason, are attempting to mimic real English people' (Kozlov 1987, p. 195). Kozlov was thus clearly speaking of a social – not a biological – distinction as well as asymmetrical societal power relations. However, what is also evident is an essentialist approach to the concepts 'English people' and 'immigrants'. It would then seem necessary in the circumstances to examine what Englishness was for Kozlov – a Soviet internationalist and anti-racist – in order to understand what

'Russianness' represents for Kozlov as a post-Soviet nationalist. Kozlov (1987, p. 195) himself states that the English were

Conscientious, but not proud, polite but not intrusive, ready to help someone they know very little, but keeping him at a distance,... to respect the opinions of others, but to be able to argue for one's own... to have a sense of social order and participation in the political life of the country, to be proud of England and its traditions.

It took no great theoretical or methodological innovation to translate this sort of Englishness into a stable essence of Russianness ten years later.

Kozlov also remarks that inter-ethnic marriages are only a 'possible factor that may facilitate the interpenetration of languages and cultures on the *everyday* [my emphasis – N.Z.] level'. In addition, because mixed marriages work to efface anthropological differences, they are nothing less than a necessary condition for the assimilation and integration of 'ethnoracial groups' in the receiving society (Kozlov 1987, p. 143). He explains this necessity in his theoretical work, which was published in the same year, by the inevitable existence of racial prejudice in both the receiving society and among immigrants (Kozlov 1987b, p. 94). However, an author who, by his own admission, firmly accepted the principles of internationalism and described hybridization as an inevitable process that promoted social cohesion, had clearly ambivalent feelings when he saw hybridization in practice. Kozlov (1987, p. 193) commented with sarcasm that

I felt the atmosphere of a certain ethnoracial 'idyll' when visiting the family of a scholar of racial problems, Englishwoman Sandra U., who married a Negro engineer from the West Indies. They had three children who demonstrated the combination of a clear dominance of negroid characteristics with an English upbringing.

Kozlov maintained that the way in which differing ethnoses aim towards the achievement of racial uniformity does not constitute racism, but is rather inseparably bound to ethnic psychology and self-determination (Kozlov 1987b, p. 88). When speaking of ethnic processes in the Soviet Union, however, he always emphasized, with reference to Lenin, the necessity and desirability of voluntary assimilation. Nevertheless he put forward a theoretical argument that the 'unity of ethnic self-consciousness is an obstacle to penetration of racially differing types into the *ethnos*' (Kozlov and Cheboksarov 1982, p. 112).

In a 1993 article programmatic for understanding how his views have evolved, Kozlov (1993, p. 112) claims that ethnic self-consciousness includes a 'genetic' element. Kozlov (1993, p. 115) emphasizes the importance of the given situation, as well as the importance of nationalist and racist conceptions, for the maintenance of inequality. Kozlov (1993, p. 135) also maintains that the intellect is genetically predestined, supporting this position by the results of studies of twins conducted in the United States, and he defends Jensen's (1972) hypothesis that IQ scores reflect racial inequalities against his Soviet colleagues. In addition, he criticizes 'anti-scientific humanism' and draws the conclusion that 'in a qualitative sense, large ethnoracial groups are not equal'.

Valeriy Solovey and Vladimir Avdeev: the search for racial 'Russianness'

The discussion concerning empire and nation plays an important role in intellectual debates in Russia today. This discussion has been reformulated in politically nationalist think-tanks as a conflict between so-called 'imperialists' and 'ethnonationalists' (Sergeev 2010, p. 78). The former are described as statist who subordinate the interests of ethnos to those of the state (usually empire), while the latter are described as those who put the interests of Russians as an ethnic community above those of Russia as a state. This type of division, which became increasingly pronounced in the late 1990s, partially coincides with the division between the '*derzhavniki*' and 'ethnonationalists' in the so-called 'Russian Party' of the 1970s and 1980s (Brudny 1998; Mitrokhin 2003). But although this division was accepted in scholarly literature until the end of the 1990s, the distinction was rather theoretical. It was also common to combine both of these approaches, as Solzhenitsyn sought to do. In reality, the theoretical configurations in question were quite idiosyncratic, combining a variety of often mutually contradictory hypotheses. Their internal contradictions, which are evident in the works of those advocating Russian nationalism, were manifested even more clearly in the views of rank-and-file activists and supporters. Since political circumstances and the social structure of society have changed, strategies of struggling for access to discourse as well as the intellectual evolution of nationalist-minded activists have also changed considerably.

With the dissipation of the former mainstream discourse, and after the successful reconstruction and appropriation of the patriotic-state discourse by Putin, it became necessary for nationalists to reformulate their principles. The unique operational potential of the eclectic

discourse of the party in power has made it possible for it to rehabilitate Stalin to a degree and to make successful use of old Soviet symbols while also supporting Christian Orthodoxy and expressing nostalgia for pre-revolutionary Russia. By emphasizing the reconstruction of firm vertical structures of government and disseminating imperial propaganda in various forms – from the liberal empire advocated by Anatoly Chubais to the Eurasian empire of Alexander Dugin – the political elite controls many of the key elements of the discourse formulated by Russian nationalists. At the same time, protest moods generated by increased social division, increased competition for employment, a lack of civil rights, and the absence of protection under the law need to be expressed in the political programs of politicians who position themselves as the opposition. The nationalist opposition thus accuses the government of populism and demands ‘genuine’ patriotism for the benefit of all Russians. The universalism of empire and Christian Orthodoxy can also be opposed to paganism and the particularism of an ethnically uniform state (Shnirelman 2002). The key element around which such discourse is constructed and becomes racialized is Russianness understood as ‘whiteness’ and ‘rootedness’.

Valeriy Solovey is a former expert at the Gorbachev Fund, an historian, and a professor at the highly prestigious MGIMO University, a school for Russian diplomats. He is at present one of the leading intellectuals among the ranks of Russian nationalists, and combines being a scholar of nationalism – Simonsen (1996, p. 102) has spoken of him as ‘a leading expert on Russian nationalism’ – with being an active ideologue of Russian nationalism. Solovey’s most recent major work is *Nesostoyavshayasya revoliuciya* (The Revolution That Failed), which he co-authored with his sister, Tatiana Solovey, a professor of ethnology at Moscow State University. In this book they undertake not only a political analysis of the Russian nationalist movement and its failures, but also a new ideological program and possible strategies for making the political struggle for Russianness to be understood in racial terms. Whereas in the 1990s Solovey had argued for the ‘nationalization’ of state policies, his position has shifted in the last few years towards the ethnic core of nationalism and he now argues in favor of the ‘ethnization’ of policies. Solovey and Solovey (2009, p. 426) maintain that the basis of such ethnicization is an ‘impulse of biological nature – the instinct for the self-preservation and survival of the ethnic group’. While he identified the main problem for Russia in the 1990s as threats to its integrity and power as a state, he now instead claims it is a biological crisis brought about by racial others.

In his previous two books, which cemented Solovey's place as one of the intellectual leaders of Russian nationalists, he proposed a 'new' theory of ethnicity and an original reading of Russian history through the lens of 'race relations'. Solovey maintained that 'Russian history cannot be imagined as an epiphenomenon, as a mere result of such factors as the natural landscape, geography, and the state' (Solovey 2008, p. 25), and he added that the main driving force of history is neither institutions, nor anonymous social universals, but rather the people, who exist only in their ethnic quality, not in a social, political, or cultural quality (Solovey 2008, p. 27). But although history would thus be 'the unfolding of the ethnic character of a people', Solovey correctly noted that it would be necessary to define the ethnic character of the people – Russianness – before his new paradigm could be applied to Russian history.

It is commonplace in Russian public debates to label Russians as an 'ethnaclass' – a socially oppressed majority – which is analogous to Menshikov's (2004b) notion of 'nationality as class'. Mikhail Menshikov (1859–1918) is one of the writers included in the canon of those who have examined sociohistorical processes in Russia through a racial lens. Menshikov was a pre-revolutionary journalist and the chief ideologist of the ethnonationalist political party *Vserossiyskiy natsional'nyi soyuz* (All-Russian National Union) from 1908 to 1917, and although he went through a period of obscurity, his ideas are now experiencing a renaissance. Nationalist Sergey Sergeev (2010, p. 216), for example, now refers to Menshikov as the most important Russian nationalist. As I have noted previously, most Russian authors who wrote about the Russian idea during the period of the rise of the nation states in Europe emphasized the universal messianic mission of Russians. When they compared Russians to other European nationalities, they always stressed the absence of racial consciousness and prejudice as well as their readiness to accept as Russian anyone who thought of themselves as Russian. This system of ideas, which was formulated in the works of Berdyaev, Bulgakov, Struve, and others, became a sort of canon of the 'Russian idea' – and it is precisely this canon which is disputed by the spiritual heirs of Menshikov. Solovey, for example, advocates the ethnization of the 'Russian idea', and this standpoint is typical for all Russian ethnonationalists. What makes Solovey remarkable among this cohort is his approach to the question of who is to be described as Russian, along with the higher level of theoretical development of his position concerning the concept of Russianness.

The core of the newly formed 'scientific' position is not the opposition between the essentialist and constructivist paradigms, but rather the 'dichotomy between the sociological and the biological approaches to ethnicity' (Solovey 2008, p. 44). Solovey argues that a new ethnic quality cannot appear from essentially non-ethnic qualities, and his approach not only racializes ethnicity, but carries this process to its logical conclusion, turning ethnicity into race. He rhetorically states (2008, p. 39) that

If we cannot define Russianness through a single 'social' criterion, then perhaps we could try to define it through a matrix of criteria. In other words, we could add the Russian language, cultural socialization, certain psychological characteristics, and the fact of living within the territory of the Russian Federation or to Orthodoxy. But the final result of this might be a second or third-generation Georgian living in Moscow [and not a Russian].

After disposing of the validity of social criteria in this manner, Solovey then claims that Russianness is a biological feature that is passed down genetically, like the color of one's eyes (Solovey 2008, p. 48). Russian history would then be the 'realization of Russianness – a concept of an initial sameness of the Russian people that is biological in its essence' (idem.: 64). Solovey (2008, p. 63) also supposedly resolves in a similar fashion Gumilev's dilemma of how the genetic relates to the geographical through such statements as 'Russians possess a gene for the Russian landscape'.

Solovey (2008, p. 360) further maintains that genetic racial endowments – racial differences in themselves and not differences as external markers that are visible in interaction – are responsible for generating conflict between migrants and the societies that receive them. Consequently, one of the main dilemmas facing the advocates of scientific racism is how to explain and evaluate miscegenation – the key trope in knowledge concerning hybridity. Menshikov (2004a, p. 59) stated in 1909 that

At first glance, one nationality seems to have been formed from a thorough mixing of races – there are times when all memories about the elements from which it has been created are forgotten. But only memory is lost, while the natural antagonisms remain. A struggle between tribes is transformed into a struggle between parties and sects. This finally becomes a struggle between irreconcilable characters, creating the material for drama.

Menshikov believed that this entails obvious policy considerations:

Russify all who are non-Russian' means to de-Russify Russia, make it a country of bastards, dissolve the noble metal of the race into cheap alloys. The same relates to the Orthodoxation of all who are non-Orthodox. That would turn the religion which belongs to the Russians alone into a complete falsification.

Solovey (2008, p. 97) claimed that he had resolved the challenge presented by the common belief that assimilative strategies have been dominant in the Eurasian space by proposing that a 'racial state of mind' is present throughout Russian history. He argued that

Its early phase was characterized by a forced mixing of Russians with neighboring tribes, which constituted an unconscious strategy for territorial expansion and the survival of Slavs on the local lands. But, even during this early period, one-dimensional assimilation was predominant in this process – namely, the *assimilation into Russianness*, more often voluntary than forced, and not the assimilation of Russians into the others.

In respect of the importance of the human material associated with the supposed racial divisions within the Russian people, Solovey accepts the postulates of his intellectual predecessor Menshikov (2004, pp. 51–3) that the 'quality' of the population takes priority over its 'quantity', and that statehood has been the 'patron of weakness'. Solovey also both challenges and refines the civilizational approach on the basis of the racist knowledge he claims to have articulated in his publications. He believes that he has provided a radical and more plausible explanatory framework to replace an approach which explained everything, and yet nothing, and which seemingly failed to interpret social agency as meaningful.

The principal elements of his program that distinguish it from populist nationalism, with its emphasis on welfare redistribution, imperial nationalism, and Eurasianism, are the notion of racial hierarchy, the attitude towards World War Two, and the greater importance of the enemy within in comparison to the external enemy. Solovey himself, who claims to be an impartial scientist who happens to have created a new political platform for the Russian nationalist movement, states explicitly that

Over the past 20 years the West has continued to be the constitutive Other for Russians, more by the forces of inertia and historical

tradition than anything else. At present, within the sharply reduced range of Russian space, the real constitutive Other is the 'foreigner within'. (Solovey and Solovey 2009, p. 374)

Although the political elite still assign primary importance to the external Other (March 2012), ordinary Russian citizens have moved from an attributive state and civilizational construction of the Other to a construction of the Other based on the ethnic principle. Solovey's followers have the advantage over supporters of the imperial nationalist or Great Power (*derzhavnyi*) view concerning Russia by virtue of the horizontal network of their potential supporters. The idea of making Russia an ethnonational state dominated by Russians has become a strong mobilizing force under conditions that will be addressed below in detail as the movement against immigration is discussed in Chapter 5. Solovey claims that relations between ethnic Russians and 'racial foreigners' are devoid of any messianic or metaphysical dimension insofar as Russians regard and compete with racial others only in terms of ethnicity. In his opinion, the values of empire and Eurasian unity must be displaced by the value of the Russian national state, and the motive force of this social process must be the urban middle class, which is young, raised in post-Soviet Russia, and imbued with the ideas of racial consciousness and ethnic competition (Solovey and Solovey 2009, p. 380).

The role of the theorist who will 'enlighten' the urban middle class and Russian nationalists, providing them with a proper racial education, has been taken up by the writer and publisher Vladimir Avdeev. In contrast to Kozlov and Solovey, this self-proclaimed 'theoretician of *rasologiya*' has no academic position. He is an electrical power station engineer by training, but has now become, without exaggeration, the best-known advocate of so-called 'scientific' racism in contemporary Russia. His fame is founded both on his popularization of works that formed the theoretical core of racism in the Third Reich, and on the success of his own works, particularly *Rasologiya*, which has become somewhat of a non-fiction best-seller. The 'discipline' he promotes is analogous to *Rassenkunde*, that is, 'a single philosophical system, existing at the junction of the natural sciences, mathematics, and the humanities, with which all social, cultural, economic, and political phenomena can be explained in reference to the actions of inherited racial differences between nations' (Avdeev 2005, p. 22). Avdeev's works may be described as a collection of weakly connected quotations, primarily of physical anthropologists writing approximately between 60 and 150

years ago, accompanied by his own free interpretations of these sources. Their aim is to make the reader understand that a racial hierarchy exists, that all social phenomena are determined by the racial belonging of the actors, and that Russianness and Aryanness are one and the same thing. But his *Rasologiya* contain a large amount of false information and erroneous statements, such as the view that Australian aborigines belong neither to the species *Homo sapiens*, nor even to the genus *Homo*. Avdeev (2005, p. 435) even constructs the image of aggression perpetrated against Russians by members of different races by appealing to recent events in Chechnya and the trauma caused by a wave of terrorist attacks. He claims, for example, that women from the Urus-Martan district of Chechnya are the most aggressive women in the world. Avdeev's ideas, as well as those of his allies and co-authors, including the ultra-nationalist Alexander Sevastyanov (2008) and the politician Andrey Savelyev (2007), have had a significant influence on the conception of race held by a large proportion of intellectuals in Russia.

In his works Solovey frequently refers to Avdeev's pamphlets and he has also written an introduction to the second edition of his *Rasologiya*. Neither Avdeev nor Solovey hide the fact that their aim is to challenge the norms, inherited from the Soviet Union, whereby racism is judged to be something reprehensible. However, as may have been anticipated, the professional community of ethnologists and physical anthropologists has also become involved in this affair. So-called 'scientific' arguments found in the works of those advocating a 'racial turn' (Avdeev 2005; Avdeev and Sevastyanov 2007; Savelyev 2007) have been subjected to thorough analysis and devastating criticism at the hands of professional ethnologists and biological anthropologists (Shnirelman 2007a,b; *Kritika rasizma* 2008). The authors of racist pamphlets have also been sued in court. Nevertheless, the successful business begun by Avdeev and his colleagues in publishing the 'Library of Racial Thought' series continues to grow. In Chapter 1 of *Rasologiya*, Avdeev (2005, p. 24) states his approval of the 'commitment in principle concerning the main question' on the part of Russian anthropologists, namely, their defense of the objectivity of race as a biological phenomenon, and he goes so far as to claim that his book supports the 'positions and authority of Russian science' during the difficult times it is now facing. Consequently, although Avdeev claims scientific value for his work, he admits that Soviet and Russian physical anthropology, with all its conservatism in presenting race as a biological reality, is unable to construct racial discourse and, moreover, does not claim to do so.

Avdeev (2005, pp. 25–6) formulates this acknowledgement in the following way:

In *Rasologiya*, anthropological facts play the role of illustrative material in the explanations of certain societal processes. The architectonic of my text is built upon laws different from those of classical anthropology. Not to record, but to evaluate and explain – that is the task of *Rasologiya*. This text has no analogues in Russian scholarly literature because the latter is still unable to recover from the diseases of the Marxist class worldview. It is still incapable of honestly and openly defending its primary origin, that is, the Europoid race.

Yet Avdeev (2005, p. 107) continues to insist that ‘change in the concentration of particular racial features serves to accelerate or impede the promotion of any ideology, including religious ideology’. The task of Avdeev and his supporters, including Solovey, is to create a cultural and political context that would foster the interpretation of such categories as race, ethnos, nation, culture, and Russianness in a way that would forge a defined racial discourse in Russian society.

Although Avdeev cites the works of contemporary geneticists and anthropologists, he nevertheless always chooses fragments that mention the supposed Russian belonging to the ‘Nordic race’. He claims that Northwestern Russia has provided the foundation of the ‘Nordic race’ among Russians, while Southern Russian anthropological types, with their characteristic darker features, occupy a secondary position in comparison to the prevalent blonde-haired, blue-eyed type. But, in a manner very typical of the racist position in contrast to those who support ethnonationalist views, Avdeev (2005, p. 117) resorts to a trick in order to support his notion of the ‘Russian Nordic race’ – he places Russians in a lineage shared with fictional images of ideal ‘Others’:

The patricians of Ancient Rome exhilarated by awareness of their own magnificence, headstrong German knights, epic and miraculous Russian warriors, paragons of Russian beauty as gracious as the ‘white swans’ of fairy tales, SS officers with faces carved from ivory, reserved English gentlemen – This multitude of heroes of different ages and peoples are all characterized by the term *Nordic*, which defines the complex of physical and spiritual features of people who have originated in the sole Northern primeval motherland.

An analysis of this statement reveals not only the construction of the Nordic image of Russianness through comparison with already established figures of the racial imaginary. We also witness what the absence of relevant and detailed description means for connecting physical appearance with social position and psychological traits. Avdeev's image of Russianness is essentially non-historical and possesses no distinctive concrete features – Russians are simply strong and beautiful in an archaic 'folkloric' style. More importantly, however, his goal is to translate this vague image into contemporary language in order to brush aside the more traditional image. Russian traits that were constructed long ago, and which have been actively reproduced by ethnonationalists – patience, humbleness, hospitality, spirituality – cannot satisfy Avdeev, Solovey, and the other advocates of the 'new' racial definition of Russianness because they regard them as unwanted elements of racial mythology. Why would they be unwanted? Because they are judged to comprise obstacles for those who wish to position the 'Russian body and soul' in their allegedly proper and dignified place in the hierarchy of the supposed world racial order. Avdeev thus creates his own canon, racializing the images of the 'folklore anthropology' described by Olga Belova (2005).

***Rasovedenie* against *rasologiya*: physical anthropology's concept of 'race without prejudices'**

The texts detailed above as important elements in racist discourse are related not only to competing scientific programs, but also form part of a system of knowledge that is expressed in publications. Analyzing the logic of combining an apparently constructivist position in relation to ethnicity with a racial interpretation of Russianness may help reveal why the racist outlook is so widespread among all sections of society in post-Soviet Russia, irrespective of their political sympathies or levels of education. The primordialist view of ethnicity that is characteristic of Russian intellectuals and Russian academia is evident to any interested observer. Furthermore, the racist outlook can by no means be restricted to the discourse built up by those adhering to the Russian ethnonationalist movement. Academic specialists in physical anthropology have not only refuted Avdeev's main hypotheses, but also engaged in the struggle for influence over racist discourse and for the 'correct type of raciology'. Participants in the 1998 'Race, Myth or Reality?' conference, which was attended by more than 100 physical anthropologists

from the countries of the former Soviet Union and Poland, issued the following position statement:

The negativism towards the race concept that has become evident in recent decades could be explained in many respects by the psychological shock that all progressive humanity felt in the aftermath of World War Two. Interest in racial analysis was lost in Western Europe and the United States, which caused the loss of methodology and proper training and brought about a shift in physical anthropological investigations to genetic structures and genetic markers... [T]he result evident on both the popular level and at scientific conferences is the blurring of such concepts as race, ethnos, nation, language, and culture that has taken place. This is in fact very dangerous because it leads to a variety of pseudo-scientific insinuations. (Alekseeva and Yablonsky 2002, pp. 74–5)

This comment reflects the crisis of legitimacy in scholarly institutions as well as the introduction into academic discourse of works by intellectual entrepreneurs that had previously been rejected. The revision of ideological foundations and the opening of borders to international cooperation has led to the loss of authority for and recognition of the 'master narrative' of academic scholarship in Russia. This situation led Leonid Yablonsky to co-author an article published internationally in 2004 (Lieberman et al. 2004) concerning the contrasting views of race in the United States and Russia. In a conference presentation he observed that

Russian anthropology has made a great contribution to the study of the correlation between biological and social factors in human history. It still serves as a powerful outpost in the struggle against racism and the various forms of racial and national intolerance. Nevertheless, the current ethno-political situation in our country and new tendencies in the world of anthropological science demand that we strengthen Russian anthropology with skilled personnel, popularize its achievements, and maintain dialogue with foreign colleagues. (Yablonsky 2003, p. 36)

Galina Aksyanova, a physical anthropologist and a critic of Avdeev, states in a reference to Professor Yablonsky's comments that the 'space which has been abandoned by scientific raciology will immediately be occupied by charlatan scholars' (Aksyanova 2008, p. 81). The fall of

the ideological hegemony that had been provided by the state has, in fact, been accompanied both by a drop in the status of scholars and scholarly publications and a change in the communication structure of Russian society, in which the popular media have begun playing an ever larger role.

Post-Soviet physical anthropologists found themselves in a very difficult situation when the object of their research was discredited among western colleagues and the interest in studying the morphology of human diversity was weakened by the flourishing of genetic research – and the simultaneous boom in pseudo-scientific *Rassenkunde* at home. They were faced with the necessity of not only defending their academic discipline from the challenges of western science, but also answering the challenge of the new ‘scientific’ racism, which actively refers to the works of physical anthropologists themselves in its effort to establish and legitimize the conceptual complex of *rasologiya*. The latter task has been facilitated by Avdeev’s work. Avdeev (2005, p. 22) actively constructs the political indifference and axiological neutrality of Russian anthropology and juxtaposes this with his own views, which he presents as a ‘unified philosophical system, by means of which all social, cultural, economic, and political events are explained by the action of inherited racial differences among peoples’. If the anthropologist is, in Avdeev’s words (2005, p. 21), an ‘impassive wanderer among the academic natural sciences, then the raciologist is a watchdog of race, on guard against aliens even when the master does not throw him bones’. Advocates of Russian *rasologiya* regard their work as science in their efforts to provide ‘evidence’ that illustrates and justifies their theories. The level of discourse is sometimes sophisticated, the arguments apparently conform to the prevailing logic of science, and the conclusions drawn seem sound to the man on the street.

The search for a ‘master’ is very important in garnering possible institutional support for racial ideas and racist practices in contemporary Russia. In this respect, academic scholars have not been able to adequately confront the privately funded groups who are working together closely in order to produce a guiding vision that facilitates the racialization of scholarly and public discourse. My research regards these rather small but close-knit groups of writers and scholars with shared intellectual goals as agents of scientific change who are bringing about major paradigmatic shifts through their work. Nevertheless, the strategy of biological anthropologists remains ambivalent in respect to the challenge confronting them. On the one hand, they call for distinguishing

between public and academic discourse, preserving for themselves the role of scientific experts in the field. On the other, they are unable to speak out in public concerning the object of their research, either in the form of criticism of racist pamphlets, or in the form of public education through the discussion of race in school textbooks.

The official position of Russian anthropologists in relation to the idea of 'race' has often been voiced at many conferences and made available in publications (Alekseeva and Yablonsky 2002; Aksyanova 2003). It rejects racist postulates on the hierarchy of races, and also describes the idea that there are no discrete racial features common to all humans as 'deeply mistaken' (Alekseeva and Yablonsky 2002, p. 5). While criticizing the decline of the school of scientific racial studies in the West, Russian physical anthropologists harshly criticize the 'politically correct' position of western science, in which race is declared to be the cornerstone of hypocritical ideology, justifying exploitation, and racial studies are regarded as 'racist science' (Gerasimova and Vasilyev 2004, p. 12). At the Fourth Russian Congress of Ethnographers and Anthropologists the leading Russian physical anthropologist Alexander Zubov (2003, p. 22) argued that

[A] serious unbiased scientific approach from the anthropological point of view to the question of the different existing human races could defeat racialism. The idea that there are no human races can only do harm to humanity and humanism, and it is for the most part only a political conception.

A standard Russian ninth-grade school biology textbook (Ponomaryova et. al. 2010) provides numerous examples of what is supposedly the 'scientific' knowledge of race. I leave the statements without additional comments since they present the best illustration of the postulates of racial knowledge that have been singled out above in the works of Solovey and Avdeev.

Children resemble their parents by various characteristics, which demonstrates that they are inherited (82)... A race... is an internally specific group consisting of populations... characterized by similar morpho-physiological and psychic features (176)... The Europoid [Caucasian – N.Z.] race is characterized by... *blue eyes* (177)... Thick lips, a wide nose, and elongated and slender bodily proportions appeared as a means for enlarging the surface area of the body, which is useful for *thermoregulation in a hot climate*. (178) [my emphasis – N.Z.]

In works devoted to ethnographic descriptions of the various peoples who populated the former Soviet Union and addressed to the more interested reader, physical anthropologists also resort to strategies of racialization, as was noted above. For example, instead of emphasizing the particularity of Russianness as an anthropological type, whereby it can be distinguished from other types, the stress is instead placed on the typical and homogeneous features that Russians share with other Europeans (Alekseeva 2005, p. 71). From this position, Russians are considered to comprise a 'standard European type' (Deryabin 2002, p. 31) which can even make it difficult to identify them as specifically Russian. Such strategies for constructing Russianness differ from the strategies used to racialize other national groups. For example, when anthropologists describe the anthropological types of, say, Ukrainians, they stress their differences from 'Russian anthropological types' (Dyachenko 1965). While this serves to legitimize their national independence, it also highlights their supposed peripheral location on the map of Eastern Europe as well as the differences between their 'common' anthropological type and that of 'average Europeans' (Alekseeva and Dyachenko 2000, pp. 55–63). Several anthropological types, illustrated by photographs, are also defined in the case of both Ukrainians and Russians, which makes it possible to describe Ukrainian and Russian anthropological types in a number of different ways in comparison with those of contemporary Europe.

From the ethics of authenticity to the new biopolitics

Advocates of the racial turn in Russia have adopted a position similar to that of Foucault in their belief that new groups have been constructed on the basis of the discourse of racial war which are subjects in the 'new reading of Russian history'. Foucault clearly racialized the reading of history and social processes in the hope that new forces of resistance would emerge in contemporary conditions. Such forces of resistance have taken the forms of the Russian nation, Orthodox or Eurasian civilization, the white race, and Pax Russica (*Russkiy mir*) in the writings of numerous Russian intellectuals and politicians. The counter-history put forward by Russian nationalists comprises an attack on the authorities that has unfolded in conditions associated with the availability of racial knowledge to the broad public. But although Foucault (2003) celebrates the discourse of the war between races (understood as a revolt against oppression), he nevertheless distinguishes the latter from racist discourse, which he views as merely a particular expression of

the former in sociobiological terms in support of the interests of social conservatism.

The polyvalent character of racial discourse, together with its conversion into modern biological racism that has taken place in Russian society today, explains the use of Foucault's terminology by the nationalist politician Savelyev as he calls upon Russians to take up 'objective biopolitics'. But advocates of a racial reading of history and society are confronted by an obvious paradox in their representation of the themes of cultural authenticity and anti-colonialism. On the one hand, they claim that western domination has hindered the development of Russian identity and people's ability to question the hegemonic discourses of the West, as did the Slavophiles. On the other, they do not refer to the neo-Eurasianist Alexander Dugin – who is viewed by academic society as an object of research rather than as a colleague (Mitrofanova 2008, p. 101) – in order to support their claims about the distinctiveness of Russian civilization, but rather to the works of renowned historians of Russian nationalism and to such western scholars as Samuel Huntington. But even as we acknowledge Dugin's dubious fame for having introduced racist ideas into the academic and political weaponry used by certain nationalistic groups in Russia during the 1990s, we must nevertheless recognize that there is a clear contradiction between his theoretical platform and the definition of Russianness that Russian racist scholars have put forward. The position of the supporters of racialization is much more coherent and theoretically grounded than Dugin's eclectic constructions, which combine racist, Eurasianist, imperialist, and neoconservative ideas (Umland 2004). In addition, his geopolitical and civilizational project utilizes a great amount of mystical-philosophic rhetoric in order to provide an appearance of unity to his internally contradictory conception. The possible polysignificance of Dugin's conceptions also makes it easier to pick and choose which of Dugin's hypotheses to use in light of the political circumstances.

The proponents of the 'racial turn' uneasily juxtapose the ideological structures of anti-colonial Russian nationalism with the image of a heterogeneous imperial space that they christen *Russkiy Mir*, the 'Pax Russica'. The civilizational paradigm cannot be abandoned easily without endangering the cogency of discourse insofar as it is firmly entrenched in the social and historical sciences and is reproduced through the educational system (Shnirelman 2009). My position is that the development of a discourse denying 'political correctness' as a new ethics of authenticity is the main cornerstone upon which advocates

of racialism attempt to construct a coherent new 'Russian idea' and overcome the above paradox concerning cultural authenticity and anti-colonialism. In their views the main competitive advantage in the world of both Russia and Russian civilization would then be that they have not been contaminated by political correctness because Russians have allegedly preserved their racial pride and purity. Such rhetoric gratifies the large number of Russian citizens who have limited access to any capital whatsoever other than their perceived 'whiteness'. It makes them feel that they participate in those national policies, institutions, and social practices which reinforce social divisions by ascribing racial meaning to them.

The most active element in the production of racial discourses in Russia are the 'National Democrats', an influential intellectual and political movement. Its members are gathered around the journal *Voprosy Natsionalizma* ('Questions of Nationalism'), whose chief editor is Konstantin Krylov. Krylov (2011) describes the dilemma outlined above as follows:

The thought that 'a Russian is a white man' will inevitably cause Europe to hate us. 'Serving white masters' – which has been imposed on us – and 'becoming a white master' are two contradictory things. And the dream of a Russian 'Westernizer' is to obtain the position of a 'white master' in his own country with the 'right' to enslave his compatriots. For the sake of this pleasure he is ready to pay the 'genuine white masters' from the Anglo-Saxon paradise with his servile love and service – with his heart and soul.

For Krylov (2011), however, whiteness instead implies both autonomy and resistance. He states that

Becoming a 'genuine white man' is not only easy, it is very easy. Do what you want and understand how to do it. Try not to do what you do not want to do – and also try not to do what you do not understand, unless you are strongly forced to. But do not ape others of your own volition.

These words are directed, above all, to those who have too quickly abandoned the image of oppressed paleness in their wish to join the "master whiteness" of the 'world-historical Übermensch'. For example, the 'watchdog of race', Avdeev (2010, p. 4), writes in his acknowledgements to *Istoriya angliyskoy rasologii* [*History of British Racial Thinking*] that

I am also infinitely grateful to my English colleagues Professors Richard Lynn and Christopher Brand who opened the door for me, the first Russian, into the elite club of racial theorists. I am also grateful to Professor Jean Philippe Rushton, who undertook similar efforts to spread my ideas in Canada and the United States. Due to their efforts, I have joined the intellectual elite of the 'white world'.

It should be clear from this that the discursive practices of Russian intellectuals who disseminate racial knowledge are mediated by the master narrative (Spivak 1988; Dijk 1993), and it is thus not without reason that Krylov (2006) wrote the extended afterword to the Russian edition of Edward Said's *Orientalism*. Ilya Kukulin (2009) makes the following illustrative comment in this regard:

In general, T. and V. Solovey cite Russian authors principally through foreign scholarly texts, so the nationalism of these two Moscow professors acquires a certain suspiciously imported character. The thoughts of Petr Kireevskiy and Konstantin Aksakov are presenting through the work of the Polish historian Andrzej Walicki; quotations from Pavel Pestel' and Mikhail Katkov are provided from the works of the British historian of Russia Geoffrey Hosking. Such examples go on and on.

But the attitude of these intellectuals towards the West is nevertheless ambivalent. On the one hand, it is important for the advocates of 'making race' in Russia to emphasize that Russia's human material has a genetic and racial value which is equal to that of the West. On the other, their need to define Russianness as a priori distinct from westernness leads them to proclaim the autonomy of Russian civilization from the West. Russians as an ethnos would then be a kind of 'subrace' with an established and closed genetic pool. This ambivalence is also entrenched in the necessity to sustain the self-perception of Russians as an ethnoclass that has been subject to discrimination. The slogan 'for the Russians, for the poor' of the populist politician Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has provided both electoral support for his party as well as mass mobilization in the case of property-related conflicts. Avdeev (2007a) brutally expresses his evaluation of the West with the remark that 'There has never been any West. The West is the North tainted by the Jews. So we should speak only about the North and the South.'

Consequently, the task then is supposedly to activate the racial instinct, which, argues Solovey, is rooted in everyone from the

beginning, and endow it with appropriate social and cultural forms, which have been previously distorted – either intentionally or because of the objective character of the environment. Intellectuals in the circle around the journal *Voprosy natsionalizma* (Questions of Nationalism) address this issue by representing the Russian people as being disoriented. Russians has supposedly become confused and humbled by the notion of ‘humanity in general’ (*vsechelovechnost’*) that the government and nationalist competitors have imposed on them. These intellectuals, in fact, claim that the main value today of Russian intellectual and artistic contributions is their militant denial of political correctness. Sergey Sel’yanov (2004), the producer of the above-mentioned *Brat-2*, probably the most popular post-Soviet film in Russia, has declared that ‘Political correctness is harmful to art, devastating for art, even if art is only cinema.’ At this venture the doctrinaire interests of Russian racist scholars coincide with the instrumental goals of physical anthropologists, who, as a rule, condemn scientific racism but defend ‘race’ as both the object and analytical tool of their research.

A wide circle of Russian intellectuals have come to the conclusion that ‘political correctness’ does not mean justice and defense of the weak, but rather strengthening the control and hegemony in political life of western imperialism. The latter is often represented as racially alien Jewish (Rossman 2013). According to the logic of the imperial ‘Russian idea’, Europe had a reason to admire Russia for the higher quality of its soul even though it was backward in many other respects. However, a narrative that has become established as a result of the racist turn in social sciences and history maintains that the admiration of the West for Russia should be based on the fact that Russian people have not bowed to the indoctrination of political correctness, but have kept faith with the ideas of the purity of the white race. This view is in complete correspondence with that of the ideological progenitor of Russian racist thinking, Mikhail Menshikov, who stated in 1909 that ‘the differences between souls is nothing other than the difference between races’ (Menshikov 2004a, p. 59). Certain elements of the narrative of the messianic self-sacrifice of the Russian soul have also been retained, namely, that Russia now allegedly shields the West with its own body against the onslaught of the yellow and black hordes. This is one cause of the diversity of narratives about compassion towards the West. For example, Kozlov (1987) speaks of his ‘empathy’ towards the English and respect for England, a country which has been overwhelmed by a wave of non-European immigrants, while Solovey (2008) expresses his sympathy towards but also condemnation of the French, who have defined

their nation through political and territorial unity rather than ethnic belonging. In contrast, the former allies of the Eastern bloc are despised, being represented as having only taken from Russia without giving anything in return. Moreover, Europe should envy Russia because Russia is the authentic Europe – Sergey Sergeev (2010, p. 91), in fact, identifies the ‘revival of Russian Europe’ as the future mission of Russians in the world.

The other cornerstone in the works of the above-mentioned authors is their ambivalence towards the particular official discourse concerning World War Two. The focusing of all patriotic discourse on World War Two has become excessive; the fact of the Soviet Union’s participation in the war has made it impossible to accuse Russian society of racism. Nevertheless, representing soldiers as having fought for their motherland while hating the Bolsheviks, as well as attempts to partially rehabilitate the participants in the collaborationist Vlasov movement, have gained a degree of popularity since the late 1980s. There is also clear sympathy towards Russia’s ethnic Germans (Kozlov 1996, pp. 254–5), Germany, and the German nation as a whole (Avdeev 2005). But this obsession with what is Germanic and Nordic is not the same as classical Germanophilia. It is not the idea of the ‘typical German’ that is important, but rather the idea of nourishing what is German inside you in order to become civilized, which is the racial mythology of Nordicism. Egor Kholmogorov (2006) goes so far as to argue that Russians belong to ‘Nordic civilization’ by their ‘mentality’ and race, whereby there is a difference between Russians and Slavs.

Racialization is understood here as the process of making races and the process of acquiring Russian racial identity. But while the authors discussed in this chapter maintain that it is present on the pre-discursive level as a biological instinct, they consider their task to be to raise it to the discursive level, thereby endowing it with the symbolical value that correspond to supposedly objectively felt differences. The essence of scholarly racialization is thus to construct ideology and form groups. One of the ways in which human beings learn the world involves how their place in it defined. The authors discussed above regard identification as identification with the Russianness that has been institutionalized in social groups. This process unfolds, first, as a cognitive process, that is, as knowledge of belonging to a group. New ideologists of race actively construct this knowledge, thereby ‘enlightening’ the reader. This process unfolds, secondly, as an axiological process, that is, ideologists generate positive (or negative) connotations associated with belonging to a certain group. Finally, this process unfolds as an

emotional process in which one takes a certain group as hers. The Russian nation usually plays the role of such a group in the Russian Federation today. The appeal to nation and not to *ethnos*, as is the case in, for example, Lev Gumilev's works, is a necessary element of self-positioning on the political field.

The obvious ambivalence concerning the definition of Russianness in the official discourse, which is more inclined towards the civic definition of *Rossiyanе*, permits those scholars who are opposed to the party in power and advocate Russian nationalism to say that, in contrast to some other nationalities in the former Soviet Union, Russians have no state of their own. Liberally inclined Russian scholars of race and nationalism also emphasize that post-Soviet Russia has had to face the fact that 'there is no Russian national project', whereas there is, by contrast, a 'growing nationalization of non-Russian peoples' (Mogilner 2008, p. 277). Ethnic mobilization, along with the search for roots, forebears, and lost statehood among 'imperial minorities', has left the imperial majority without a formulated ethno-civic sphere. Whereas the significant level of social cohesion that was reached in Soviet times allowed its ideologues to talk of the existence of the 'Soviet people' as a new historical community, the only parameter in contemporary Russia that unites all Russian citizens is – according to Russian nationalists – the fact that they live on the territory of the Russian Federation.

The consequences of this situation can be overcome, Solovey and Solovey (2009) maintain, only by the particularization of the civic sphere, leading to ethnocracy as the only legitimate system of government in Russia. Scholars like him preach the necessity of what they term the 'ethnicization' of consciousness, social groups, and social relations in Russia. This leads invariably to questions about who and what is to be considered ethnically Russian. There exist two theories based on the concept of *ethnos* formulated by Gumilev and the Soviet mainstream framework within which Russian policy makers and experts sensitize social issues associated with nationalism and ethnicity. The call advanced by such authors as Sokolovsky (2001), Tishkov (2003), and Malakhov (2007) for the analysis of ethnicity as a form of social organization of cultural diversity has been heeded only in the narrow circles of a relatively small part of the academic community.

While Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev claim that nationalist ideas will lead to Russia's collapse, scholars who emphasize the racial character of Russianness do not see anything particularly tragic about such a prospect. Even Kozlov, who can hardly be classified as a member

of the young post-Soviet middle class, has discussed the inevitability of ethnic conflicts as well as the possibility of creating a Russian Republic as one of the members of the Russian Federation (Kozlov 1996, p. 285). This was clearly a ground-breaking step in 1996, when, just before the clash between Yeltsin and Zyuganov in the presidential elections, the nationalistically inclined electorate was marching under the banner of nostalgia for the Soviet Union, the supposed heir of the Russian Empire. As in the 1990s advocates of both empire and ethnonationalism shared anti-western and anti-democratic sentiments, and were opposed to the mainstream discourse of neoliberal changes. Personal freedoms, democracy, and civil society in an ethnically homogenous Russian state have become the new alternative vision to Putin's system of government that certain ethnonationalists have presented.

5

Rioting for Whiteness: *Doing* Race on the Squares of Moscow

December 11, 2010 was marked by the worst racial riots in Moscow history when the police proved incapable of stopping the 5,000-strong crowd beating up anyone who was 'non-Slavic' in appearance who they happened to catch on Manezh Square near the Kremlin. This mass protest expressed the widespread public reverberance (inter alia, affecting the political sphere) caused by the shoddy official investigation into the murder of Yegor Sviridov, a Spartak fan killed by a group of 'individuals of a Caucasian nationality', to imply people from the Northern Caucasus and representing ethnic minorities in Russia. On October 13, 2013, the Moscow borough of Biryulevo also saw clashes with the police as a public reaction to the murder of Yegor Shcherbakov, again by a person who was again described as of 'non-Slavic appearance'. Again, the police were nearly helpless, and the Moscow authorities were at a loss. These events were remarkable in terms of both their significance and their consequences, and, therefore, they should be considered not only as racist violence episodes but, more importantly, as a collective action involving ideological, material, and organizational resources to achieve political goals nationwide.

The events at Manezh Square and Biryulevo brought to life a number of issues. What social forces challenged the established sociopolitical order in Russia? What analytical tools could be used to address them? How does such collective action correspond to the previous idea of racist movements in the post-Soviet space? To what extent these riots were caused by the pre-existing social and political situation in Russia, and what social changes did they bring about? Is it possible to theoretically comprehend this collective action within the existing definitions of social movement?

If expressive aspects are more or less clarified with regard to racist disorders in Kondapoga 2006, Stavropol' 2007, and Manezhnaya Square 2010 (Foxall 2010; Yurchishin 2013; Zakharov 2013), a lesser clarity exists for instrumental aspects of their being a racist collective action. Precisely these latter aspects allow us to consider these insurgencies as interrelated events, themselves to become objects of the sociological research into processes of 'doing race' in present-day Russia. This chapter will address the questions as formulated above and will draw on the social movement against immigration in Russia as a basis for its theoretical constructions. These constructions aim to grasp both the materiality of collective action and the corresponding social actors, and social significance of these processes. Collective action is considered here in its specific socioeconomic as well as political contexts, and to bear some crucial mobilizing importance rather than mere manifestations of spontaneous discontent with regard to the murders, which triggered the unrest.

It is important to note that a person's awareness of belonging to a social movement suggests some further development of their sense of solidarity and group identity. In addition, an instrumental social movement is aimed to change the society by influencing the attitudes and practices by participants in the movement, their potential supporters, and the beneficiaries of the planned social change. The social movement against immigration is currently one of the most important players in the field of social movements in Russia. Even without any proper legal status, this movement is structurally supported by its presence on the Internet that allows its activists to network with groups of football fans and far-right activists. Identifying this movement's key elements, such as their discourses and narratives of migration processes in Russia, will help to explain how the participants in these riots understood their protest, and how they were involved in the particular events. It will also help uncover racialization mechanisms and actors in Russia.

Racialization should be treated not only as the allocation of race meanings to hitherto racially unclassified public relations, practices and groups but also as the acquisition of racial feelings by immediate agents of this process. Such acquisition involves the adoption, discussion and practical application of racial discourse through the social practices specific to a given country or society. Thus, pursuing the aims of the study, it is necessary to reveal the discourse-to-actors interaction that entails the structure that is most common in the case of the immigration issue, and to determine the actors-to-social order relationship that either prevents or contributes to framing processes.

This chapter asserts that in certain situations and as based on these subcultures and political structures, a social movement may arise. Not all skinheads nor members of other subcultural groups (such as football fans) would eventually form a social movement. Nevertheless, any sociological analysis of racist collective action should apply certain criteria of a social movement. The social movement against immigration offers convincing evidence that social activism is compatible with individual lifestyles. Studying such events solely as subcultural manifestations would circumscribe our ability to analyze the processes of social change in the Russian Federation, with its historically underdeveloped party system, where the anti-immigration movement has become a part of the political process and formulates its goals of social transformation. Another reason to shift our focus from subcultural processes to social movements is the specificity of the Russian context supporting the point that Russia is 'more than just a case'.

[T]he Russian experience reveals the slippages between subcultural and mainstream cultural activity, and it is precisely because of this that the non-authentic terminology 'formal' and 'non-formal' activity remains useful. These categories posit a horizontal and interlocking relationship between cultural worlds which may be more analytically productive than more familiar Western ones which suggest a vertical (subcultural) or horizontal, but parallel (counter-cultural) relationship. (Pilkington 1994, p. 198)

There are at least three reasons for the heretofore lacking sociological conceptualizations of collective action against immigration to Russia. One of them concerns the nature of sociopolitical processes in Russia and Eastern Europe at large. There is a certain tradition to consider social movements as a necessary component as well as a prerequisite of democratic consolidation, which is largely based on the role of social movements in the transformations of the late 1980s (Chebankova 2013; Gabowitsch 2013).

A novel feature of the approach taken in this chapter is its focus on the role played by the 'uncivil society' being part of the broader concept of 'civil society' and constituted by radical right-wing movements (Kopecky and Mudde 2003). These movements are considered to be true representatives of civil society that engage in the grassroots-supported contentious politics. While in other European countries the driving force behind the race riots were second-generation young migrants, the corresponding central role in Moscow and other Russian

cities was played by young Russians opposed to immigrants and considering themselves as ethnic Russians. At first glance, it may seem counterintuitive to consider these episodes as samples of collective action in the framework of the theory of social movements. Indeed, prior to the 2006 mass protests in Kondopoga, racist violence in Russia had never taken the form of collective action. By protest, we mean 'joint (i.e. collective) action of individuals aimed at achieving their goals or goals by influencing decisions of the target' (Opp 2009, p. 38). However, beginning with the Kondopoga events, when the protests led to pogroms of those who had come there from Northern Caucasus, not only neo-Nazi gangs but also 'normal' ethnic Russian people were participants in racist attacks. Moreover, those active in the October 2013 Biryulevo as well as the 2010 Manezhnaya Square events considered the Russian political establishment as their antagonists, who combined racist rhetoric with a liberal migrant policy. In both cases, rank-and-file participants were led by such professional politicians as the DPNI leader Alexander Belov and members of other far right-wing groups and parties (Belov 2011).

'Ethno-racial' mobilization by a dominant group on the basis of its primordial identity is somewhat unusual, given the present stage of development of nation-states. According to the definition by Tilly (2008, pp. 187–8) adopted in this chapter

[A] social movement is a sustained series of interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support.

Since it is impossible to argue that ethnic Russians are deprived of such representation of their interests, the asymmetry of power relations is not rooted in the institutionalization of their ethnicity. Instead, this issue can be discussed as being generated by somebody's subjective perception of inferiority of their position that impacts their identity. According to Alexei Navalny (2011), a popular leader of anti-Putin protests:

There is no genocide of the Russian people – as it was the case in Rwanda. However, problems of Russians expelled from Turkmenistan are a million times closer to my heart than the terrible suffering in

Rwanda, which experienced a real genocide – just because Russians in Turkmenistan are my much closer relatives.

Another reason for the absence of any theoretical analysis of the social movement against immigration is the fact that there is often some confusion in Russia between social movements and NGOs, as it was rightly observed by Clement et al. (2010, pp. 340–1). They are usually presented in the media in a simplified form as a group of enlightened intellectuals who have registered their NGOs and are trying to impose on society some western-style and western-funded innovations, which are resisted by ordinary, traditionally minded Russians. This notion of civic initiatives plays in favor of the authorities and allows, for example, Putin to describe civil activists as ‘jackal-like scavenging around foreign embassies in Moscow’. However, recent empirical studies by both Clement (2013) and Gabowitsch (2013) show that Russian NGOs today are underrepresented in civil initiatives and movements. One of the central goals of the analysis here is to question the NGO-ization thesis. The special attention in this study of racialization via ‘doing race’ is paid to how ordinary citizens (rather than members of NGOs) were co-opted and mobilized through social networks for their collective action in the movement against immigration. Considering the racist disorders in Russian cities through the prism of social movement research is also justified by the success of anti-immigration activists in attracting public attention to, and accentuating immigration problems. In addition, the events Manezhnaya Square triggered similar protests in many other large cities across Russia. This chapter demonstrates a reaction that the movement provoked in addressing its two major targets of influence – public opinion and political elites.

Concerning a third reason, it seems difficult to treat as a single movement all of the dissimilar organizations and groups that are considered to represent Russian nationalists, and to regard as racist all of their actions, ranging from ‘Russian marches’ to protests under the slogan ‘Stop feeding the Caucasus!’ Indeed, they differ in many respects, starting with their different titles and leaders. Most importantly, only some of them identify themselves clearly as belonging to the anti-immigration movement. However, the growing presence of terms such as ‘migration’ and ‘migrants’ in their documents, slogans, and speeches mean that immigration is close to the ideological core of the movement. In addition, all of these protests are related to each other both by ‘the man in the street’ and in the mass media, thus turning them into ‘sequences of contentious politics’ (Tarrow 1998, p. 2). Some key

public appearances by the movement demonstrate the close interaction between activists and their leaders, and include their general demands, thus turning them into a metaphor for the 'race question' in Russia. According to Varga (2008, p. 566), a complex picture of the far right in Russia is easier to understand if we imagine them as a 'sector' of the social movements sphere. It is the recurrence and regularity of such protests in the past as well as the sustained interaction of key activists that coordinate their responses to various events that allow us to regard one-off protest events as collective action by the social movement. Of crucial importance is the fact that 'doing' race by taking part in violent clashes wasn't short-lived. Violent protests took place for at least several days in various cities of Russia, thereby making them different from any one-time racist violence.

Understanding the anti-immigrant movement and its collective action

The leaders of the anti-immigrant social movement try to impress Russian society by creating its image that stresses consensus and solidarity. In fact, its activists are highly dissimilar individuals belonging to various nationalist groups (Verkhovsky and Kozhevnikova 2009). In order to grasp the actual extent of this movement's specificity and unity, its collective action should be examined. Using Tilly's expression (2008, p. 194), 'we look for a sustained interaction in which mobilized people, acting in the name of a defined interest, make repeated broad demands on powerful others via means that go beyond the current prescriptions of the authorities'.

Since the potential for action is actualized in the practice of protest activities, it is necessary to assess real events in search of those forces that drive race formation. An event here is a distinguishable happening, one with some pattern or theme that sets it off from others, and one that involves changes taking place within a delimited amount of time' (Conkin and Stromberg 1989, p. 173). Michael Hechter (1975) emphasizes the importance of the event for group solidarity, while Brubaker (2004, p. 12) proposes to regard 'groupness' as an event, and the moments of collective solidarity – as lasting events. In addition, events involving members of subcultures are more accessible for empirical study than their subculture per se or a movement at large.

Every year since 2005, a key event for many right-wing groups is a 'Russian march' (Zuev 2010b, 2013). Over the years, this has been organized by the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), which

coordinates the march in different Russian cities. Prohibited in 2011, several months after the Manezhnaya Square events, this organization set up a number of other protest actions with regard to various protest causes. These protests ranged from individual conflicts between Russian home owners and migrant tenants to bloody clashes in Kondopoga that received widespread coverage in the media.

This chapter considers at first hand an act of civil disobedience that was provoked by careless police work with regard to the murder of a football fan on December 6, 2010. Yegor Sviridov was a member of the fan club of Spartak Moscow, a leading football team, and his death alongside the subsequent release of suspects from detention enraged a huge community of Russian football fans, some of whom were involved in skinhead and other extreme right-wing groups. Sviridov and his friends were attacked by a group of six people from the Northern Caucasus representing ethnic minorities in Russia. The prosecutor's office released five of them, leaving the remaining one in custody, who was subsequently charged with murder. The peaceful protest was soon escalated into a riot when, for example, teenagers exchanged Nazi greetings and 'Russia for Russians, Moscow for Muscovites' exclamations. A number of public places in Moscow and other major Russian cities were the sites of racist violence and civil unrest. These crowds consisted of a core of activists forwarding a specific set of goals, and a periphery of bystanders. Their mass character was the case not only due to football fans that usually participate in any clashes, but also owing to the attendance by usual, law abiding Muscovites.

According to the Resource Mobilization Theory, collective endeavors, such as anti-immigrant social movements, require financial, human, social, and cultural resources (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). These resources serve a movement's internal aims and its sociopolitical goals, such as addressing social problems in line with this movement's vision and priorities. According to Zuev (2010a, p. 264), when popular media channels are controlled by one political party, the success of a social movement depends upon effective interaction between its real actions and Internet resources. One of the movement's leaders, and an informant in this research, Vladimir Tor (2011), privately admitted to me that he came into politics largely owing to new communication technologies, and primarily through livejournal.com blogs. Subsequently, these blogs allowed him to coordinate activists taking part in events organized by various nationalist groups. These protests were directed against the government's immigration policy and fueled anti-immigrant sentiments against immigrants from Asia, the Caucasus and the republics of

the Russian Federation, thereby replacing to some extent the old anti-Semitism and anti-westernism. The composition of the participants is also in flux, and today their majority are young people, instead of the older generation, as it was in the nationalist protests of the 1990s.

How do the participants regard both themselves and migrants? What are their goals? Collective self-presentation of this movement is a key to a reliable analysis of its ideology and central narratives, as is discussed in the following examples cited by Charles Clover (2010):

Ivan Katanayev, ex-leader of Phratria (Fratriya), a movement of fans of Spartak FC, explained it: 'The crowd who came to the rally has no leaders – only the consciousness that we cannot go on living like this and the desire to change everything.' ... 'This is a massive political wave, and no-one can stop it,' said Anton Susov, a member of the Movement Against Illegal Migration, one of the groups behind riots on Manezhnaya Square. 'That wave', he says, 'reflects a wider popular anger against the government over the influx of migrants, official corruption and a stagnant economy.'

According to the movement's participants, the problem of immigration is par excellence the problem of migrants' presence in the public space as well as the identity of former migrants who at some point cease to consider themselves to be migrants. Commitment to an idea of a migrant-free and ethnically homogeneous Russia is possible only by representing migrants as 'the other'. Stressing a racial component, or the racialization of visual differences among separate groups of migrants serves this exact purpose. The origins of the use of ethnonationalist solidarity and cooperation in collective interests and via collective action are to be found in social conflict. Since Simmel, sociologists have often theorized conflict as driving group cohesion, whereby group identity is formed.

Any conflict occurs among some identified groups, as in the case of the 'white' majority and 'black' migrants, or between members of the movement against immigration and the government, sided by institutions that regulate migration to Russia. Yet the other side of the conflict is often served by potential members of the movement and the police that may initially be represented by the actual participants as 'traitors of the white race and the Russian people' but nevertheless, have an opportunity to 'rehabilitate' themselves by joining the movement.

Analyzing the mechanism of the identity of the participants in the riots, as in the case of Manezhnaya Square and Biryulevo, we must note

that the interests of individual participants can be formed over a collective project, and that involving them in collective action in itself is often a purpose of mobilization. Acting in a particular social situation, movement participants gain solidarity that can be imprinted in their collective memory in the form of a positively colored unity. As Vladimir Tor (2011, p. 4) points out, 'Were those who came to Manezhnaya Square Russian nationalists initially? Not necessarily. However, it is much more important that they were Russian nationalists upon leaving this place.'

In the context of resource constraints, any declaration of identity is a request for material resources that disputes some direction in social policy, resource allocation, and membership rules. The protest agenda of the movement at point is focused on such resources as public space, presumably monopolized by immigrants and supposedly leading to what they term the 'blackening' of the city. Participants come into communication with people who share their views and beliefs, and the former put pressure on the latter in order to achieve greater uniformity between their beliefs and articulation of identity that initially may vary. When collective action goes as far as countering the police and beating the phenotypically distinct passerby, the participants tend to perceive all belonging to the same social group or subculture (youth from suburbs, football fans) not only as 'fellows' but even as a kind of epistemic authority (Yurchishin 2013, p. 353). All of these factors contribute to the self-segregation of a group, with its members learning to make decisions and act on the basis of their newly acquired race identity. In other words, they get involved in the process of 'doing race'.

In addition, the deprived, marginalized and often underpaid youth is ready to mobilize in racist groups. For them, the migrant can be seen as a competitor for resources. Social space plays an important role in group identity, and Moscow, in its role as a global city, reproduces inequality both internally and externally. Since ghetto inhabitants are powerless under the conditions of Russian capitalism, protest social movements are directed against the government. As Muscovites enjoy the benefits of city life – their social security and welfare level is several times higher than in other regions – they articulate local chauvinism, which is only enhanced by a racist ideology. 'Russia for Russians, Moscow for Muscovites', the most popular slogan of the nationalist youth, football fans and members of the movement, reflects the structure of this representation. Muscovites are involved in particularist solidarities for at least several decades, and they perceive their privileged unity through their opposition to those living elsewhere. This division appeared in Soviet times as a result of the residence permitting (*propiska*), which

determined the access of Muscovites to resources such as goods and services (Vendina 2013). When the boundary of local privileges coincides with certain imaginary boundaries between those who look like a Muscovite and everyone else, people start to engage in racialization.

According to some studies, the social mobility of ethnic Russians deteriorates from generation to generation (Chernysh 2011, p. 37). Improved opportunities for consumption under the conditions of economic growth during the last decade, against the background of the time of radical economic reforms, cannot compensate for the trauma associated with entering a new economic and social order. Members of those groups that have lost their former social statuses and privileges are more likely to participate in social movements that they regard as representing their interests. Chernysh (2011, p. 39) makes the following observation in his analysis of results of a 2007 survey in St Petersburg on the achievement of success in modern Russian society:

Those who think that ethnicity (nationality) is essential for social climbing often also believe that it is similarly important to live in the capital and to have political views acceptable to 'mobility watchers' in order to succeed. Thus they produce an explanation of why some people are more successful than others. They think that some Russian citizens are successful because they have learned the correct ideology and used their ethnic ties as well as the fact of residing in the capital.

Alexander Prokhanov (2002), a nationalist, a popular writer and media figure, wrote in his editorial in the nationalist newspaper *Zavtra* that

skinheads – children of unemployed Russians, brothers of raped sisters, sons of the exterminated population that is shrinking by a million a year, as if Russia has been occupied by Hitler – now subject to arrests. They frighten those gentle Azerbaijani tats [a Jewish group] who have already bought half of Moscow, own half of its markets and restaurants, and proudly sit in the prefectures, to administer the fate of unreasonable Muscovites.

Nationalist sentiments and reactions to inequality are mobilizing resources. The mechanism of obtaining racist attitudes via interpersonal interaction is combined with a macro-level trend and propensity to seek consistency and cohesion in a changing Russian society that is causing much social pain. Frustration and discontent on the part of

disadvantaged groups should also not be underestimated as a factor of mobilization. Ian Law (2012, p. 155) argues that 'racism has become the social glue that is holding a traumatised and disillusioned Russian society together'. Support from the groups interested in the escalation of social unrest, pursuing their own goals, and capitalizing on immigration issues, should also be taken into account. One ideologist of contemporary Russian nationalism, Sergey Sergeev, expressed the opinion that, in modern Russia, it is the 'middle class' that is most interested in a strong and independent nation state, because otherwise the process of liberal globalization might bring down the country. Since the Russian 'middle class' competes with strong ethnic clans, nationalism turns out to be the most instrumental ideology for its representatives' daily usage. However, Sergeev (2010, pp. 47–8) goes on to assert the hope that at some point in the future it would be possible to elevate 'the national consciousness to a higher level from the present-day primitive biological ethnocentrism'.

As the anti-immigration movement intensifies, it becomes necessary to develop ideological components to substantiate its messages. Often these elements are borrowed from the existing repertoire of available discourses, adapted to the purposes of the movement, among other things, by taking into account the audience to be essentially informative and credible. As is the case with western 'white power' movements, 'martyrs' are used in Russia to recruit supporters, given that public resentment is an important driver of any such movement. In the case we are considering here, such resentment was fueled not only by Sviridov's death, which strengthened the feelings of the most militant activists, but also by historical factors. As noted by Rydgren (2007, pp. 238–9), 'ethno-nationalist narratives that promise ethnic renaissance and status reversal are particularly likely to find a susceptible audience in situations that breed widespread *ressentiment*'. Accordingly, members of the movement claimed that migrants from the Caucasus practiced random attacks on ethnic Russians, and the translation of this and such-like complaints representing Russians as the 'suffering majority', became the rationale for racist attacks. Despite the fact that many present-day scholars dispute the importance of 'social deprivation' as the cause of social movements and identity, the logic of racialization in Russia features subjective deprivation as a discursive resource for agency. The writings of Alexander (see, for example, Alexander et al. 2004, p. 10) argue rightly that even the ruined economy is not necessarily a trauma for society, because for such 'traumas to emerge, social crises must become cultural crises', while the trauma itself is not

a collective pain but rather a result of 'acute discomfort entering into the core of the collectivity's sense of its own identity' and represented as 'a fundamental threat to their sense of who they are, where they came from, and where they want to go'.

Lost faith in an established ideology results in the loss of civic identity, solidarity, and cohesion. Following the defeat of the nation in the Cold War – as the collapse of the Soviet Empire is often presented in the media – the former Soviet people were not confident in their joining 'civilized nations' that won the Cold War. However, they also refused to admit themselves to be citizens of a 'Third World' country that previously had been stigmatized by the Soviet media as raw material appendages of the imperialist West and as being undeveloped, poor, powerless, and culturally inferior.

Healing this trauma required to turn negatives into positives. The Social Darwinian thesis that was in widespread use at the beginning of the 1990s and manifested in masochistic self-flagellation, became converted into the antithetical imperial chauvinism. This defensive reaction could originate either at the grassroots level, or it could be fomented by elites, seeking to widen the social distance between themselves and the masses and hiding behind slogans for the protection of the customs and traditions (Bauman 1992).

Healing the trauma: the authorities' responses to Manezhnaya Square and Biryulevo riots

The events on Manezhnaya Square and in Biryulevo demonstrated a failure of the Kremlin's policy to control the political activity of the youth. The first to respond to this situation was the police and its leadership, as it was supposed to do with regard to any public disorder. Another quotidian thought about this situation is that for ordinary people the police are the embodiment of the state. A rather non-quotidian remark characterizing the police on that occasion concerns its negotiations with a man in a balaclava.

For a police force not known for being shy with its truncheons, this [negotiating with a man in a balaclava] was an unprecedented move, and it has solidified the growing belief among the Russian public that the authorities are either unable or unwilling to stop the recent wave of violence being perpetrated by the country's nationalists. 'It was basically admitting defeat', says Evgeny Valyaev, the shaven-headed leader of supremacist group *Russky Obraz*, whose members took part in Saturday's riots. 'They shouldn't have provoked us. That was their

mistake. So Kolokoltsev [the Moscow Police Commissioner, now the Minister of Internal Affairs] was forced to negotiate with a man in a black mask'. (Shuster 2010)

Over a protest, the police can have representations of either movement participants or a protest target by embodying corruption and faulty immigration policy, or fellow travelers also fighting against 'criminal blacks'.

In three years, at the time of the Biryulevo events, the police could not prevent pogroms at the local vegetable warehouse, which was employing migrants from Central Asia. In that case, the law enforcers became targets of several attacks and a most seriously affected party of these clashes. Following the public unrest in Biryulevo in April 2013, Moscow Mayor Sobyanin preferred to avoid any dialog with Muscovites who were resentful about the murder.

Where would you like me to come? To the market? In order to speak to some nationalists and to wave a baton? This is a task of professionals who have done their job properly. (BBC 2013)

When it came to the discussion of the collective action on Manezhnaya Square in the public sphere, it demanded a response from President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin. In turn, they mentioned the events and warned that any further protests would be stopped, then they promised to deal with uncontrolled migration and the corrupt law enforcement system, and finally Putin went as far as to lay flowers at the grave of the murdered soccer fan Yegor Sviridov. These actions made manifest the ambivalence of the government's position of a major target of influence of the movement. The Russian President Dmitry Medvedev assured the public that the situation was under control and that the organizers of the 'pogrom' were to be found and punished. He appealed to Russians:

[T]hink of the unfortunate example of Nazi Germany. This ultimately struck a blow to the German nation... All Nazis, independent of where they come from... they simply undermine the cultural foundations of our state... Intolerance, aggression and closed-mindedness are phenomena that, as a rule, occupy the lowest levels of culture. (cit. in Ferris-Rotman 2011)

Putin made accusations against certain corrupt Moscow investigators who had allegedly released a gang of murderers in exchange for a bribe, but he also condemned the riot for being a manifestation of

'xenophobia'. In his annual televised dialogue with the Russians, he stated that Russian liberals should understand the necessity of the 'law and order'. He also said that the government was there to implement the will of the majority, because 'otherwise, liberal intellectuals would have to shave off their beards, put on helmets and go to the streets to fight with radicals' (Putin 2010). He meant that the bearded liberals and intellectuals (in itself a racialized image) would never protect the people, and that the government would protect them instead. This is a significant remark in the light of the practices of masculinity construction among football supporters and skinheads in Russia (see, *inter alia*, Belikov and Gromov 2009; Kosterina 2009; Pilkington et al. 2010).

Thus, a major message of these public statements referred to the powerful state ready to suppress any inter-ethnic conflicts and also far-right extremism.

In their turn, Church officials stated that the riot on Manezhnaya Square had been organized by unidentified forces that were seeking to ruin Russia. In his televised address, Patriarch Kirill likened these forces to those people who had snowballed an ethnic strife into the collapse of the Soviet Union twenty years ago, and he warned citizens of Russia from following a similar path.¹ However, prevailing public responses to the riots came very quickly through a combination of journalists' reports and sociological surveys. During a 'phone calls in the studio' broadcast by the Vesti-24 state-run radio station with regard to the recent violence in Moscow, the majority of callers expressed their support for the protesters on Manezhnaya Square. In Moscow and St Petersburg, those sympathizing with the rebels amounted to 37 per cent, as reported by VTSIOM, a state-controlled public opinion research center that collected these data in its survey conducted in 138 Russian cities on December 18–19. Another survey recorded that 55 per cent of Russians supported the 'Russia for Russians' slogan (Clover 2010). Finally in this regard, Levada-Centre (2013) conducted its survey immediately after the Biryulevo events and showed 54 per cent support of the idea to prohibit entry to Russia by migrants from the Caucasus, and 45 per cent advocating similar actions against those migrating from Central Asia.

From the above mentioned it is clear that, at some point, the public opinion favored the movement. The state-controlled TV could no longer turn a blind eye to the events, as it had done previously in the case of some smaller-scale inter-ethnic clashes. As was mentioned, following a meeting with football fans, Putin visited Yegor Sviridov's grave and announced that the authorities were considering the introduction

of tougher immigration policies. President Medvedev (2011) also decided to change his tactics at this point and he switched from his previous strong disapproval of the riot to references to the unique role of the Orthodox Church for the Russian people in the Russian Federation, and then to replication of a 'cultural trauma' meme:

We should pay attention to our multiethnic culture. But, without any doubt, special attention should be paid to Russian culture. This is the foundation and backbone for the development of our entire multiethnic culture. This is fine, and we should not be ashamed to say this. Overall, Russians are the majority in our country. Russian is the state language. The Russian Orthodox Church is the largest religion in our country. We need to develop the best traits of the Russian character, precisely because at one time the best traits of our character made our country strong and essentially created our country.

Thus on the one hand, Medvedev recognized Russia's multiethnicity, while, on the other hand, he proposed to elevate ethnic Russians to become 'first among equals', which would be practically impossible to accomplish without relegating all the other nationalities of Russia into inferior positions. Whereas, in his annual address to the nation, Putin (2011a) stated that

This is not only a Russian problem. Similar problems take place in Europe. I often talked with my colleagues in the European countries. You know, there's one of my ex-colleagues, the Prime Minister (I will not name the country), who told me about people from North Africa who reside in his country for 10 years and who do not speak her language... And we know what problems they presently have there with immigrants from Islamic countries of North Africa. Moreover, even those people who are very democratically minded, nurtured on principles of tolerance, as it is fashionable to say in their milieu – now they claim that this policy has completely failed in Europe.

In general, government officials today strive to present any racist violence either as extremism on the part of football fans or as a European phenomenon, brought on by the massive in-country migration, such as from poorer southern regions in Moscow and other relatively well-off Russian cities.

Church officials have taken more drastic steps to hamper the formation of a non-ethnic civil nation in Russia. After the Manezhnaya

Square events, Rev. Vsevolod Chaplin² (2011) confessed to a Russian TV channel that, if ethnic identification was to be discontinued, as was being proposed by supporters of a Russian civil nation, the question would inevitably arise: 'Why, then, all of us do not immediately become citizens of the world?' Then Rev. Chaplin added that 'it is a common knowledge that Jews play chess better, and Africans play basketball better... which is not to imply that they are ["simply the best"] but that they are ["just different"]', and also that the ethnic diversity should be accounted for at all time'. After the Biryulevo events and referring to the fact that football fans and some provocateurs took part in them alongside local residents, Rev. Chaplin remarked that:

There is no good in that some people yesterday attacked the police. People have to express their opinions and feelings within the law. But this is not the main problem. The main problem is that the city and its environs contains some criminal 'clots' where the law is violated systematically. These clots' inhabitants are rude and commit crimes on the streets, sometimes killing civilians. If this problem is not resolved, a situation similar to the Biryulevo events will be repeated more and more often and in all the more severe form. (Chaplin 2013)

An all-important role in this discourse is played by the mass media, as noted by Hutchings and Tolz (2012, p. 896) in their analysis of the TV coverage of the Manezhnaya Square riot: 'The only full point of consensus shared across all the channels remained the unreflexive equation of ethnic Russians along with the Russian Federation as a whole – a view that contradicts the Kremlin's ideal of a multiethnic civic Russian nation.'

The scale of measures taken to police the Manezhnaya Square and after the Biryulevo event two years later shows that the authorities take the movement seriously. The Government of Moscow presently introduces an additional echelon of regional security in the form of Moscow police units to combat ethnic crime. In addition, the riots resulted in the first attempts to establish state control over the Internet in Russia, in the name of national security. Events in the Middle East and North Africa have also prodded the authorities to take further steps in this direction. Moreover, the Russian government's decision to ban the Movement Against Illegal Immigration as an extremist organization, as Vladimir Tor told the author in person, reflects Putin's apprehension that an uprising along Egyptian lines could take place in Russia, but only serves to unite the vast Russian nationalist movement.

When a year later, Putin was asked whether he later regretted putting flowers at Sviridov's grave, his reply was as follows (2011a):

No, of course I do not regret it. [...] In general, people show their positive attitude; although there may be different manifestations [of public displeasure with migrants and of popular racism], both here and abroad. Have not we seen shops and stadiums smashed abroad? ... Are we any different from them in this regard? Of course, we are not. With regard to all these questions, please think about what sort of Russian chauvinism or nationalism may be involved, where there was not a single Russian name either among those who have called for revenge or among those who have committed the murder, or who have been otherwise involved in the murders. What was there from superpower chauvinism? Look at the names of the convicts. No Russian names. So let's not provoke the Russian *muzhik* [the masculine representative of *narod* N.Z.], or you would never get him calmed down.

Such statements are used in Russia in order to normalize the discourse of the movement against immigration in accord with its European counterparts, through promoting the ethnoracial understanding of Russianness and despite all the calls for a civil Russian nation. Racism in Russia is denied, just it was in the Soviet Union. The Russian leadership increasingly use the racist rhetoric in a concerted attempt to reclaim it from the movement. At the same time, the judiciary detain activists under Article 282 of the RF Criminal Code which requires the imposition of a criminal penalty for inciting hatred on racist grounds.

Another reason concerns the above-described efforts by government officials to present the unrest as ethnic collisions. Their explanations ranged from a neo-Nazi conspiracy to youth vandalism, the collision of incompatible cultures, and the arrogant behavior exhibited by representatives of ethnic groups from the Caucasus. Obviously, we are dealing with the racialization of social protest movement as a whole and on a national scale, where *racialization is nothing else but creation of a race by the state*. The state imparts the racial meaning to collective actions, thereby presenting them as evidence of the incompatibility of cultures and ethnic groups. For two weeks after the Manezhnaya Square riot we were already witnessing changes in the way in which government officials represented the movement. From Medvedev accusing the activists in fascism, it moved to Putin laying flowers at the grave of the slain football fan, and to his meeting with the protesters. The very fact

that the group of activists had managed to achieve some legitimacy with the population allowed them to be recognized as a social movement rather than as a group of extremists. This also means that there has been a fall in the costs of participation in any future meetings and events for them.

Unsurprisingly, of the two possible targets of attack – the presumably corrupt establishment and migrants with non-Slavic appearance – the state chose to discharge its anger against the migrants. Putin warned the middle class that their stable status quo and structural advantages could only be maintained by means of strict state control and the adoption of absolute power. Thus, the crystallization of the ethnonational identity of Russians often rests on their solidarity with the authorities (Gudkov 2004, p. 117). The 'primordial stability' is also imposed through the use of concepts, such as *narod* [nation] and *Rodina* [Motherland], both of which derive from the concepts of kinship and lineage) (Kharkhordin 2001; Sandomirskaja 2001). The same was the case in the Soviet period, when the nationalities policy was formulated to fit the slogans 'friendship of peoples' and 'the moral code of the builder of communism' prescribing 'fraternal solidarity with the workers of all countries.' Peter the Great was referred to as the 'father of the Fatherland', prominent Russian generals officially addressed their soldiers as 'sons of the Fatherland', Stalin was the 'father of nations', while his subordinates happened to be 'brothers and sisters'. However, when trust in the major institutions of the state began to dry up, a new identity was required.

A negative assessment of the group occasionally produces a desire to leave for another group. An alternative strategy involves the restoration of a sense of personal and collective group dignity by clearing the identity from any stigma. Since achieving a positive identity always involves comparing the group with a negative as well as positive 'others' (Fiske 2000), it is impossible to totally agree with the thesis whereby most Russians have a negative identity (Gudkov 2004, p. 88). Nevertheless, appealing to the race supports the idea that it is difficult to formulate the dominant identity without having to start out from the 'others.' While some titular nations gained their independence by achieving legitimacy for and consolidation of their identity, for Russians the creation of 'an independent Russia' after the collapse of the Soviet Union meant, above all, the collapse of their homeland. The Russian identity vis-à-vis the outgroup, defined during the Soviet period to meet certain statist ideological purposes, currently acquires a clear racial character: 'we are white and civilized'.

'Doing race': in search of racists

This chapter's main theoretical problem is whether the analysis of racist movements should stick to any 'emergentist' interpreting of racial practices and values as a residual effect of activities by a social movement, or whether they should be theorized as basic elements of collective action and the capacity to generate social change. On the one hand, the very definition of social movement suggests the possibility of changes in consciousness and social practice, which is reflected at the micro-level in successive interactions, when the actions of one party stimulates others to engage in appropriate behavior. On the other hand, the same forces drive people and social changes. Any type of social activism fosters a plurality of beliefs by members of a group that directs the movement (Klandermans 1992; Eyerman and Jamison 2007).

This chapter shows that the social movement against immigration employs racialization practices in order to declare its aim of achieving full citizenship for ethnic Russians as the majority in Russia. Since solidarity can arise only when the principles of justice are intertwined with the basic cultural values; actuating the dialectical process of inclusion and exclusion, these values presuppose the movement's agenda to include the ideals of participation and social justice. The foregoing attempt to restore civil solidarity was grounded on ethnoracial mobilization, which is explainable by the history of Russia as well as the availability of appropriate cognitive structures and other mobilization resources. A sense of solidarity with some vaguely defined victims of the existing social order is best augmented by familiar representations, which is, for example, an imagined community of 'indigenous' Muscovites. This chapter considers a social movement presenting the Manezhnaya Square events in familiar racial categories, while the projection of empathy and solidarity beyond the regional community (Biryulevo residents) and the sports community (the 'Spartak' fans) was achieved by using the racial discourse of Russianness. In the case of the social movement at hand, radicalization combined with democratization, while the racist ideology combined with the distributive justice ideals.

The breach of the social contract, based on the concepts of normative interdependence of Russian citizens and the state, is one of the reasons why the racist collective action resonates with (and finds support among) the public. Among other things, this contract involves maintaining a certain cultural capital and symbolic privileges enjoyed by certain groups (Makarkin and Oppenheimer 2011). These normative concepts are based on the continuing practice of ritual speeches

emphasizing a 'special role' that Russians play in shaping the Russian state as well as the system of social norms and values. In Durkheim's terminology, this form of collective representations is based on shared experience, which is determined by the causal effects of materiality, institutionalized regulations, and laws. These include a system of residence permits (*propiska*) in the Soviet Union that prevented a free choice of residence and directly affected the distribution of benefits (Chandler 2011). *Propiska* was replaced by a system of registration of new arrivals, which is much more liberal and often a mere formality because of widespread corruption and deregulation. Nevertheless, this formality has acquired a symbolic meaning in the collective ideas of Russian people by invoking the Soviet practice in their memory. Furthermore, the system of racial profiling, evident in routine police checks in the subway and on the streets, has transformed the visually different migrants into an identifiable social group that is aware of its common attribute, which is their much-cited 'non-Slavic appearance' (Light 2010, p. 297). Increasingly frequent in times of terrorist threats, these checks have become so apparent to the 'white majority' that they also contribute to their self-racialization. A typical protective reaction caused by a routine police check or detention – 'But I'm not black, I'm a Muscovite!'

The historically defined out-group contacts to realize all of the complexity of the inclusion of 'others' in Russian society should also be considered. For many years, Russia was an empire, where ethnic Russians constituted the core, carried out their spatial expansion, and left behind a system of asymmetrical power relations. In order to preserve the unity of the empire, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes often co-opt the minorities by using the fact of belonging to a particular nation or territory as criteria for the allocation of resources. This is also true with regard to Russia, in its imperial times giving special privileges to its attached territories, and in the 1930s practicing their indigenization [*korenizatsiya*] (Martin 2000). In his *Civil Sphere*, Alexander (2006, p. 415) notes that when democratic societies employ primordial qualities as criteria for distribution – affirmative action in the United States, the scheduled caste system in India – they can maintain public legitimacy only if citizens perceive this emphasis on particularity as deepening the textures of common humanity. Because state societies have much more rigid and restrictive cultural codes, and communicative and regulative institutions, it is much more difficult to legitimate the primordial criteria in this manner.

Despite the fact that the policy of indigenization and affirmative action ensued from the Soviet ideology of internationalism and anti-racism, was intended to assist in building a new society on the ruins of

the Tsarist empire and received its legitimacy after the 1917 revolution, many years later it proved impossible to construct any similar system on the ruins of the Soviet Empire. Yeltsin's policy not only strengthened Russian federalism but also revived ethnic nationalism by granting special rights of national autonomy. Although the federalist system had been partially dismantled under Putin, the events in Chechnya and Dagestan demanded a new policy in these regions. In order to stabilize the situation there, the Russian government decided to make a deal with the local elites in the North Caucasus by promising them generous funding and non-interference in their traditional system of power relations in exchange for their tough policy against radical groups. While remaining Russian citizens, natives of the North Caucasus now face a situation where the relationship between their local authorities and the federal state are different from those in other regions of the Russian Federation (Shnirelman 2011 (2), p. 482). During his meeting with the Chechen leadership, Putin (2011b) commented the 'Stop feeding the Caucasus' slogan by recent racist riots and the anti-immigration movement as follows:

Does it mean we shouldn't spend money on developing the North Caucasus republics or creating new jobs in the Caucasus? But we understand and everyone must know that in this case even more young people from the North Caucasus will start moving to other regions of Russia, primarily major cities, in search of jobs and a better life. Naturally, they will bring with them all the headaches caused by this migration. What should we do then? Kick them out? Then what? Where will they go? They will fill the ranks of illegal armed groups. What is to be done in this case? In this case guys from these major cities and other settlements of Russia will have to come here and fight against guys from the Caucasus, shoot at each other, and kill each other, thus continuing this fratricidal war, in the literal sense of the word.

These groups of Russian citizens are racialized as 'Caucasians' and then combined into a homogeneous, faceless mass of 'blacks', thereby sharing the same stigmatizing markers with migrant workers who are not Russian citizens (Roman 2002). Although many ethnic minorities have created interpersonal networks that help them adapt to changing circumstances, most Russians rely on the pre-existed Soviet understanding of Russianness as a social norm rather than a particular ethnic group. This explains the virtual absence of ethnic mobilization by Russians

in the recent history of Russia (Gorenburg 2003). However, a rather unclear definition of Russianness in the official discourse presents a window of opportunity for someone to formulate it in their narrow interests. Former social identity bases – language, citizenship, history of the territory – are inconsistent and no longer in the new post-Soviet context. Present-day representations result from conflicting with outwardly non-Russian people and can offer an explanation of the success of the movement in the conditions described above. In itself, belonging to the ‘white race’ becomes a unifying factor by combining personal interests with group consciousness.

Thus, collective action in the name of the ‘indigenous’ Muscovites is only possible by the creation of a joint representation of the collective good, whereby it appeals to potential supporters of the social movement. In this respect, emphasizing ‘whiteness’ helps the transition from obsessive ‘distinctive features’, or ‘otherness’, to the less fashionable but much more relevant and clear-cut concept of race. If we do not take into account Russianness as a way to belong to the white race, we risk losing sight of the processes where it serves as the subject’s public stance, its cultural capital, and identity.

Vladimir Avdeev describes the ‘healing’ effect of believing in the existence of racial hierarchy and Russian ‘whiteness’, which he now adheres to strictly. This new-fangled Russian racist, in his anticipation of a clear-cut system of racial profiling (‘the racial-biological scale’), in particular, stated that in such a case, ‘the world would be clear and transparent’ and ‘most daily concerns would be resolved’, since such a system is in place and ‘you begin sorting people... and interpret them according to their value on this scale’. He concluded in the following way:

Then there would be fewer mistakes and spiritual trauma. You would not lose faith in yourself because of a mosquito bite or because of street dogs barking. This is the way you have to deal with those who are mistakenly identified as belonging to the human race. Once you realize that they are from a different species, you will pass an important moral milestone. There’s nothing to worry about, as it is a legitimate process of cleansing our biological conscience from the slag, which hampers the effective use of our natural racial identity. (Avdeev 2005, pp. 393–4)

However, the above-discussed arguments offers only a partial answer to why so much has been invested in the cultural codes associated with race. As remarked by Swidler (1995, p. 37), it is easier to ‘reshape the

world... through defining its terms' than to change its basic institutions. This may well be the case, especially given the repressive nature of state power and the limited opportunities for structural changes in modern Russia. Its dominant institutions and repressive policies have brought on the values and strategies of the movement against immigration. In recent years, the concept of 'nation' (*narod*) in its political meaning has been substituted by 'population' (*naseleniye*). Adding your own contribution to the common good as a sign to identify the good citizens has lost its importance with the advent of unbridled capitalism. Some compensatory concepts appear whereby it becomes possible to legitimize inequality. This is one reason why racialized groups have become the main target of the social movement against immigration. Not only has social racism, including Social Darwinism, become the basis of a new ideology of Russian capitalism, but it also often coincides with sentiments of masses, who follow the prevailing discourse regulations in exactly the opposite way.

The media's take on the civil unrest as belonging to 'race relation problems' 'urban problems', 'class problems' or 'youth problems' plays a decisive role in shaping public opinion about the type of events that we consider. Fruitless attempts by the mass media to repair the familiar representation of Russian society as free from racial conflicts are demonstrated by Hutchings and Tolz (2012, p. 895), who sum up as follows:

Rather than transmitting a univocal state narrative, post-Manezhnaia broadcasting reveals multiple fault lines whose partial convergence is largely attributable to constraints imposed by the conceptual frameworks upon which all channels draw and to the fact that they felt compelled to reflect the perceived popular mood.

Any direct or indirect mention of events such as 'race riots' highlights some features of social processes in modern Russia that result in racial meaning being attached to those social conflicts that have already been presented in the Russian school textbooks and the media as having occurred on the basis of civilization differences. Such information may lead a person to different conclusions, depending on their inclinations and biographical experience. Reproducing race by playing a part in racial practices ('doing' race) may be discursively mediated by the different positioning of the subject, such as using 'center-periphery' localization principles, ethnicity, and the membership of a particular subculture. The growing gap between migrants and 'the rooted' in the given society results in symbolic boundaries dividing people with

different phenotypes and, therefore, to greater plausibility of this gap. These circumstances have imparted the processes of racialization in Russia their present-day dynamism and stability. Shared concepts and images that originally come from members of the group subsequently create those social representations that guide this group, that are historically reproducible and attachable to entire nations. Furthermore, as the events in both Manezhnaya and Biryulevo have demonstrated, belonging to a group and entering into a bipolar conflict situation can generate a system of social representations that activate a certain cognitive susceptibility and strengthen a certain border.

While members of the movement 'do race' via their corresponding rituals and practices, the social movement, being part of civil society, is actively involved in the 'creation of race'. Alongside certain other social institutions, it works as an agent of racialization. As this chapter has shown, the anti-immigration movement has succeeded in establishing a balance between the non-negotiable principles and racist attempts to achieve concrete results. The public unrests have consolidated the hegemony of those social formations that regulate migration by outwardly distinguishable migrants.

Concerning the present-day organizational infrastructure in Russia, many new organizations currently appear, instead of those political organizations that have been banned on extremist grounds. Many of these communities have relied on cooperation with officials, using them for their own purposes. Some of them, such as the symptomatically named 'Svetlaya Rus' ['Light-faced Russia', as one of the possible translations], aim 'to scare.' This particular organization is led by Igor Mangushev and has a membership of up to a hundred, some of whom either have personal connections in the Federal Migration Service or used to be policemen themselves. This group has gained in popularity due to their YouTube videos, where, for example, their members harass a group of working migrants, who illegally live in shabby basements within Moscow center.

Participants in racialized conflicts reproduce and reinforce their identity, when they follow stereotypes of Russianness and 'blackness'. However, this method of identity-building among participants of the movement against immigration is twofold. On the one hand, access to such resources as the discursive 'whiteness' and 'rootedness in the urban space' determines the identity assertion. On the other hand, this identity has been based on their perception of their denied access to resources. Participants in the movement formulate new values and new ideas about themselves as a response to social change and that of their

own social position. Nevertheless, formed in such conditions, these representations tend to be vague, and the behavioral response of participants to these representations is uncertain. Thus, the organizational and other subsets of culture of the movement against immigration is being formed as the movement progresses. This means that the social movement against immigration can be seen both as a byproduct of social and political processes in Russia, and as a generator and transformer of discourses, actions and political alliances, themselves having their creative and structurally transformative potential.

Used by the state and state media, the strategy of fragmenting the protest movement into separate disadvantaged groups is ambivalent. It redirects the attention of movement participants to local cultural and symbolic conflicts, during which certain political, social and economic demands start to be seen as particularist requirements for the acquisition of the ethnonationalist cultural and symbolic domination. However, the genuine and broad support of racial themes by many Russians, including both the middle class and those in power, combined with the fact that Russia is a country where ethnic Russians account for 80 per cent of the population, gives the movement a significant potential to mobilize those who remain uninvolved. Against this background, ethnic entrepreneurs are supported by certain segments of the political and economic elites, and they can take advantage of the positive inertia, which continues to work towards their goals.

Given the weakness of civil society and the role of state power in Russia, any assimilation or any 'exclusion of out-group primordial traits from the public arena' can be understood by minorities as a form of harsh institutional domination and discrimination (Alexander, 2006, p. 424). Reactions to events such as restrictions in terms of new mosques and the calls to create special rules of behavior for visitors to the capital certainly produce the radicalization of certain groups. Civil communication in these groups may subsequently push their members to make even louder protests against the supposedly hegemonic order of 'internal colonization' and racialization on the part of the 'white' majority. Simultaneously, the public unrest also leads to a range of legislative acts and bylaws that restrict the participation in mass protests that have already been used widely in taking legal actions against activists of nationalist movements, protest meetings on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow against the ballot rigging at the time of the 2011 parliamentary elections. The very fact that these civil communications take the form of spontaneous reactions to racial incidents, followed by the imposition of restrictions on civil society, only increases the likelihood of future conflicts.

6

Becoming Racial: Race as a New Form of Inequality

If *Homo Sovieticus* was thoroughly unfree in her choice of identity in conditions under which both her class and ethnicity were imposed, then why did she, with all the xenophobia that was encouraged by the ideology of Soviet patriotism, not develop a level of racism comparable to that in the new Russia? Drawing on the discussion to this point, an initial answer would appear to be that, due to globalization and the abandonment of the idea of socialist modernity, new forms of identification emerged that broke down the individual as a coherent subject into a set of various cultural identifiers. This would then mean that the social structure itself, along with the new economic conditions and the intentions of governing elites and intellectuals, are important factors – in fact, crucial factors – in the reformulation of the theoretical framework of the sociology of race. Another such factor is the availability of multiple discourses insofar as individuals learn social norms from, for example, the media which complement cultural identity.

The destruction of private property and the entrepreneurial class as a result of the socialist revolution meant that social relations were transformed, because changes in the ownership of resources changed streams of opportunities (Sorensen 1996, p. 1339). In a similar vein, the state's legalization of entrepreneurial activity and the sanctioning of forms of private ownership during *Perestroika* disrupted the foundations of societal structures and the patterns of interpersonal interaction, which accelerated the fall of the political regime and its ideology. The resulting process of social change in post-Soviet Russia has been conditioned by, among other factors, the redistribution of property and the emergence of extreme economic inequality. It might then seem that the majority of conflicts in a situation of enormous social differentiation should unfold around economic cleavages, and that the only colors that should

matter in Russia today are the gold and platinum hues of credit cards. However, the majority of scholars believe that 'societal conflicts that typically occur within post-communist societies are of a nature *other than class conflicts*' (Elster et al. 1998, p. 247). The popular explanation for this is that 'ethnic associations can be revived much more quickly and effectively than any other' (Gellner 1991, p. 133). Although this explanation is often true in the case of other East European nations, it is misleading in the Russian case, because the erosion of national borders and the expansion of capital flows across them have contributed to the dismantling of the symbolic structures still remaining from the previous xenophobic and autarchic Soviet nationalism. The transfer of resources to other means of redistribution has led to the establishment of new forms of domination and exclusion, new notions of justice, and, consequently, new methods of legitimization. Specific 'ideological material' would instead be required if new borders and barriers to the commodities of competitors were to be erected.

The difficulties within the Soviet-style socialist societies concerning the transfer by inheritance of positions of power in the economy and politics led the administrative *nomenklatura* to invest in non-financial and non-political forms of capital (Suny 1993). Although status did not then come to be defined in exclusively ethnic, let alone racial, terms, status nevertheless came to possess connotations that in the future would acquire racial traits. In light of the changes that have subsequently taken place during the post-Soviet period, the system of racial distinctiveness in the Russian Federation today could, in fact, be quite readily presented in terms of Bourdieu's (1977) notion of habitus. Sergey Kropotov (2006, p. 224), for example, argues that

The privatization of post-Communist space and time, industrial potential, and the country's natural resources did not take place in the manner typical of private property, but rather as a collective appropriation carried out by brotherhoods comprised of criminals, athletes, territorial administrative units, or bureaucratic departments from either the lower or higher *nomenklatura* ('blue' or 'red brothers'). This appropriation of economic and social space is accompanied by a symbolical 'enclosure' (we are the best, the clever, the successful), a feeling of being chosen on the part of those who have remained inside the corporate fence erected around certain prosperous business 'estates'. This leads to an oppressive logic of exclusion towards aliens as well as exclusivity and a non-critical condescension towards one's colleagues.

In respect of racial traits, the shift from being a xenophobic socialist nation to a 'multiracial' society informed by racial knowledge can be effectively analyzed through the use of a notion of racialization that emphasizes the dynamic and morphogenetic character of racial discourses and practices. It is also necessary, however, to take into consideration the fact that racialization facilitated the gradual inclusion of previously marginalized strata of the population, who received a greater share of civil rights when nation states were institutionalized and groups of non-national others were thereby constituted (Miles and Brown 2003; Silverstein 2005). But if the democratizing reforms that led to the integration of the previously excluded citizens into the public sphere did not also lead to the bridging of economic gaps in the United States, then, similarly, the representation in racial terms of social divisions in semi-authoritarian Russia did not directly provide citizens with either a clear and relatively secure class positioning or with a national identity. Whiteness as Russianness, as class, as belonging to the 'First World' is a topic of both contestation and negotiation, the meaning and significance of which cannot be taken for granted.

In the post-Soviet period, a perception of being underprivileged, or unequal, which relied largely on the symbolic system of the re-identification of the self, acquired a new form that cannot be described exclusively in the terms of domination. Social historian Sheila Fitzpatrick (2005, p. 304) reveals the logic of this process:

In the case of post-1991 Russia, of course, there were no occupying powers; culturally, however, what occurred in Russia after 1991 might be regarded as akin to Western occupation. In Soviet times, the capitalist West was the Other. Now Russia itself had to become this Other: the 'normal civilized life' that was the catchword and object of desire of the 1990s necessarily had Western characteristics because it was Westernism that was the familiar antithesis of Sovietness.

The new concept of peoplehood that has emerged through this process possesses both descriptive and normative meanings. For example, the traditional concept of the Russian people (*russkiy narod*) that was historically associated with the peasant majority is increasingly represented today, by both doctrinaire racists and their opponents, as a racialized 'population'.

In respect to racialization, the idea of internal orientalism acquires a very clear form as it has been expressed in fiction describing contemporary Russia. Dmitry Bykov (2006), a liberal-minded author and

one of the most popular public figures in Russia, gives clear racial features in his novel *ZH D* to the new Russian social stratification that has developed. His combination of racial imaginary, coupled with a reflection upon recent political changes in Russia, grant a heightened persuasiveness to today's attempts to racialize the new forms of social differentiation. Moreover, Bykov's narrative about officials from the state security forces (*siloviki*) as the Varangians who were called to rule reflects the actual state of affairs concerning the recruitment of regional authorities, for *siloviki* are almost never native to the region which they govern (Petrov 2008, pp. 429–37). Also significant is the manner in which *Nemtsy* (Germans), Alexander Terekhov's (2012) bestseller about Russian bureaucrats, depicts those endowed with power as a separate race in juxtaposition to a faceless race of people with Russian surnames. It is obvious that the clear turn towards ethnonationalism and racism during the 1990s on the part of certain deprived social groups was grounded in a sense of frustration after the pact with the welfare state had been broken. In addition, the ruling elites also adopted and internalized conspiratorial thinking as a strategy for coping with the trauma of self-colonization (Lipovetsky and Etkind 2008, p. 2004). An insightful example in this regard is provided by remarks made on June 24, 2012, by German Gref, the Chairman of Sberbank, the leading Russian state bank, on the occasion of the international Saint Petersburg Economic Forum:

You're saying terrible things – you're in fact proposing to give power to the population. When people understand the basis of their ego, it will become very difficult to rule them, to manipulate them. How do you live in, how do you manage a society in which everyone has equal access to information, in which everyone has the opportunity to judge for herself, to obtain uncensored information – instead of getting it from government trained experts, political scientists, the huge mass media organizations beating on their heads? ... Frankly speaking, I'm rather frightened by your ideas... The Kabala remained a secret teaching for many years precisely because the authorities did not want to remove the veil from people's eyes and make them self-sufficient.

Such cynicism argues for the internalization of a system of ideas that makes it possible to elaborate a rational strategy for legitimacy directed to only certain persons or groups among the population. Shifts in hegemonic discourse have been conditioned by political and economic circumstances that influence the acceptance of classifications and the

interpretations of differences, but the social arrangements that have been internalized have been actively created by individuals. This is often regulated by a set of rules, especially in the Russian case, and breaking the rules leads to sanctions.

This does not imply, however, the Gramscian oversimplification that elites simply manufacture racial ideology for the purposes of domination. First, it is impossible to regard racialization as an intentional political strategy leading to the establishment of the necessary institutions and the implementation of the necessary policies – it simply does not function at this level. Secondly, this view reduces the idea of race to a mere function of class interests, which it is not. Racial discourse plays a special and relatively autonomous role in a situation in which economic interests and the motives of economic exploitation are explicitly represented as determining the strategies of power domination because such discourse is rarely used to mask the structures and strategies of hegemony. In such conditions, racialization instead operates according to the logic of legitimation and self-assertion.

The new economic order: from racialized capital to racialized labor

Migration studies is one of the fields that have successfully adopted the racialization approach, and this has helped to grasp the logic concerning how migrant flows into European social landscapes have been categorized (Silverstein 2005). A scholarly examination of the processes through which migrants are racialized makes it possible to reveal the social forces and mechanisms that utilize the power of categorization to justify existing inequalities. Insofar as such justification often portrays migrants as inherently incapable of enjoying equal rights with everyone else because of their 'otherness', it serves to preclude the application of the principle of equality to them. But while various facets of this process of the 'othering' of migrants in the Russian Federation have been investigated (see, for example, Pilkington 1998; Malkova 2007; Kozhevnikova 2007), the elements of the discourse that such studies have isolated have themselves not been theorized as racial. This has stood in the way of their being analyzed further using the insights of the sociology of race. As a result, there is no solid ground upon which to draw the conclusion that such practices do in fact result in racialization, whereby otherwise extremely diverse labor migrants are rendered virtually indistinguishable from one another as one black mass and have an identity imposed upon them that they subsequently challenge.

Rogers Brubaker (2004, pp. 152–3) claims to have isolated two allegedly basic differences between Eastern Europe and Western Europe in the patterns and perceptions concerning migration. He argues that

[T]he problematics of migration in western Europe have focused on immigration, especially from outside the region, seen both as a problem (in political terms) and as a solution (in economic and, increasingly, demographic perspectives). In eastern Europe, questions of migration have been, in the first instance, about emigration... [I]n western Europe – to highlight a final stark dimension of difference – migration involves mixing and generates new forms and degrees of ethnic, racial and religious heterogeneity, together with the new challenges to national self-understandings and new forms of politicized ethnicity sketched above. In eastern Europe much migration – not only in the last fifteen years, but over the last century – has involved *unmixing*, reducing rather than increasing heterogeneity.

Brubaker's interpretation not only partially excludes Russia from an analysis of racialization processes, it is in fact misleading when it comes to the identifying the particularities of the migration regime in the country. The United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM 2005, p. 397) states that Russia is host to the world's second-largest number of migrants after the United States. If we limit ourselves to the American and Western European contexts, studies that focus on the racialization of migration and migrants not only reinforce parochial tendencies in choosing themes for scrutiny, but also undermine the explanatory power of the racialization framework itself.

The second limitation of existing scholarship may be described as the reverse side of the parochial approach. The use of racialization as a concept has often served as a convenient tool for transferring well-established research strategies to radically different sociohistorical circumstances, which leads to an analysis of racialization as a morphogenetic process being replaced by a study of inequalities that have been racialized by the scholar herself. In a similar vein, other types of scholarship have sought to challenge the folk perception that a primordial essence underlies racial differences, which has long been promoted by biology and retranslated through the educational system. From the perspective of these types of scholarship, racialization would indicate that biological races do not exist and it would reveal the constructed character both of social groups that are called races, and of divisions between groups that have been described as racial in character. This

type of analysis can be problematic in certain contexts because it omits from consideration the mode in which 'race' – understood both as a set of ideas and as the visible markers of difference organized in reference to these ideas – operates as a functional principle of material exclusion as well as a source of social meaning.

This chapter seeks to contribute to the fields of sociology of race and the sociology of migration by extending the range of instances of the racialization of migrants to be addressed and by proposing certain shifts in scholarly focus. Above all, racialization should be understood as a social process involving the emergence – or 'becoming' – of new groups, meanings, and relations that are conventionally called 'racial'. By isolating those historically specific elements of the racial knowledge dominant in the current legislation and discourse which can be understood as resources for meaningful agency, we can acquire an understanding of how they operate as mechanisms of the social arrangements that promote inequality. Instead of struggling to deconstruct the biological-essentialist understanding of race, a sphere that should finally be abandoned, we should focus on the criteria and goals associated with extending racial meaning to relationships, social practices, and groups that have previously not been classified in racial terms.

The third limitation, as was indicated above in Chapter 1, is the clear tendency in ethnosociology, or the sociology of race and ethnicity in Russia, to regard the racial problematic as something extreme and abnormal – as if it were a virus with which certain political figures, activists, and journalists have been infected. While racialized exclusions may be viewed as the result of a deliberately realized strategy on the part of those so 'infected', any analysis of the migration regime must also include a study of the discourses concerning migration and migrants and look more closely at changes in structures and institutions that constitute the logics and mechanisms of this regime.

When studying racialization in Russia, it is thus necessary to examine the identities and experiences of migrants along with those of the other actors involved in the construction and negotiation of the migration regime. For example, 30 per cent of migrants stated that they feel like outcasts in Moscow (Vendina 2009, p. 95), and as many as 60 per cent of Muscovites have a persistently negative reaction to the growth of ethnic diversity (Vendina 2009, p. 97). While 38.9 per cent of young Swedish people are positive about immigration by non-Europeans, the corresponding figure for their Russian counterparts stands at only 11.4 per cent (Drobizheva 2009, p. 199), with 64 per cent Muscovites in general and 61 per cent of those living in Krasnodar being negatively

disposed towards non-Russian migrants (Arutyunyan 2011, p. 17). It is interesting to note, however, that an ESS survey indicates that Russian respondents 'are typically much more favorably inclined towards migrants of the same race and nationality as the majority in the country' (Drobizheva 2009, p. 200). Other surveys have revealed that tensions between ethnic groups are perceived to be the second most important conflict in Russian society after the clash between poor and rich (Chernysh 2011, pp. 37–9). Such findings are puzzling against the background of the character of issues connected with race in Soviet society. Examining the process through which racial discourse in Russia has been formed and normalized will enable us to gain a better understanding of how it could have happened that post-Soviet Russia became a country with such widespread negative attitudes towards visible migrants.

The fourth limitation of existing studies of racialization concerning labor migrants in Russia is that they often represent migrants as rootless and also unequivocally subordinate racial discourse to nationalist and anti-liberal discourse. Marlène Laruelle (2009, p. 71) has revealed how anti-immigration sentiments constitute a theme in Russian politics that is capable of providing a consensual basis for extra-parliamentary nationalist parties, which she explains by the ease with which the ideological framework, supported by a shared concern with the supposed de-Russification of Russia, can be connected with such practices as pogroms and rallies directed against migrants. Oksana Karpenko (2013), who provides an insightful analysis of the performative logic of public discourse, describes the otherness of migrants as residing upon the distinction between 'locals' and 'newcomers'. In the spirit of an established tradition of sociological analysis of established and outsiders (Elias and Scotson 1994), her study isolates the discourse of migrant disloyalty to the local community, which is constructed upon the metaphor of 'home, host and guests' (Baraulina and Karpenko 2004, p. 204). However, even though Silverstein (2005, p. 366) maintains that the rooted/uprooted dichotomy is often used to 'reinforce the characterization of the migrant population as nationally suspect and potentially disloyal', such interpretations do not take into account how this particular discourse is integrated into the wider context of the history of racial domination and exclusions. The government newspaper *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, citing opinion polls, shows that people base the distinction between 'migrants' and 'newcomers' upon their perception that since the latter allegedly do not differ visibly from the majority, they are assumed to have the same ethnicity, culture, and values

(Dobrynina 2009). By revealing the relatively autonomous character of many of the key themes of racial discourse, this chapter argues that the logic behind the racialization of social groups and relations does not reside upon divisions between locals and newcomers, employers and employees, and Russians and non-Russians. Although the processes of forming class, nations and ethnicity are intimately intertwined with the biologization of cultural differences, the latter cannot simply be reduced to the former. Moreover, any ascription of meaning and the channeling of groups or individuals into particular experiences and categories is an issue open to debate – labor migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia are by no means the first groups to become the victims of racialization practices in Russia (Fikes and Lemon 2002). Since groups and individuals develop strategies for negotiating their place in the racial order, they are also involved in the process of negotiating access to material and discursive resources. We thus need to identify and examine trends in the shifting logic underlying the construction of the racial other through the migration regime and also take a closer look at individual and group responses and negotiations in respect to this process.

Galina Kozhevnikova's (2007, p. 52) analysis of statements in the Russian media about various ethnic groups has revealed that the category of 'migrant' is the object of the 'greatest burden of harsh, in fact criminal statements – 34.4%'. Such essentialization of the very concept of migrant began at the beginning of the 2000s. This is evident from the results of the monitoring of the Russian media regularly conducted by the SOVA information and analysis center (sova-center.ru), which are available in both Russian and English. Kozhevnikova (2007, p. 11) draws attention to the fact that

The main innovation at this stage is the inclusion of the concept 'migrant' among the objects of hatred. This is explained by the fact that this word has practically lost its social meaning over the last 18–24 months... At the same time, it has acquired a distinct ethnic coloration – a 'non-Russian' person, even though he may be a Russian citizen or someone who has migrated to what is defined as a 'Russian' region).

The dynamics of producing and reproducing migrants' differences are to be regarded as part of the broader processes of placing the migration regime under the lens of the sociology of race. The labor market is one of the main instruments for policing the population. During the first stage of post-Communist transition, which coincided with Yeltsin's

rule, the resentment of the ethnic Russian majority was directed primarily at representatives of minority diaspora groups who had become successful entrepreneurs (Gudkov 2004). Donna Bahry (2002) maintains that it was easier at that time to control political office than the market economy, which contributed to the relatively limited perception of individual discrimination even though perceptions of collective unfairness and inequality were more widespread. While many Russians had lost status as heavy industry and the state sector were restructured, ethnic groups who had traditionally been employed in the service sector and in trade became the personification of success and the first capitalists (Glushkova 1999). Communities with a penchant for monopolization were formed with the support of racialized ethnic markers that helped to sustain the group's boundary. These same markers were supported by outside discriminatory pressures and racist violence, which contributed to the racialization of the ethnic groups in question.

Olga Vendina (2002, p. 233) cites that Slavs comprised no more than 15–20 per cent of the most important businessmen during the early stage of transition. A project led by Leokadia Drobizheva (2002) that focused on real and perceived socio-economic differences between several ethnic groups indicated that ethnicity came to play a decisive role in the creation of ideas about social inequality in Russia. It is telling in this regard that results of the study emphasized 'the low social mobility of Russians and a less expressed readiness for social activity' in comparison with other ethnic groups (Drobizheva 2002, p. 474), which implies that, in general, they perhaps would be engaged in entrepreneurial activity less than other groups. In addition, the statistical fact that the percentage of non-Russians living in the most prestigious areas of Moscow and St Petersburg was higher than in the working-class suburbs is easily explained insofar as the migration of people from the former Soviet republics to Moscow and St Petersburg constituted a 'brain drain' for those republics that was driven by recruitment on the part of the governing elites. This was ultimately reflected both in their positions in the social hierarchy, and in their visibility within the urban space. It is also significant that, according to the census of 1989, 25.5 per cent of Russians had higher education, while the figures were 60.4 per cent and 48.7 per cent for ethnic Jews and Armenians respectively (Vendina 2009, p. 142). Clarke notes (1999, p. 42) that although a significant proportion of the jobs being lost at that time were the most highly skilled jobs, most of the new jobs being created demanded a lower level of skills that could be acquired easily and quickly. This led to a situation in which a significant number of highly qualified people left Moscow and

St Petersburg for the United States and Western Europe, the majority of whom were ethnically Russian or Jewish (Rybakovsky 2009). This was followed by an influx of migrant labor from the former republics of the Soviet Union to the more economically successful locations in the former metropolitan state, that is, the big cities of the Russian Federation. Some of these people might be educated, but many more would fill the new lower skilled jobs that were being created.

The social position of the racialized migrant can be explained in terms of her position on the labor market in that hierarchies are formed that correspond to the division of labor that exists in society (Carter 2003). The most acute forms of inequality are found when the value added by labor and the concentration of power are high. Social stratification is characterized by sharp contrasts in Russia (Shkaratan and Il'in 2006; Medvedev et al. 2007), where the economy depends on the export of natural resources and power resides in the hands of a rather narrow circle of people. Both winners and losers in the transition to the market economy are objects of racialization in the process of internal 'othering'. Just as *sovki* are off-white because of their cultural choices, migrants are classified as non-whites because the work they now typically perform is defined as menial in the public and political discourse. They are 'black' because they 'work as hard as Negroes' doing 'dirty jobs'.

Racialization is one of the processes by which Russian authorities understand national and labor belonging, which together constitute the notion of the migrant. Those who originate from the imagined West and occupy white-collar positions are never migrants in Russian public discourse – they are instead expats, rather reminiscent of the foreigners during the Soviet period discussed in Chapter 2, for whom, to use Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's (2012) words, 'we should make Moscow attractive so that they will feel comfortable'. This also contributes to the representation of work done by migrants as 'dirty' and 'unskilled', which degrades entire sectors of the economy and restructures them as racial. In addition, students coming to Russia may have very different experiences depending on whether they are considered to be 'blacks' who represent the Third World or are regarded as 'whites' from 'civilized' countries (Radina 2009).

While the Right tends to play down inequalities based on race and class on the Western European political scene, in Russia both the Left and the Right strive to emphasize the economic inequality of ethnic groups, successfully creating two sets of stereotypes, one for 'inherently' entrepreneurial and hard-working groups, the other for groups who are lazy and unintelligent 'by nature'. In the 1990s, both nationalist

and communist opposition to Yeltsin represented ethnic Russians as constituting an exploited class in Russia, which evolved into a class struggle with the pro-western, non-Russian oligarchy (Sokolov 2007, 2008). On the other hand, the anti-egalitarian opinions of pro-western public figures often included neo-Darwinist themes that were driven by the necessity to attain the civility of the West and become westernized and modern. Ideas associated with liberalism and the free market were also used to argue against policy remedies for collective inequalities. Advocates of neoliberalism in Russia racialize not only 'backward anti-American nations', but also their own fellow-citizens allegedly comprising the 'immature' majority who retarded the return of Russia to the 'home of civilization'. Andrey Novikov claimed in his famous 1991 essay *Ya – russofob* that 'the "Homo Sovieticus" who had emerged from the Soviet regime's test-tube is the main carrier of totalitarianism' (quoted in Neumann 1996, p. 168). Racialized western modernity has thus again become the frame of reference for Russians as the ideal that should be attained. The retreat from the Soviet language of social justice and equality meant that the middle class was signified as a promoter of modernization while the working class was more and more pathologized in public discourse.

This racialization of class, gender, and ethnicity, along with their intersectionality, are outlined in the analyses of Esther Kingston-Mann (1999, pp. 190–1). She observes that

In the period following the break-up of the USSR, a number of Westward-looking economic reformers constructed an image of the United States as the possessor of a national economy wonderfully devoid of substantial poverty or market failure. Contemporary observers like Boris Kagarlitsky reported that Russians enamored of the West contended that 'good Americans' prospered; homelessness and unemployment were viewed as a well-deserved plight of lazy African Americans and other people of color... In the rush to embrace American-style capitalism, obstacles and difficulties were attributed to elderly, unattractive women, 'peasant-like' factory workers, bigoted, Stalinist, and anti-Western Communist hardliners, or even – in one recent formulation – to the rigidity of Russian males who prefer suicide to the difficult task of adjusting to much-needed change.

A tendency to attribute newly emerging inequalities to the lack of 'civilizational competence' (Sztompka 1993) was also readily detectable in the European post-Communist societies. For example, Sztompka

(1993, p. 82) claims, that because of the perpetual peripheral position of Eastern and Central Europe, together with its unsuccessful engagement with the 'fake modernity' project that had been imposed by the Soviets, Poles were initially unable to embrace and adapt to the new order. Public perceptions of the causes of poverty in Russia and a number of other post-Communist societies have been characterized by the inclination to blame both the economic system as well as individual behavior, which differs from the explanations of poverty typically put forward by Western Europeans (van Oorshot and Halman 2000; Lepianka et al. 2010). However, the fact that individual blame is considered to overlap with social blame indicates the widespread confusion of Russian respondents. On the one hand, the prevailing hegemonic ideology has often generated a system of neo-Darwinist values; on the other, the everyday stratification-related experiences of individuals has resulted in a conflicting system of beliefs. Both of these views can be racialized, albeit by means of differing logics.

Differences in the accumulation of wealth and in social status can be viewed as semi-autonomous causes that have equally contributed to social polarization in Russian society. In reality, these two factors reinforce each other, which makes the analytic distinction less stable and renders social practices highly negotiable. Bobo (1988) argues that the racialization of group conflict is a function of competition as rooted in the scarcity of resources and perceived threats to identity. There is thus a clear tendency, both in public discussion and on the labor market, to move away from purely economic to ethnic and racial understandings of capital. In addition, the transition to a market economy in Russia has been marked by the dominance of informal contacts as the most effective method for exchanging services (Gerber and Mayorova 2010). Under conditions of a lack of trust in post-Soviet Russia, ethnic minorities and migrants have tended to group into enclaves that provide them with a sense of protection. The formation of relatively closed communities has also been encouraged by the positions that emerge for migrant labor (Tyuryukanova 2009), which has a negative impact on the number of an individual's personal contacts (Chai 2001, p. 229). This may lead to more stereotypical views and reinforce groupist thinking in comparison with the Soviet period, when the relatively closed working collective served as main location for interaction beyond the family (Sahadeo 2012). In general, however, the level of differentiation inside the main ethnic groups is higher than it is between them (Chernysh 2011, p. 29). The struggle of groups and clans for power and economic resources is inevitable when limitations are placed upon

those resources in an economy based upon the extraction of and trade in natural resources with an authoritarian form of political government.

Resentment targeted against minorities who adapted successfully to the new social and economic conditions and 'imposed' modernity on the majority through their entrepreneurial activity facilitated racializing them as the exploitative 'others'. This is comparable to the construction of Asians as being above Whites in the hierarchy of IQ scores in the United States. Laura Desfor Edles (2002, p. 116) observes in this regard that 'While on one hand Asian Americans are lauded for "outwhiting the whites"; at the same time they are *resented* and even *hated* for "outwhiting the whites".' The feeling is, 'how dare those Asians outwhite the *real* (white) Americans'. Such statements can also be applied now to the middle-class Russian majority, who have begun to construct their identity around their whiteness, turning it into a symbolic privilege. At the beginning of Yeltsin's reforms, the 'other' were the retrograde Communist and the alcoholic and atavistic Russian peasant who did not wish to understand the beauties of entering capitalism. During the Putin period of economic growth, the 'other' has now become the uncivilized and ungrateful labor migrant who has come to Russia in order to engage in criminal activity. The strategies for how race provides the ideology of social cohesion have thus changed over the last two decades. If racist ideologies may be characterized as reflecting a type of defensive reaction by those who could not become a part of the new capitalist order in the Yeltsin years, then the racialization of deprived labor migrants should be understood as a process in which the relatively satisfied segments of the Russian population who had already improved their material well-being also acquired social capital and cohesion in the Putin era.

Evgeny Gontmacher (2010), the Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, suggests

It has long been known that these [low-skilled] jobs are not very attractive for our citizens, even those living in the provinces. An employer will provide accommodation for them, but *our man* (*nash chelovek*) deserves something better than living with five other people in a single room. We have to a degree attained a level at which people should have rather decent housing even if they are guest workers.

This seems to support the logic of Weberian thinking, which emphasizes alterations in class and status groups according to the level of economic

stability and perceived social tension (Parkin 1978, p. 623). However, the interconnections between class, ethnic, and racial identities can be held simultaneously and reinforce each other. Class formation shaped by, among other factors, racialization and market relations may intensify racial hierarchies, if not by producing them, then by mutual maintenance. The intersection of racialization processes with the processes of class formation depends on the specificity of racial knowledge and the economic system in any given society.

Racialization here serves as a rational tool for resolving the following dilemma: On the one hand, labor markets need a supply of cheap labor. On the other, and in order to ensure social control and domination, policy makers and a significant proportion of the inhabitants of Moscow and St Petersburg have come to the conclusion that, in the words of Yurii Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow between 1992 and 2010, 'Moscow is not a thoroughfare'. That is to say that migrants who have a different mentality than the original residents of the host cities are supposedly unable to function successfully in the receiving society. Luzhkov was one of the key players in the formation of this discourse and also the social practices that follow logically from it. He maintained that

The only effective mechanism for regulating migration is one that combines two key strands. First, we must organize a rotation of unqualified foreign laborers so that we can address the particular problems of specific regions while providing only a minimal opportunity for these laborers to be naturalized. Second, the supply of migrants must be able to replenish the permanent population of Russia – the community of Russian citizens – with high quality 'human resources' of the highest cultural, linguistic, educational, and age standards. (as reprinted in Guboglo 2008, p. 353)

It is evident from this statement that the stigmatization of the other, as well as exclusionary social policies in relation to that other, take place on the basis of applying an explicitly formulated panoply of racial ideas. As in the Western European context, differences are presupposed to be the fundamental and immutable basis of belonging and rootedness. If, however, such statements are practically unimaginable coming from the lips of government officials in the West, they are part of the mainstream in present-day Russia. This makes it more difficult to problematize them since it fails to provide critics with a solid point of departure for deconstructing such propositions. Nevertheless, since ascribing social status exclusively on the basis of variations in phenotype inevitably leads to inconsistencies,

ideological and psychological interpretations of these variations have historically played an enormously significant role in the realization of racialization practices. In such statements as Luzhkov's we are dealing not with cultural essentialism, but with a racial knowledge that relies heavily on a sustained tradition of classical biological racial thinking.

Representation of migrants as a security problem

Students of the Russian migration regime maintain that Russian migration policies are primarily reactive and are marked by a negative approach to immigrants (Zayonchkovskaya 2009; Shevel 2011). It is necessary to study the 'securitization' of the migration in Russia when the widespread view is that migrants are the cause for the feeling of insecurity (Huysmans 1995). By securitization is meant the justification of taking measures that are outside the formal procedures of politics by using the rhetoric of fear (Buzan et al. 1998). Matthew Light (2010, p. 302) makes the following observation concerning the policing of migration in post-Soviet Moscow:

The dismantling of Soviet methods of administrative limitation of migration and the failure to replace them with effective targeted policing has created an enforcement vacuum... [A]busive police practices keep the non-Muscovite population in a state of fear and insecurity that limits their willingness or ability to settle permanently in Moscow... [B]y maintaining a constant pressure to leave, Moscow raises the stakes for outsiders, forcing each person to evaluate whether the financial gains from being in the city outweigh the financial and physical risks.

Applying the securitization approach helps to underpin the analysis of the ongoing processes of racialization of migrants. First, it 'illuminates one of the overarching self-conceptualizations of the Putin government' (Bacon et al. 2006, p. 16). Considering the significant role played by the authorities in forming and imposing discourse, it is unsurprising that the vast majority of academic studies of migration into Russian cities have problematized such migration in terms of a threat to national security and sustainable development (Iontsev 2003; Guboglo 2008). The title of the project within which the latter publication was written is revealing: 'The Creative-Adaptive and Ethno-Destructive Energy of Gastarbeiterism'. Secondly, by studying the discourse of fear and political constellations, we may come closer to understanding both the arguments employed as

well as their successful acceptance by the particular audience to whom they have been directed (Buzan et. al. 1998; p. 25, Bacon et. al. 2006, pp. 12–16). However, scholars who to date have analyzed the formation of the Russian migration regime within the framework of securitization (Alexseev 2006; Kosygina 2009) have failed to demonstrate that the racialization of visually different migrants is one of the main means by which the securitization of migration is achieved. Light (2010, p. 302), for example, claims that ‘Moscow has created a modernized, *de facto limitchiki*¹ class based on extralegal coercion’. Nevertheless, he (2010, p. 299) argues that ‘the city government’s hostility to registering forced migrants actually victimizes ethnic Russians along with non-Russians and thus cannot be explained by racism or xenophobia’.

There are at least two patterns in the construction of a feeling of being threatened. First, threat is constructed in relation to the impact that high numbers of jobseekers have on economic stability. Different methods of enforcing residence controls have been proposed in order to regulate the numbers of migrants, but the discourse concerning the alleged social problem is constructed in terms of the discourse of unwanted newcomers. This accords with the familiar schema of established and outsiders. Secondly, as Jef Huysmans (1995, p. 55) observes, ‘the threatening character of population flows can also be caused by the specific characteristics of migrants’. When newcomers from Central Asia are represented as ‘hungry hordes’ that have ‘invaded’ Russian cities, disharmony refers not only to one’s private purse, but also to the self-identity of the majority. Huysmans (1995, p. 55) proposes that ‘the security world is one in which the threatened identity is placed in the centre (of attention)’. This leads to the creation of a center-periphery image that ‘seduces by turning the centre into the unquestionable given’ (Huysmans 1995, p. 55). Putin (2012a) declares in his article on the national question in Russia that

[W]e must bolster our judicial branch and make our law enforcement agencies work effectively. This is of paramount importance not just in tackling the issue of foreign migrants, but, in our case, in dealing with internal migration from the republics of North Caucasus. Without these pillars, we will never be able to reconcile the interests of different societies objectively (both the in-group and the out-group) and foster a perception of migration as something safe and fair.

Scholars have been prevented from seeing race as a dominant subtext because of their inability to view the securitization of migration within

the more global context of the nation-building process in Russia, which includes racialization processes. During the 1990s the main concern of political debates and scholarly studies were issues connected with refugees (Shevel 2011) and with Russian compatriots abroad (Kolstø and Edemsky 1995; Laitin 1998). Although compatriot refugees and migrants often found it difficult to integrate into Russian society and were frequently met with suspicion (Pilkington 1998, pp. 184–98), and refugees were suspected of not genuinely seeking asylum (Shevel 2011, p. 105), none of these groups came to be actively represented and constructed as the Significant Other. Furthermore, debates and political views concerning national identity had not yet been greatly informed by the perceived ‘blackness’ of the internal Other. It was the traumatized Russian nation itself that was represented as the victim, as the community that had undergone a ‘national tragedy’ (Oushakine 2009). Significant Others were the rather successful minorities who had exploited the impoverished population as well as the external Others who had conspired against the Soviet and Russian states and societies. Moshe Lewin (1995, p. 269) made the following observation concerning the first years of the market economy in Russia:

We observe, for example, that economic misery and unsettled political conditions induce Russians to react negatively, if not violently, against people with Caucasian features, who dominate the Russian open, semi-legal, and illegal (but always very expensive) markets, especially in the capitals... [I]n a situation when millions of Russians feel unsafe because they find themselves unwanted foreigners in the same republics from which those merchants come to trade in Moscow, the seemingly ephemeral type of nationalist reactions can easily grow into something more powerful; agitators who would like to thrive on such moods are available.

The concept of labor migrant acquires a very negative connotation within the context of the many information campaigns and statements of officials that refer to the drain of capital abroad. While the securitization of the flight of capital and the formation of the corresponding discourse had been class- or socially-oriented and directed to the unmasking of unpatriotic *nouveaux riches* in the 1990s, the object of criticism suddenly changed at the beginning of the 2000s – it is now the Gastarbeiter who ‘feed their undeveloped countries’ with money earned in Russia (Tyuryukanova 2009, pp. 170–3). The media are filled to overflowing with information about the percentage of the GNPs of

former Soviet states that consist of remittances – money earned by their citizens in Russia – which contributes to the spread of racial knowledge associated with the Third World discourse (Malkova 2007). But this change in discourse is not connected with Russian businessmen and officials now taking less money abroad. On the contrary, they still prefer the safer harbors of the ‘civilized West’ and invest in perceived ‘whiteness’. But the aims of the Russian elites have altered dramatically. The formation of capitalism and of a property-owning class, which also enjoys full political power, has led to conditions in which any reinforcement of the old discourse would mean criticizing themselves. The need to normalize popular discontent among the electorate and direct it into a safe channel therefore means that they have had to find other targets than themselves. This has been somewhat facilitated by changes in the distribution of property that generates rent, which has changed the stratification structure of Russian society, and by low rates of social mobility, which supports a system of ascriptive identification.

The strategy of elites is to use the discourse of an existential threat to overcome the objectively existing strains between the powerless majority and those who have power. The product of this strategy is the implementation of racial discourses and the launch of mechanisms to promote the racialization of others. This discourse consists of two elements. The first is positive, linked to the self-assertion of Russia as a Great Power, the true Europe, populated by people who have the highest potential for ‘whiteness’. The second is negative, linked to the definition of the other as either an external jealous enemy, who cannot accept the imperial ambitions as well as the moral and cultural superiority of Russians, or an internal enemy, a racialized other, who, by virtue of his ‘nature’, cannot attain the aims marked out by the power elite.

According to the discourse now dominant in Russian society, migrants go to Western Europe to receive benefits, rather than to work, while they come to the big Russian cities to enjoy higher salaries and better standards of living. The migration regime in Russia thus also needs to be interpreted within the context of the reorganization and dismantlement of the welfare state (Chandler 2011). The state, by promoting the image of life in big Russian cities as prosperous and with abundant opportunities, reinforces the understanding that embeddedness and Russianness are assets. Alexander Tkachev (2012), the governor of Krasnodarskiy kray in the Kuban’, addressed this issue during a meeting with police officers:

Today – and maybe it was already time for this yesterday – we have to re-assert our independence, our values, and traditions in a new way.

And together with the Caucasian peoples who have traditionally been here – Armenians, Adyghe, Dagestanis – in proportion to their relations with the Russian people, with Slavs. This will be good for everyone, including the ethnic communities. They understand very well that they have been integrated into Russian culture – they feel comfortable, they're engaged in business, they make a profit. They understand that migration from other territories, the growth in population of one or another nation, would interfere with them. They're also afraid of that. People who would live here for 100, 200, 50 years. So I'm confident that there is no other way – we will squeeze them, we will impose order, ask for documents, enforce migration policies... [T]hose who want to try... to stake their claim, organize trouble, engage in illegal business, they should understand that they better not come to Kuban'. There are Kuban' guys (*kubantsy*) here, with our own laws, rather tough guys. There's a working police force, there are Cossacks – I would rather go somewhere else.

Such symbolic superiority may be regarded as a stabilizing factor in light of the risks that the middle class and intellectuals now face in their pursuit of private happiness due to the Russian economy's dependence on the prices of raw materials, the absence of the rule of law, and the cutting back of civil freedoms. The new economic structures and rules thus not only facilitate the process of imagining new communities, they also create the new communities of interests. The institution of *propiska*, just as the institution of citizenship, may be viewed as a form of social closure that reinforces the position of Moscow and several other large cities as an internal West (Omel'chenko and Flynn 2004, pp. 97–8).

While both the 'invasion of migrants' and the West are constructed as threats to Russianness, they also symbolize that Russia is entering and embracing the new global order. Putin (2012a) begins *Russia: The National Question*, published during his most recent presidential campaign, with a reference to the migration processes unfolding elsewhere. He states that

In many countries, closed national and religious communities are forming, which not only refuse to assimilate, but will not even adapt. There are neighborhoods and entire cities where generations of immigrants are living on welfare and do not speak the language of the host country. The response to this situation has been a rise of xenophobia among indigenous populations in an attempt to protect their interests, jobs, and social benefits from the "foreign competitors." People are shocked by the aggressive pressure on their

traditions and way of life, and are seriously threatened by the possibility of losing their national identity.

The following comments by the Mayor of Moscow, Sergey Sobyenin (2011), in an interview with the most popular talk radio station in Moscow reveal a similar concern:

When I first came to Paris I didn't even understand where I was – there are people there whose skin is not Paris-colored, and the number of migrants who have already settled there and are already living there has, I think, reached nearly half the population of Paris.

Konstantin Poltoranin, the former chief spokesman for the Federal Migration Service, the state body responsible for policies relating to migrants and refugees, expressed a similar view much more bluntly in an interview with the BBC. He stated that

What is now at stake is the survival of the white race. This is what we feel in Russia. We want to make sure the mixing of blood happens in the right way here – not the way it has happened in Western Europe, where the results have not been good. (Sandford 2011)

Even in academic works on inter-state migration one may come across such statements as 'the white population is diminishing in absolute and relative terms, so a white man may be included on the *Red List*' (Starchenkov 1997, p. 133). Sociology departments at Russian universities are instituting chairs of the sociology of security, a subject which now forms part of the sociology curriculum. Migration processes, which are viewed in the Russian context as elements of wider demographic and even geopolitical processes, are regarded as constituting, in Putin's words, the 'threat of Russia disappearing as a nation'. If a distinction is drawn between society and this state-centered framework, the emphasis is usually shifted to the threat to collective identities and to the 'spiritual security' of the Russian ethnos.

Becoming racial, doing race: negotiations of 'blackness' and 'whiteness' by racialized minorities in Russia

Every modern state establishes a legal and ideological boundary between citizens and foreigners and develops numerous instruments of social closure (Joppke 2004). Although the citizenship law in Russia makes no

reference to an ethnic definition of the nation, the majority of other post-Soviet states explicitly give preferential treatment to the titular ethnic groups. The racialized subject is, above all, a stranger, as opposed to 'our own' or 'one of us' ('svoi', 'nashi'), which are persistent concepts in Russian history. Boundaries remain in the post-Soviet space, although the objects of categorization have more than once been moved from one category to another. While this confirms the instrumentality and historical specificity of patterns of exclusion, it in no way reduces the importance of racial discourse in the nation-building process. Oxana Shavel (2011, p. 89) comments in this regard that

With the adoption of the 2010 amendments to the 1999 compatriots law, the Russian state's answer to the question who constitutes 'us' institutionalized an ambiguity. The official definitions of compatriots are now vague enough to allow defining compatriots by a virtually infinite combination of ethnic, religious, cultural and even professional characteristics.

Inclusive nationalism, such as Cuban *cubanidad*, challenges the historical and contemporary determinants of the racialization processes that have involved Russianness as an exclusive mono-ethnic core. However, the basis of the Russian economy is the export of natural resources – a fact that has become a part of the public discourse – and connections with territories rich in resources are activated through the symbolic construction of locals, or those 'who possess the land by birthright'. Under such conditions, defining Russianness as the possession of a Russian passport one has rather unexpected or unwillingly received is evidently not only lacking in persuasiveness, but is also destined to be contested by the discourses of rootedness. One can instantaneously become a 'migrant', or even an 'invader', without traveling or crossing any borders. Brubaker (2004, p. 148) is correct to observe that is then not the person who crosses a border and becomes a migrant of his own free will, but rather the border which 'crosses' a person's life story, thereby transforming her into a 'migrant' with all the political connotations such a designation entails. Now it is no longer people who, being free to travel, choose the direction of their movement, the place and the state in which they wish to live, but rather the state itself that defines its own citizens, that is, those who are settled on its territory and inhabit the space within its borders. The set of citizens (civic society) thus changes not by the free will of individuals or by their intention to combine the 'ecological' and 'political' aspects of their existence in a unified whole,

but rather in accordance with the shifting boundaries of the state. *Jus soli* here acquires a paradoxical force in the definition of citizenship, since it emphasizes the great significance that we would have expected to be attributed to being permanently settled in a single location.

Applying the framework of racialization helps us to explain why, out of all migrants, it is those different in appearance who become victims of racial profiling in Russia during police checks on the streets, which has been described as 'the most extreme and egregious ethnic profiling ever documented through a statistical survey of the practice' (Jurix 2006, pp. 51–2). It is hardly plausible that the imagery of race could have been activated solely by new impersonal historical conditions. That is to say that the conflicts in the Caucasus and migration to the larger Russian cities should not be viewed as the source of supposedly completely new discourse of race and migration – they rather comprise a series of events that have activated these discourses, possibly shaping them in a particular fashion. When we say 'a person of such-and-such a nationality', the warning sign of the danger we subconsciously feel is not the 'nationality' itself, but rather the 'face' – and both 'person' and 'face' are translated by the same word in Russian, *litso*. We can try to choose our 'nationality', but our face will betray and separate us.

The everyday character of racialization is also the product of an interaction through which an intersubjectively categorized objectivity of social phenomena and processes is formed in the minds of humans. The routine document checks conducted by the police constitute a 'situational mechanism' Goffman (1963, p. 18) that ascribes meaning to differences. Goffman (*ibid.*) maintains that a 'situation begins when mutual monitoring occurs, and lapses when the second last person has left'. In this respect, the system of racial profiling in routine police checks on the underground and on city streets transforms visually different migrants into an identifiable social group that is well aware of its common denominator – its non-Slavic appearance. Moreover, identifying 'illegal' migrants by their 'non-Slavic appearance' endorses the discourses of threat, fosters their racialized character, replaces non-belonging with appearance, and defines illegality by the fact of police units checking identity papers. The latter action itself becomes the cause for having a particular status in Russian society.

Economic migrants from the southern regions of Russia, who might have a different phenotype from those who live in the towns where they have come to work, are called 'Gastarbeiter', a term that has become firmly established in the standard rhetoric of officials and the media (Guboglo 2008). Not only do migrants themselves not fit comfortably

into this system and resist the stereotypes and classifications imposed on them, they are judged as posing a threat to the 'safe' picture of familiar surroundings by their very external appearance. Although they represent formerly established communities of Soviet people who had been ethnicized as, for example, Armenians or Georgians, they have now been merged under the circumstances of large-scale migration into one generalized 'black' mass, in part due to the narrowing of the everyday horizons of ordinary people in comparison with Soviet times (Sahadeo 2012). Meredith Roman (2002, p. 8) describes this process as the 'racialization of friends into enemies' and states that

Russian officials accomplished this by racializing the non-Slavic nationalities, by systematically speaking of them and treating them in a demeaning manner. This process has reduced dark-skinned non-Russian peoples in the media, legislation and popular thinking from what the Soviet era had made distinct nationalities to a criminal Black race. Moscow was able so quickly to portray and conceive of their former little brothers as criminals and parasites because, according to the logic of the official Soviet script, non-Russians' foolish secession from the system in which they were the chief beneficiaries simply meant their degeneration to their uncivilized pre-Soviet existence.

As Mark Beissinger (2002, p. 39) has demonstrated, 'any adequate theory of nationalism needs to explain not merely the process by which national consciousness crystallizes, but also variation in the forms of behaviour by which populations contest the nations'. The same is true for the racialization framework of analysis – since the migrant is an agent, she may develop strategies for the de-racialization or negotiation of her perceived racial belonging, and these strategies may vary depending on the dominant ideology, the economic situation, and other factors. Brubaker's (1996) model of the triangular configuration of relations between nationalizing states, national minorities, and the external homeland are of great importance when analyzing the racialization of migrants. It should be noted that we are dealing here not with groups or identities, but rather with dynamic and relational concepts that operate as 'group-constituting and identity-evoking "stances" emerging from the competition between elites and from the evoked responses of the populations' (Hagendoorn et al. 2001, p. 15). Vic Satzewich (2000, p. 283) has demonstrated that the racialization of 'peripheral Europeans' by elites in North America did not lead ethnic Ukrainians in Canada to create a

racial identity based on claims to whiteness. Racialization can support an unequal distribution of resources, but it also leads to the formulation of counter-ideologies by racialized minorities.

The character of relations between Russians and 'titular' groups in the national republics of the Russian Federation has changed insofar as the status of Russians as the older brother has been contested (Ryzhova 2011, p. 43). Perceived changes in status have also been reinforced by the trauma of defeat in the Cold War, which entailed – at least in public opinion – the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Putin has called this the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century. Ryzhova (2011, p. 44) has shown that, during the 'sovereignization' of national republics in the Russian Federation in the 1990s, "Russians perceived the socio-psychological background of inter-ethnic relations more pessimistically than did the 'titular' nations. Russians two or three times more often thought that inter-ethnic relations were heated." Ryzhova (2011, pp. 46–7) has also revealed a certain habitus of Russians who 'lose psychologically to "titular" nations because of their lowered social self-evaluation in comparison with them and their social inheritance of essentially less constructive and market-oriented values. Russians definitely count less on themselves in the strategies for avoiding poverty.' However, this contrasts with the opinion polls Ryzhova herself refers to. For example, the most common response to the question 'What gives you confidence in tomorrow?' among ethnic minorities in Russia was 'the support of family, relatives, friends', while for Russians it was the 'ability to earn, a profession' (Ryzhova 2011, p. 44). Nevertheless, the main value in life for both groups was a 'good family'.

But to speak of racial discourse only as it is formulated within the context of 'Russianness' is a serious limitation. Even if it is ethnic Russians who most often benefit from racialization at the expense of the other inhabitants of the Russian Federation, we must keep in mind that even the entrepreneurs who represent other *natsional'nost'* also employ and reshape the concept of race and racial knowledge. As was the case with the Soviet Union, Russia is a multi-ethnic state in which both national policies and academic research have often been dependent on intellectuals from ethnic minorities, which closely ties a sense of group position with social prestige. In addition, many peoples continue to define themselves in ethnoracial contradistinction with either the Russian majority, or with other minorities that populate a given national autonomous region in the Russian Federation or one of the former Republics of the Soviet Union (Roeder 1991; Arutyunyan 2011). Ethnic minorities have also taken part in the struggle ongoing within contemporary

Russia to claim 'genuine whiteness'. Many intellectuals from a variety of ethnic groups have thus become engaged in the process of becoming 'white' under conditions of the growth of racist discrimination and violence and the unfolding of racialization practices.

But if 'becoming white' for Russians had initially involved a painful transition from being 'truly red' to a situation of anemic paleness or colorlessness, then becoming racial was informed for ethnic minorities by fairly different legacies. For example, Soviet rule in some of the republics had been characterized by a high degree of autonomy in the public sphere, the preservation of primordial clan relations, widespread 'non-Socialist forms of economy', and traditional forms of family relations (Lewin 1995, p. 250). It is also significant that the preservation of such 'national specificity' – a term from Russian public discourse – in exchange for political loyalty was more easily provided for in agrarian societies than in contemporary industrial, urban, and nuclearized societies. *Natsional'nost'*, which by law had to be indicated in the identity document issued to every citizen of the Soviet Union, became one of the main attributes of status because it turned one's blood ties into social capital (Suny 1993; Baiburin 2012). When the sense of a Soviet supra-ethnic commonality was challenged by the formation of new states, Russia experienced a paralysis at the center of power in Moscow. In contrast, the national republics of the Russian Federation became eager 'to gain for themselves as much as the center would concede willingly or unwillingly' (Lewin 1995, p. 250), which resulted in a transition to clan-based ethnic particularism in Russia's Muslim regions (Yemelianova 2005). This situation gave rise to a regression towards imperial policies of indirect rule with the new 'tribal chiefs' who had gained official positions.

Surveys have revealed that ethnic minorities in the national republics of the Russian Federation are much more strongly oriented toward marrying within their own ethnic groups, and they more frequently use the categories of 'physical appearance' and 'character or psychology' as markers of ethnic differentiation (Ryzhova 2011, pp. 53–5). Ryzhova's analyses also show that while ethnic Russians indicate that a common language and state unite them with representatives of their ethnicity, the main markers that delineate the lines of difference for ethnic minorities are physical appearance and the system of kindred relationships with other representatives of the same ethnic group and language.

It is interesting that Russians seem not to have had their own Golden Age, something which has been constructed by all of the Empire's minorities. To be more precise, no consensus was ever attained about

the pre-revolutionary 'Russia That We Lost'. Promoting the values of Tsarist Russia against the stability of the Soviet society became too politicized after the break-up of the Soviet Union – adopting them would have divided Russian society in much the same way it was divided in the period immediately after the 1917 Revolution. The use of the Great Power imperialist rhetoric supported by the symbolic code of whiteness in order to ensure temporal and spatial domination constituted a less ambivalent strategy than ethnonationalism coupled with a search for historical roots and lost statehood, which has been more characteristic for the minorities.

Tishkov (2001, pp. 451–82) reveals, in his analysis of Chechen anti-Semitism and racism, that certain Chechen intellectuals maintain that the Varangians, the founders of Kievan Rus, were in fact not Scandinavians, but Chechens. By thus claiming their right to form a racial discourse, these intellectuals have entered the post-colonial imperative of self-racialization as 'becoming' racial, so much so that the official position implemented by the personal order of President Dudaev (Tishkov 2001, p. 455) was that Chechens were Nordic warriors. In addition, Chechen racism and ethnonationalism became strangely united with religious extremism and messianism, which makes the logic of its formation and development comparable with the logic by which contemporary Russian ethnonationalism took shape. The discourse of Zombardian 'warriors and merchants' also lies at the basis of the narratives of Chechen masculinity. Tishkov (2001, p. 475) remarks in this regard that 'Chechen nationalism after the war remained essentially ethnic. But if before it was based on an ideology of abjection – 'historical injustice' and the collective trauma of deportation and discrimination – then now it is based upon ideas of superiority.'

Intellectuals on all the territories of the former Soviet Union endeavor to represent their history as colonial (Tlostanova 2010, 2011). Myths of ethnic descent are focused on genealogical ancestry, and local elites in areas that have been annexed go so far as to define themselves racially in terms of having a different lineage than either the perceived colonizers or the populations they themselves have governed (Shnirelman 2006). This combines 'ancestral race-thinking beyond the one-drop rule' (Glasgow 2009, p. 65) with the phenotypical race-thinking that has been predominant in the ethnic core of the empire. While race is usually thought of as 'type' in the Russian intellectual tradition, ethnic minorities more often use race as 'lineage'. Of great importance in this regard is the distinction proposed by Banton (1998, 2010) between the horizontal (classifications by 'racial type') and vertical (classifications

by descent) dimensions that are inherent in the conception of race. Vertical dimensions comprise an important element in founding myths that emphasize the historical importance and continuity of the group. Visible minorities, who often do not possess convincing reasons to be regarded as more 'white' in a given social context, utilize alternative strategies for negotiating their position in the racial order. In light of Roediger's (1998, p. 6) observation that 'discounting and suppressing the knowledge of whiteness held by people of color was not just a byproduct of white supremacy but an imperative of racial domination', groups that have the longest history of stigmatization in Russian society may develop different strategies of resistance. In discussing the strategies used by Roma in Russia to cope with their perceived blackness, Alaina Lemon (2002, p. 61) writes that

Here was a foreign category – race in another nation – being used to make a point about local relations. In other cases, by indexing foreign 'blackness', Roma could attempt to *shift* their place within local racial hierarchies. Younger Roma also claimed affinity with American blacks – not as 'second class' but in terms of an 'attitude' they detected in the movement of musicians on MTV that rendered them 'like us'. They equated *this* kind of 'blackness' with 'America' (that is, 'The Statue of Liberty – isn't that where Michael Jackson dances in the video?'). Since many former Soviets positioned 'America' as materially better off or even 'more civilized' than Russia, Romani youth could try to reverse the local valence of blackness: if Roma were like American black musicians, and thus like Americans, they could be 'better' than Russians – all the more for being 'black'. Here, at least in a limited social space, the direction of slippage between race and nation were two-way, and non-Russians deployed *both* as capital.

Ulrike Ziemer (2011) has demonstrated how Armenian and Adyghe youth have begun to identify themselves with 'blacks', or a supra-national category of Caucasians (*litsa kavkazskoy natsional'nosti*), as a result of external racialization. Labor migrants from Central Asia are well aware of being stigmatized as 'slaves' by both the host society and their compatriots at home (Reeves 2009; Rocheva 2013). Such groups previously responded by emphasizing that they were 'ethnic' and claiming their ethno-national belonging, which confirms my thesis of the relative autonomy of racialization in connection with the processes of becoming ethnic and national. This also confirms the proposed pattern

of nation-building whereby Russians construct their national identity by, among other things, negotiating their whiteness, while minorities use their claims of 'whiteness' or 'blackness' mainly as strategies of resistance.

Because of their primordial nature and the narrowness of their solidarity and trust, individuals and groups identifying themselves with ethnic minorities in Russia can face challenges in attempting joint action against the state. Such issues, in their turn, may lead both to political apathy and to enclosure in a racialized community, which may then give rise to a strengthening of stability of the social and political orders. Becoming racial in Russia as a mode of self-racialization can, in many ways, be compared with the process of *Selbstorientalisierung* among Polish migrants to Germany that Uffermann has described (2009).

Insofar as the painful remaking of identity in Russia has been a self-conscious process that is informed by social change, it can be studied sociologically. Robert Park (1950, p. 249) argued, in his *Race and Culture*, that social performance, or the process of playing a given identity role, often begins cynically as a intended strategy to pass as someone else that one would like to be, which later becomes a true and sincere self:

It is in these roles that we know each other; it is in these roles that we know ourselves. In a sense, and in so far as this mask represents the conception we have formed of ourselves – the roles we are striving to live up to – this mask is our truer self, the self we would like to be.

7

Geopolitics of Racism and the Nation-Building Processes

Empire and whiteness: symbolic economies of difference

The Soviet project sought to successfully carry out an ambitious task, namely, to be civilized, or 'white', without being European, or racist. Today's new project of Russian identity attempts to solve the same complex task with one variable less, that is, simply by becoming 'white'. In this respect, those constructing a new Russian identity today are leading a fierce fight against the colonization of public discourse by 'political correctness'. For example, the Russian nationalist Valeriy Solovey (2007, p. 15) complains in his 'Preface' to the second edition of Vladimir Avdeev's *Rasologiya* (Avdeev 2007) that 'Even in the face of invasions by other races, Europeans do not regard Russians as their brothers.' The influential pro-Kremlin politician and Dean at Moscow State University Vyacheslav Nikonov (2012) recasts the same argument, but also adds that race is the main source of misunderstanding on the international level:

Such an attitude towards us [Russians] is connected not least of all with the fact that we are white. Europe and America expect from us the same type of behavior as the Western white man. And they are very upset when our reaction is different. They think that we should constantly demonstrate to them our European image, but Russia is an independent civilization because of its entire historical experience.

Thus, racialization needs to be reconsidered as rooted in, among other things, the geopolitical relations between states. The Russian case reveals the complex relations between the logic of identification constructed externally – as belonging to the domain of 'civilization' and

'whiteness' that is situated beyond the 'Third World' – and the logic of identification constructed internally – as informed by the racial discourses of differences in 'human material' (*chelovecheskiy material*) that allegedly structures the inequalities at home.

Let us now examine more closely certain issues associated with reconsidering racialization as it is rooted in the geopolitical relations among states.

First of all, the logic of identification is constructed externally as belonging to the domain of 'civilization', which supposedly has a special mission concerning the 'Third World'. If we study Russia in this regard, we have a unique methodological opportunity to examine race by using the concept of empire. Empire does not merely involve space and a mode of government, for it is also a meaning that is articulated in communication. Empire may thus represent both a research situation that makes it possible to overcome the limitations of the strictly national approach as well as a theoretical framework that helps to eliminate the distinction between modern and pre-modern societies that has been traditionally accepted in sociology. Race can and in fact does act as one of the themes of such communication in Russia.

The Russian sociologist Alexander Filippov (1994, pp. 462–3) observed several years after the end of the Soviet Union that

There has been the greatest interest in our development during the last two or three years, when the formal disintegration of the empire has become a widely discussed issue. That is not to say, of course, that the majority of people are now thinking about the imperial space, which in principle is not accessible to broad thematization. Attention has instead been drawn to the problems caused by the disintegration of the empire. It is rather that the number of people now discussing traditionally elevated topics has grown to a certain degree. It is in this sense that empire as a visible idea has become not widely discussed, but simply more widely discussed – to the same degree that politics is now publicly discussed.

It is important to note that the public discussion to which Filippov refers has also introduced the elements of racial knowledge, which are addressed in my research, into mass circulation.

Olga Malinova (2008, pp. 63–6) has mapped a number of criteria for defining the meaning of empire in Russian public discourse that may be presented as binary oppositions. First, the multipartite character of the political body, which was manifested primarily through ethnic

diversity, is contrasted with the state, which had one dominant nation, national culture, and ethnicity. Nation state as a binary opposite of empire may be represented as 'Asian', 'black', 'European', or 'white', but never as multicultural. However, it may include, or be invaded by, visually different 'Others' whose presence transforms the nation-state into a 'polluted' nation-state. On the basis of Mary Douglas's (1970) definition, 'pollution' can be interpreted as a residual category of classification schemes – that is, it is possible to perceive what is dislocated only as a deviation. The second binary pair concerns the presence of asymmetrical power relations between the center and periphery (regions), which may be represented as metropole and colonies. The opposite of empire would be a unitary state understood either as a body without ethnic divisions, which Russian nationalists advocate, or as a federation of equal units, which the proponents of decentralization advocate. The presence of asymmetrical relations implies that violence could and would be used to preserve the empire and prevent the secession of any of its regions. The third criterion of empire in Malinova's view is an autocratic governmental organization from above. Its opposite is a state built upon the principles of democracy and the rule of law, with a strong civil society and horizontal bonds between citizens.

A second issue of importance concerning analysis of racialization in this chapter is 'whiteness'. In the sociology of race, 'whiteness' has traditionally been interpreted in an unreflective manner as a norm contrasted with 'blackness', around which resistance to racism was structured. Whiteness has more recently been reformulated by scholars who have conceptualized and unmasked it as an unrecognized asset (Frankenberg 1993; Roediger 1999; Delgado and Stefanic 2001). In Russia, whiteness is explicitly represented as symbolical capital that both indicates and facilitates belonging to the First World as opposed to the Third World. The peculiar nature of this view, however, resides in the fact that Russia is not a country with a ruling white minority, as was the case with South Africa during apartheid.

Soviet children escaped every week into East German films that lauded the fight for identity, with Gojko Mitić in the leading role. Russian boys, following Vissarion Belinsky and Mikhail Lermontov, also enjoyed reading James Fenimore Cooper, and outdoor games with freedom-loving 'redskins' were familiar to the children of many Russian generations. On the bicentennial of Cooper's birth in 1989 the Soviet Postal Service published a series of commemorative stamps, Soviet publishing houses printed new editions of his works that resold for between five and seven times their official price on the black market, and the

Soviet film industry released *The Deerslayer, or The First Warpath*. But what had earlier been presented as a struggle for freedom by wily Indian tribes against the whites was deromanticized during *Perestroika* and given clear colonial connotations. The aim of the *Perestroika* 'civilizing' project was no longer simply to uncover and display imperialistic strategies, but rather to present the cruelty of the doomed Indians in their fight against progress – and progress was associated with the 'whites in the fort'. The same defenselessness of the Indians in the face of advancing 'civilization' and the trauma that accompanied the need to become 'white' would also be deeply felt by Russians through the culture of the *Perestroika* years and the 'shock therapy' that followed.

Whiteness in Russia is a claim or stake that can be either challenged or supported by the media, peers, and public policies. This situation is also widely reflected in representations of racism as an attribute of contemporary Russians. For example, both of the Russian protagonists of two of the most internationally popular Swedish authors of recent years, Stieg Larsson (2006) and Henning Mankel (1993), are former KGB employees and doctrinaire racists. The intersectionality of the Russian origins of these clearly negative characters and their past membership in the ominous KGB add a certain verisimilitude to the narratives of these masters of detective fiction. In addition, the personal biographies of the authors help to ensure the believability of their works for the reader. Larsson was co-founder and editor-in-chief of EXPO, an anti-racist center and magazine in Stockholm, and he held these roles until his death; Mankel, who is well known for his criticism of European colonialism, shows a special sensitivity towards racial themes in his novels.

Additional light is cast on this complex issue by Boris Grigoryev (2004, pp. 333–4), a charismatic KGB intelligence officer who was stationed in the Scandinavian countries for over a decade. His books, which reflect his experiences and career, have enjoyed significant popularity in Sweden and Russia. He has described in one of his recent Russian publications an experience he had on one of his visits to Sweden after his retirement.

As a result of the mass influx of foreigners to the country, Swedes have what they have. When I visited Stockholm in 1996, I realized that many things had changed in the fourteen years since the end of my long assignment there. My eye was immediately struck by the mass of mulattoes and mestizos on the television who spoke a good Stockholm dialect of Swedish even though their physical appearance differed little from those of Jamaicans or Pakistanis. On the streets

of the capital, in the stores and offices, you see swarthy, dark-haired, brown-eyed Swedes who do not simply sweep the streets or drive buses, but instead occupy jobs considered rather prestigious by old standards that had earlier belonged to native Swedes. It was especially strange for me to see the stocky descendants of Latin American Indians in the uniform of a Swedish Army corporal or the slender and sinuous descendants of Hindu untouchables behind the counter in a bank.

If the Soviet regime was the object of what Bonnet (2002, pp. 441–3) called the ‘Western racial suspicion of Soviet Communism’, which denigrated it to being the rule of the ‘lower races’, then post-Soviet Russia has become an object of criticism for supposedly being the ‘most racist country in the World’. This inevitably raises the question of power relations and the construction of the Other under the conditions of global racialization. But the logic of criticism has been mutual and symmetrical – accusations of racism during the Soviet era have been answered by charges from contemporary Russian officials that the immigration policies of Western European states have been driven by fears of a supposed threat to the ‘survival of the white race’. It suffices in this regard to recall the infamous statements of Konstantin Poltoranin, a formal official of the Federal Migration Service (Sandford 2011).

A third issue of significance is associated with the Soviet project for changing human nature, which implied that the amelioration of the social order through control and planning would lead to the creation of a new type of Soviet man. In contrast, efforts in Nazi Germany were targeted at achieving the ‘purification’ of the nation in order to promote the Nordic race insofar as genetic constitution, rather than historical forces, was regarded as the determining force. Selective breeding, sterilization, and euthanasia were thus to be used to maximize the positive traits of the national population. But while both the Soviet and the Nazi projects were informed by an understanding that social development was determined by objectively existing forces that could be influenced by policies and actions, the focus has now shifted from populations to individuals and from determination to reconstruction through the use of technology and investments in racial status. Contemporary approaches instead focus upon the various aspects of individual existence that are regarded as being either open to or useful for reconstruction.

For example, an apartment has long been viewed in Russia as a personal symbolic resource that can be used for elevating – or

reconstructing – one's social status, much like giving one's daughter as a bride to a well-established family. And this was a personal resource that could be shared with several generations of one's family, as was the case with Vyacheslav Molotov – his acquiring the family apartment might in fact have demanded more effort than some of his diplomatic assignments as the Foreign Minister in Stalin's Soviet Union. In addition, the comparison with finding a husband for one's daughter might very well be more appropriate than it at first seems, for it was the children's generation whose life could be changed by marriage, symbolic or otherwise, to a western 'white' man. Molotov's granddaughter rented the family apartment, number 61 in the famous building at 3 Romanov pereulok – where Trotsky, Frunze, Khrushchev, Malenkov, and many marshals of the Soviet Union once lived – to foreign businessmen in Moscow (Polonsky 2010). Molotov himself died there in 1986 at the age of 96.

Hierarchies have emerged in the struggle for civilized clients – not only profitable, but also prestigious – on the lucrative apartment market for foreigners. Molotov's grandson, the MP and historian Vyacheslav Nikonov, who was noted above for his preoccupation with the issue of whiteness, might have received an advertisement from a real estate agency, along with many of his neighbors, that offered to improve his material circumstances and thereby enable him to approach the life of a 'white man'. The advertisement emphasized not only the material goods that he could buy with the handsome rent that foreigners would pay to live in his apartment, but especially the changed atmosphere that such tenants would bring to his building, which would improve both his status and that of the community. Patrik Aspers (2007, p. 379) points out that

In a status market, the order is maintained because the identities of actors on both sides of the market are ranked according to status, which is a more entrenched social construction than the commodity traded in the market. In a market characterized by standards, the situation is reversed: the commodity is a more entrenched social construction than the social status of actors in the market.

Such personal and collective self-reconstruction can, moreover, help rebuild the violated authenticity of subjects on the both sides of the 'color line'. James Lloydovich Patterson also rented his apartment, and in 1994, after only three years, he was able to return to the United States with his mother, repeating the trajectory of his black-skinned hero from the famous Soviet film *Circus*. 60 years after main characters Marion

and her son (played by Patterson) were expelled from racist America and adopted by the Soviet people, they were able to return to their old motherland. Patterson's exotic appearance served as symbolic capital during the Soviet period, and he felt himself welcomed as a globally minded poet. But although Patterson's blackness ceased to be an asset in post-Soviet Russia, his personal assets nevertheless enabled his speedy return to the 'civilization' of the First World.

The admiration for 'abroad', where 'everything is for humans', that is connected with the profitable use of personal symbolic capital in constructing a new identity, has steadily come to be complemented by reflections on 'who is human'. This type of reflectivity indicates, in fact, that Russians have begun to participate in those interactions that determine who is to be excluded, which is now perceived in terms of personal experience and widely disseminated in the public discourse. In respect to the consumer lifestyle available today through the profits earned from renting apartments or selling oil to 'white men', perhaps the geopolitical status of post-Soviet Russia is best summarized with the remark that the changes make sense only insofar as the new Russians are considered to be 'white men' themselves.

Another important feature in Russian public discourse, and the one that is most important in my analysis, is the messianic idea that Russia can be the foundation for a project of civilization (Neumann 1996). Furthermore, insofar as empire has acted as the incarnation of this project, it provides for the inclusion of different peoples and territories in its orbit of influence (McCarthy 2009). Yakovenko (1996, p. 119) succinctly expressed this point in the observation that 'The nation integrates the nation-state, but the idea integrates the empire.' Everything located outside the empire, rather than inside, is the space where it is to carry out its mission, which is informed by references to race articulated as a crusade against political correctness. The discourses of 'caring for Europe' and the mission of unmasking political correctness, to which both common citizens and representatives of elites appeal, may differ in their motives and in their forms of declarations, but they are both informed by a shared conception of race and the same racial knowledge. This allows us to understand processes of racialization as building upon a clearly defined set of ideas about what is related to race. Grigoryev (2004, p. 334) clearly expresses an appropriate sense of 'racial nostalgia':

When I was leaving Stockholm and waiting for an Aeroflot flight from Lima that had a transit boarding at Arlanda [Stockholm], I was shocked by a crowd of short-legged, paunchy, thick-boned,

tallowy, Latin Americans with a large share of Indian blood in their veins who left the belly of the TU-154 noisily speaking Swedish to each other. Foreigners had obviously infused their own blood into Swedish blood in rather healthy doses, and I doubted that Swedes would manage to preserve their pure Nordic type in the future with such an ethnic combination. By their language they were obviously Swedes, but August Strindberg would hardly have written his famous *Röda rummet* [Red Room] after looking at them. But times change.

‘Postcolonial in a cold climate’: Russia as a colonized colonizer

The contemporary social sciences are being transformed into a means for critiquing both society and culture from their respective positions. It is somewhat difficult to identify a set of key ‘turnings’ associated with this change in research orientation because each of the so-called ‘post-structuralist’, ‘relational’, ‘cultural’, and ‘constructivist’ viewpoints, which emphasize different aspects of the process of racial formation, provide their own perspectives on ‘race’ (for overview see Saperstein et al. 2013). Each provides an opportunity to deconstruct the social construction of race and assemble, from the resulting elements, new objects of analysis and critique. Post-colonial studies, for example, is a theoretically articulated position that has helped foster research interest in the racial problematic in Russia. It has served to direct attention to studying Russia as an empire, but this does not imply that the majority of studies of the Russian Empire have been informed by the post-colonial framework of analysis. Post-colonial studies have rather cast light upon such issues as race and the internalization of oppression, which likely would otherwise have been destined for marginal interest.

The range of post-colonial research is very broad (Sproede and Lecke 2011), from the colonial periods in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Abashin et al. 2008; Tlostanova 2010), to the multitude of forms of imperial government in Tsarist Russia (Khodarkovsky 2002; Burbank et al. 2007; Morrison 2008). This ‘turn’ cannot be ignored because a significant part of the academic discussion today that shapes racial discourse proceeds precisely within the discussion of post-colonialism, nation, and empire on the part of public intellectuals. For example, the main apologist for the racial reading of Russian history, the academic historian and political leader Valeriy Solovey (2008, p. 121), speaks of the ‘controversy between the empire and the Russian people’ as the ‘main Russian controversy’. He also refers to the revolutionary movement

of the early twentieth century as the '*national liberation struggle of the Russian people* against the oppressive empire and the socially, culturally, and ethnically alien ruling stratum' (Solovey and Solovey 2009, pp. 166–7), that is, against 'colonial exploitation' (Solovey 2008, p. 425). Solovey's italicization of the standard Soviet formula, which had been widely used in anti-racist propaganda and in descriptions of colonial and post-colonial systems in Third World countries, is extremely indicative. It resembles the appeals to race in the Austro-Hungarian Empire that sought to mobilize people by defining their unity in the struggle against imperial domination (Turda 2005). We are obviously dealing here with a creative use of the rhetoric available for representing Russia as the subaltern, which largely serves to revitalize the discourse concerning Russian national identity. As Alexander Etkind (2011, p. 251) bluntly states, 'Russia was a colonial empire alongside those of Britain or Austria, and a colonized territory like Congo or the West Indies'. Russian-ness as a uniqueness sometimes represented as race corresponds to the image of Eurasia as the geographical space of Russia, which is separated culturally, historically, and politically from both Europe and Asia (Bassin 1991). Both the advocates of Russian nationalism and the West-friendly adherents to the idea of a 'liberal empire' point to the peculiarity of the Russian imperial order, in which the metropole, or the ethnically Russian imperial center, and not the colonies, or the margins of the empire, were exploited. Ronald Suny (2012, p. 30) speaks in this respect of the everyday notions of people and remarks that 'the Soviet Union was a strange empire in which the people of the periphery, in the minds of many, lived better and had greater advantages than the people of the metropole'. Such ideas, together with the definite symbolic and pragmatic value of Russianness and the practices of Russification, grant a very unusual form and content to the practices of domination.

The application of post-colonial theory to the analysis of racism in contemporary Russia is complicated by the peculiarity of the historical position of Russia as a 'colonized colonial empire' which supports claims for exceptionalism. This does not refer primarily to whether the post-colonial approach is applicable to or appropriate for Russian studies, but rather to how the sociological analysis of racism in Russia can sensitize scholars and possibly contribute to the broader post-colonial approach in the sociology of race. Two problems arise in this regard that are of vital importance for sociologists. First, studying Russia as a colonial empire breaks with the tradition in which nation and modernity make society possible, and it questions the very foundations upon which the project of sociology as the science of modern society is constructed. Secondly,

although Russia was not a classical colonial empire, it was – and still is – an extremely complex social and political space in which barely compatible discourses of domination have somehow been combined. Stated otherwise, it is very difficult to combine the wish to control remote territories with attempts to create ethnicized national republics as well as an organization of federated multiethnic communities – yet this is precisely what has taken place in Russia (Suny 2012).

Mark Beissinger (2006, p. 302) argues that the attempt to enforce socialist integration in the Soviet Union can be understood as colonial domination, or as an attempt ‘to enforce cultural or racial difference’ that leads to the formation of an appropriate vocabulary of resistance. The high level of education in post-socialist societies has made possible a wide expansion of such discursive practices among the population at large. This circumstance defines the specifics of the production of ‘postcolonialism in a cold climate’, to use Vessela Misheva’s (2010) description, in comparison with post-colonialism in the global South. As was demonstrated in Chapter 4 in respect to the work of Valeriy Solovey, this concerns not only the intellectual elite of former or present national minorities, but also Russians, who formed the symbolic core of the empire. In addition, attempts at self-victimization go hand in hand with attempts to describe nations today as in constant struggle against the vestiges of the colonial past. Such attempts can be regarded as a ‘projection of the “postcolonial” in its effort to adapt itself to an alien, incomprehensible social world and tie itself with “historical” bonds to its other’ (Misheva 2010, p. 725). The project of renationalization is thus being constructed upon a narrative of suffering and resistance, which leads inevitably to contradictions insofar as a new national identity does not presume the acknowledgement of the secondary role of, for example, Ukrainian or Lithuanian culture in their relation to the Russian culture. Kevin Platt (2010) observes, in his study of the Latvian case, that, in contrast to classical post-colonialism, East European societies connect the recovery of authenticity with westernization and a ‘return to civilization’. The key notion in the Latvian discourse is that Latvians were occupied by ‘barbarian’ Russian communism instead of having undergone a civilizing colonization by the ‘First World’.

The ambivalence of the imperial self-perception of ethnic Russians is well described by Lev Gudkov (1994, p. 180):

[T]he Baltic indigenous population is not regarded as an object of colonization or as a less civilized entity. In Russia itself, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are viewed as ‘close Europeans,’ well-nigh

matching by their value definitions, the image of 'real European' or westerner – an Englishman, a German, or an American. This makes it easier for Russians to accept their altered status or even a subordinated position. On the other hand, Russians in Central Asia go through a role or status conflict. They see themselves as a more modernized group and therefore lay claim to administrative and other influential positions, refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of new ethnic groupings that achieve to seek power, regarding such groupings as mafia, national extremists, and so forth.

I argue that such notions contribute to the fruitful use of racial discourse since they can provide that space of freedom which would permit one to rethink the situation within the Russian Empire as not simply based upon the typical foundations of western colonialism, but as often associated with the apparent autonomy or even superiority of those peoples who had been 'colonized'. The idea of race often provides symbolic resources for the construction of a system of codes that would denote both resistance and subordination, both purity and pollution.

While the use of Eurocentric discourse concerning the new 'civilized development' by the former satellites of the Kremlin reproduces development as an issue associated with the 'cultural hegemony' of the West, the educated Russian audience has broadly resorted to a different strategy. They appear to be following Bourdieu (1990, p. 155) as they ask 'if, in order to resist, I have no other resource than to lay claim to that in the name of which I am dominated, is this really resistance?'¹ Surkov (2006), the chief ideologist in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, states that 'Here in Russia it [sovereign democracy] has to... create a new society, a new economy, a new army, a new religion. Prove that you can and should think in Russian about freedom and justice.' Dmitri Trenin (2009, p. 38) comments that

The creators of today's foreign policy occupy a position that is diametrically opposed to that once represented by Gorbachev's words and deeds. *In those days* he talked about partnership, mutual advantage, membership in Europe, and universal human values, but now we mainly speak about competition, rivalry, and animosity. Our gain today is our opponent's loss, and vice versa. No one is dying to join some other institution.

It is well known that Russians often regard the emergence of post-Soviet feminism as a manifestation of the western cultural imperialism that

NGOs promote with foreign funding (Gapova 2002). But they almost unanimously view the 'political correctness' expressed in the denial that races exist and that there is a hierarchy between them as attempts at 'colonization'. The rootedness of this perception in public discourse is ably demonstrated in the feature film *Brother 2* [Brat-2] (2000), in which the protagonist protests against the symbolical violence of 'political correctness' and opposes it to the authenticity of tradition. Moreover, the latter is attested to by nothing less than the authority of the Soviet educational system, the 'best in the world' – 'Jews live in Israel, Negroes live in Africa, we were taught that in school'.

The strategy used to struggle against western hegemony in contemporary Russia is to transform the western subject itself into an object. Dmitriy Rogozin (2004), the former Chairman of *Rodina* (the Motherland Party) and Deputy Prime Minister after Putin's return to the presidency in 2012, leaves no doubt about Russians being true Europeans:

Russia is the authentic Europe, without the domination of gays, without pederast marriages, without false punk culture, without flunkeyism towards America. We are true Europeans, we have always survived, we have proven our Europeanness in wars against both the Crusaders and the Mongols – each and every time.

Such a distinction between 'false' and 'true' Europe is not new in the Russian historical context. However, today's definitions differ from those put forward previously (Neumann 1996, pp. 120–30) because now they are imbued with racial themes.

The dichotomy that was elaborated in the relationship with the imagined West was never East versus West, nor, much less, South versus North – it was rather Russia versus the West (Greenfield 1990; Neumann 1996; Malinova 2009). Even for Eurasianists, who point to Turanic blood as the fundamental element of the Russian population, Asia was merely a loosely used means for legitimizing Russian authenticity as a unique civilization (Laruelle 2004, p. 165). Neo-eurasianist Vadim Kozhinov (2002, pp. 233–4) states straightforwardly that

The Eurasian people are precisely the Russian people and none other. All the other peoples living in Russia are basically either Europeans or Asians who have acquired Eurasian features only within Russia's 'magnetic field'. And they lose their Eurasian character, steadily becoming European or Asian again, when they step out of this field. Only the Russian people are Eurasian – by definition.

Eurasianists denied the universalism of Eurocentrism and thereby challenged the discursive practices of Orientalism. 'Postcolonialism in a cold climate' turned out to be a very controversial means for representing the logic of racialization in official discourse insofar as the ideas of Eurasianists, in various interpretations, armed both President Putin's speechwriters as well as influential pro-government think-tanks, who admired the words of Eurasianists concerning the organic and persistent nature of relations between the people and authorities when the latter 'grew in popular soil'. Putin consistently displays such a connection with the people – and it becomes quite explicit in his remarks concerning Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's monologue about 'Sharikov's children' (Putin 2008).

However, while the reimagining of the nation in the majority of post-socialist countries was facilitated by spadework that had already been done (Anderson 2006), the task of transferring ownership of the nation to the people was hampered in Russia by historical legacies and the course of political development. Insofar as racial classification contributes to the codification of difference, the adoption of western theories and practices of racialization constitutes an effort on the part of Russians to transcend the trap of the East/West dichotomy. By inscribing racialization into already available discourses of difference that include the idea of race, agents of racialization in Russia – the Second World society that insists on maintaining an inside/outside position – have sought to elaborate new logics of identification in order to facilitate social cohesion under the very specific conditions of Russia's position in the world, structural specificities, and domestic power relations.

The nation-building processes: ambivalences in the uses of racial knowledge

Russian political elites share the dominant views in Russian society concerning migration, namely, that migration should be controlled and state-regulated, and that migrants themselves must observe the values that give coherence to Russian society. It is, in fact, the lack of such cohesion today that gives rise to ambiguities in the interpretations of Russianness and in the use of racial discourse in the nation-building policies. However, insofar as the Russian government is, on the whole, more sympathetic to the *derzhavniki* position, it asserts the national feelings of Russians in terms of a civil nation rather than an ethnic group. Elements of ethnonationalistic populism are occasionally added to this picture, including statements concerning the need to limit migration or

grant preferential treatment to the indigenous inhabitants of one city or other in respect to employment opportunities. But although policy makers typically think in terms of 'established residents' and 'outsiders' rather than in terms of racial purity, the tendency to essentialize differences and biologize the particular features of Russians is clearly evident. The Russian people and the civic nation of *Rossiyanе* (Russian citizens) have always been represented as endowed with special features, such as exceptional talent and strength. There has always been talk of the remarkable potential of 'our people' and of its readiness for self-sacrifice, but precisely what was meant by 'our people' was uncertain – it could have been either the civic nation, or the peoples of the Soviet Union. Operationally, the ambiguity in how to understand Russianness reflected the tendency for the 'Russian idea' to represent Russianness as a mystically messianic and universalist quality that had nothing at all to do with blood. As Mark Bassin (2012, p. 554) argues, visions of nationhood in Russia have been framed 'paradoxically in terms of a model of what we might call supra-nations'. He adds that

These are idealized visions of multi-national agglomerations, comprised of various ethnicities, peoples, and nations. They are supposedly bound together into a single cohesive supra-national 'community' by a set of shared cultural, religious, moral, and social values, as well as a sense of common historical origins and experience. These same characteristics serve to set them apart from and against other similarly constituted communities.

In order to chart the negotiations, dynamics, and logics of nation construction, it is important to delineate the groups and 'properties' that are considered for exclusion and inclusion in the body of the nation. In his article *Russia: The National Question*, which was published as an election manifesto during his most recent presidential campaign, Putin (2012a) calls for a toughening of Russia's immigration policies. He uses the words 'migrant' and 'immigration' 44 times in the article as he presents his understanding of nation formation in Russia. The 'people' (*narod*) as a community of the 'nation-building ethnos' is always contrasted with the Significant Other, which is always represented by a migrant of a different ethnicity. Putin regards immigration as a process external to the people that can change its essence, and he states that 'the historic Russia is neither an ethnic state nor an American 'melting pot,' where everyone is, one way or another, an immigrant'. He obviously juxtaposes the people and migrants: 'today, people are concerned

with – or to put it straight – annoyed by the many troubles caused by mass migration, be it from other countries or different parts of Russia’ (Putin 2012a). In this respect, I argue that illegality in reference to migrants and migration in Russia is not merely a contingent juridical status that indicates a violation of the administrative regime, but is rather a category of social analysis and practice that represents illegality as it is innate in persons. Putin makes an unambiguous distinction between ‘gastarbeiter’ in Russia and those compatriots, fellow-citizens, and ethnic Russians who have found themselves living outside Russia as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This was put very bluntly by the former deputy mayor of Moscow, Valeriy Vinogradov:

We must call a spade a spade. We are dealing here with gastarbeiter. This is not a swear word, it has no emotional coloring at all. It’s a good German word, used in all developed countries... A gastarbeiter comes to us from another state for temporary work and for a specific purpose – to earn some money. He is not interested in whether or not he is going to contribute to Moscow’s development. And we receive him. But how does that affect our fellow-citizens who have found themselves outside Russia’s borders but are living a common spiritual life with Russians! (reprinted in Guboglo 2008, p. 378).

The Russian government discourages openly racist political parties, and in recent years the punishment for racist violence has been strengthened. But although the openly racist statements of Konstantin Poltoranin led to his immediate resignation, the government must also attempt to satisfy the demands of a significant segment of activists and intellectuals for the return of the ‘Russian question’ to the agenda of scholarly and political discussion. The main intellectual sources of Putin’s new ideology are the ‘conservative synthesis’ and the ‘Russian idea’, which is an idiosyncratic mix of the social thought of religious philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The significant diversity concerning the sources of ideas, along with the accompanying difficulty of trying to combine the various idea in a coherent manner, hamper the articulation of a clear-cut political program. The official ideology is in fact often reduced to little more than the wish that ‘our people should have a better life’. It is obvious that ‘better’ typically refers here to material well-being, but ‘our people’ remains undefined in the official discourse. Nationalist authors have justly noted the ambiguity of how the term ‘people’ has been used even in such a document as the constitution of the Russian Federation – it is used both in the singular, as

a collective concept for all the citizens of Russia, but also in the plural, in the sense of the various ethnic groups in the country. In the article on the national question of January 23, 2012 referred to above, Putin explicitly engaged with the debate concerning the ideas of those who advocate the racial turn. He (2012a) stated that

The core, the binding fabric of this unique civilization – is the Russian people, Russian culture. And it is this core that various instigators and our opponents will make every effort to tear out of Russia – with false assertions about Russians' right to self-determination, 'racial purity', the need to 'finish the job of 1991 and complete the destruction of the empire, sitting on the necks of the Russian people' – in order to ultimately force people to destroy their Motherland with their own hands. I am deeply convinced that attempts to promote the idea of creating a Russian 'national' mono-ethnic state contradict our thousand-year-old history. Moreover, it is the shortest path towards the destruction of the Russian nation and Russian statehood – as well as any viable sovereign statehood in our land.

Putin here alludes clearly to the importance of the ideas of the authors discussed in Chapter 4, and he indicates that he is opposed to those who support them – Putin explicitly endorses the ideas of the 'civilizational nationalism' which such writers and their supporters denounce (Verkhovsky 2011, pp. 28–32). The statement that the peoples of Russia share a cultural code constitutes an attempt to overcome controversy and foster social cohesion that is similar to appeals based on a common territory, nature, or the particularities of sociopolitical life. In his appeal to 'civilizational nationalism' (Laruelle 2006; Verkhovsky and Pain 2010), Putin endeavors to wed an ethnonationalist understanding of Russian specificity with an imperial striving for Russian universality.²

Anti-western rhetoric often appeals to the 'non-Europeanness' of a range of peoples living in Russia. For example, the historian and politician Natalia Narochnitskaya (1993, p. 167), director of the Paris office of the Russian Institute of Democracy and Cooperation, maintains that it is impossible that Russia will simply dissolve into the West because of such peoples living in the Federation as the Bashkirs and Buryats, to whom Russia is 'closer in spirit'. This type of argumentation can also be seen among the neo-Eurasianists, such as Alexander Dugin, whose position reflects all of the ambivalence in any notion that the West is the Significant Other. Russia is, above all, a comparable power – it differs

from the West, but its 'human material' is capable of formulating and reinforcing alternative projects.

Forms of public life that constitute civil society in Russia may be regarded as the results of an imagined collective agency that usually refers to the *narod* (people), whose opinions inform social activity. Studying the relevant signifying practices makes it possible to isolate the social meanings that constitute and inform social reality, which reveal that racial themes are destined to define nation-building to some extent insofar as 'Europe' is one of the main signifiers of alternative Russianness. It is true that such themes are subject to change since the very concept of race was decontextualized and recontextualized when it was imported into the Russian discursive field. Nevertheless, many Russians support the slogan 'Russia is for Russians', which Putin has on several occasions stated was thought up by 'fools or provocateurs'. This challenges the authorities to solve the difficult task of formulating and representing Russianness in a manner that mitigates social conflict.

The prospects for nation-building as Russification look even less bright now than they did during the Soviet period. The option of Russification implies there is no reward for possessing the special status of ethnic Russians as the 'state-building nation'. The various competing ideas of 'Russianness' provide their adherents and supporters with different formulas for building identity. Nevertheless, interpreting Russianness as belonging to the Russian civic nation would provoke protest on the part of those who identify themselves with other ethnicities, who indeed often represent Russianness as the Significant Other.

Fostering horizontal ties between the members of each community while simultaneously subjugating their loyalty to their given community to the central institutions of power is the prime ambition of any state leadership. Nation-building is transformed, however, through a policy that strengthens Putin's 'power vertical', which aims to make central institutions independent from the regional elites of autonomous national regions. In this respect, patriotism is often reduced to ideological loyalty, as was the case in the Soviet times. Colonial modes of government are instead created through the construction of systems of relations between state institutions and local authorities and clan representatives. Tilly (1997, p. 3) regards the major feature of empire to be indirect rule, which involves governance through mediators who enjoy autonomy in establishing rules for the regional population and territory under their control in the exchange for loyalty to the center. In comparison with the Soviet period, however, the construction of identity around Russianness as informed by racial knowledge has grown

greatly in scale. In addition, the strengthening of the significance of symbolic barriers in racialization processes has complicated any particular individual choice. For example, although the Russian government has adopted the ideas of Eurasianism concerning the necessity of an Eurasian center as an antipode to the West in global reorganization and restructuring, it refuses to use the 'heritage of Genghis Khan' in the construction of the new nation. Neither the 'national self-consciousness of the Tartar *ulus*', nor the 'healthy and authentic element of Genghis Khan' – to use the words of Ivan Il'in, Putin's favorite political thinker and critic of Eurasianism – are to any degree attractive representations of Russian authenticity (Kantor 1997, p. 92). Nevertheless, the conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine have indicated that the formula of Eurasian space implies, above all, cooperation with the Central Asian regimes.

The ruling elite has begun to take up certain hypotheses associated with the definition of Russianness that has been reconstructed in this study as racial. First, Putin speaks of making the nation healthier in biological terms and addresses the notion of the genetic pool of the 'population'. Secondly, the 'demographic disaster' of which Victor Kozlov wrote in 1990s has become a discourse accepted by the party in power (Wood 2012). Although the incentives offered to the population to increase birth rates are based less on the racial rhetoric of ethnic Russians dying out than on the economic need for a greater number of Russian citizens, the notion of 'human material' is nevertheless clearly present in this discourse. Thirdly, Russians who live in the West are no longer regarded as non-patriotic – on the contrary, they are one of the most important resources for Russia. Emigrants were stigmatized in the Soviet Union as 'outcasts', and in the 1990s they were attacked for supposedly having fled from the hardships of Russian life. In the last ten years, however, they are often regarded by governmental officials and represented in textbooks as having a particularly high quality 'human capital' by virtue of, among other things, their 'better genes'. This is also reflected in the government's policy concerning citizenship. Those who immigrate to Russia must renounce their citizenship in their country of origin, while Russians who emigrate may retain their Russian citizenship and acquire passports in their new countries of residence, which places them in privileged positions. Finally, proclaiming Russia as the 'true Europe', along with Germany, France, and Italy – all countries with restrictive immigration policies and a pragmatic approach to relations with Russia – as a counterbalance to the new members of the European Union from Central and Eastern Europe, brings Russian policy makers together with those inclined to support a 'racial' understanding of Russianness.

The official discourse operates with the notions of civilization and the people, which make it possible to leave the question of how to define what is 'racial' in Russianness up to any given individual who wishes to enter the imagined community. The desire for the 'status of corporate society', expressed in the programs of Alexander Sevastyanov and Andrey Savelyev, has been partially fulfilled in Putin's Russia by means of certain features of the resource state and estate society. Ilya Kostyunov (2012), a member of the Russian State Duma from *Edinaya Rossiya* (United Russia) and director in 2008–10 of the *Seliger* youth camp, the most important youth project in contemporary Russia, stated that 'the most stupid member of parliament is smarter than the average citizen'. Savelyev writes about new forms of political aristocracy, which Avdeev (2005, p. 137) justifies from the angle of *raciology*: 'World history is not merely the struggle of large races with each other, but rather the struggle of racial cores with their own genetic periphery to a much greater extent.' An interesting image in this respect is provided by Dmitry Bykov (2006), one of the most popular writers and liberal essayists, who represents the political conflict between the liberal opposition and Putin as a conflict between Varangians and Khazars for control of the Russian *narod* (people) (see Lipovetskiy and Etkind 2008; Kukulin 2012, pp. 865–6 for further discussion of this issue).

Against this background, racial thinking was transformed into a strategy for coping with the fear that Russia might well become an imagined Africa if it did not remain an important geopolitical player on the international scene in the post-Soviet period (Quist-Adade 2005). Adopting racial thinking through racialization of the *narod* provides a mechanism for securing the status of Russia as a great nation in both the official political discourse and also the everyday discourse since the 'talent of our people' would allegedly prevent the country from degenerating to the level of a Third World country. This and other similar figures of speech not only demonstrate that there was already an established conception of the 'racial' associated with the success of modernization before the start of radical reforms in Russia, but that they had been activated by the constantly growing level of global inequality. Moreover, this growing inequality was perceived in the new post-Soviet conditions as a direct threat to the survival of Russia as a 'civilized' nation, and strategies had to be developed to counter that threat. Racial thinking was a key to the strategy that emerged for this purpose.

Oushakine (2009), in his study of how Russian scholars took up narratives of the 'Russian tragedy' in order to decouple ethnicity from the state, reveals that the fragmentation of the social fabric occurred as a

process of the materialization of traumatic experiences. He argues that racialization as a process of creating new communities, partly using the rhetoric of exclusion, could be read 'as an attempt to restore – at least to some extent – the sense of collectivity and cohesiveness Russians felt during the Soviet period' (Oushakine 2009, p. 12). Such processes are not unique to Russia, and they have been encountered by a number of societies in Eastern Europe during the post-Communist transition (Alexander et. al. 2004). However, the psychological vehicles behind the logic of coping with social traumas had different dynamics and orientations in respect to the classification practices in Russia. The racialized subject is, above all, a stranger, not 'our own' or 'one of us' ('*svoi*', '*nashi*') (Yurchak 2006, p. 287). Boundaries have continued to exist on the post-Soviet territory, although the objects of classification have been moved from one category to another more than once. Although this fact again confirms the instrumentality and historical specificity of the patterns of exclusion, it in no way relativizes the substantive nucleus of the idea of race.

At the same time, it is misleading to speak of racism as an articulated political program of the Russian state. It is revealing, however, that those currently in power demonstrate their ambivalence in relation to the Roma (Lemon 1995) and Chechens (Tishkov 2003, pp. 321–2) in a manner similar to the way in which biological categorizations of the Cossacks were both used and rejected during the Soviet period (Holquist 1998). The practices of ambivalence on the part of the elites towards groups which construct their identity around whiteness or racial Russianness can be explained by their wish to use such groups to realize their biopower while ensuring that the level of racist violence never rises to such an extent that it threatens their total control.

Cognitive framing, which presupposes the unambiguous interpretation of a racist as an enemy, permits the Russian government and media to accuse Russia's political opponents on the international scene of racism and fascism, but it cannot allow them to accuse Russians themselves of such things. Those in power are even less inclined to define as racist the consequences of social arrangements that promote inequality and exclusion. Adepts of racial thinking typically adopt an opportunistic position of populist criticism directed against faceless 'bureaucrats' which involves claims about what they regard as social problems while retaining their main distinguishing feature of loyalty to the political leadership (Verkhovsky 2007, p. 18). They blame migrants, rather than officials, for the fact that the administrative services in the Moscow area are corrupt and unable to cope even with the registration of migrants.

It should be emphasized that the negative connotations of the term 'racist' have been retained. However, the terms 'racism' and 'fascism' are often used as empty signifiers, as symbolic evils, in contrast to the patriotism which the state has encouraged. To be anti-racist then means to celebrate Russian foreign policy, as well as the alleged tolerance of Russians towards the 'Other' as an innately given characteristic of Russianness. The state and the state-controlled media now use the hatred of racism and its identification with the fascist atrocities of World War Two, which was shaped by Soviet indoctrination, in order to run 'anti-racist campaigns' against the allegedly racist/pro-fascist policies of states with which Russia happens to be in conflict (Georgia, the Baltic states) (Morozov 2009). It is the toolkit that can be used in the same fashion that anti-racist rhetoric was used against the United States during the Cold War. In order to justify the prosecution of the band Pussy Riot, Putin (2012c) even claimed that one of the girls 'hanged an effigy of a Jew and said that Moscow should be free of such people' before their show in the church. Through this intentional misinterpretation of what was originally an anti-racist message, Putin made use of racial discourse to legitimize internal policies in the eyes of 'politically correct' western observers.

8

Concluding Discussion

The idea of race has clearly been present in Russian history – it has been significant in the public discourses on heredity, backwardness, and anti-colonial struggle, but it was rarely theorized in the social sciences. Only recently has race as it was traditionally understood in the Russian context – as either a relatively isolated set of geographically proximate populations or a concept that served to provide evidence of the evolutionary past – become an object of sociological reflection. This book endeavored to chart how the acquisition of western racial thinking was renegotiated, contested, and confronted in Russia within historical, political, and economical systems that were substantially different from those elsewhere. It has argued that the contradictions embedded in the project of western modernity, which have become obvious in the process of its realization, are problems to which all other modernity projects have sought to find solutions. These solutions have been theoretically developed and elaborated within the framework of such large-scale projects as communist modernity, but they have also constituted reactions on the part of societies which have realized that they have come face to face with the problem of racism as part of globalization processes. Western modernity and racial ‘whiteness’ thus remain both the source of discourse and the frame of reference for many societies, including the Russian Federation today. The self-contradiction within colonialism – to civilize its Others while also securing their otherness – has been transformed within the Russian experience into an internal civilizing mission intended to secure Russian otherness on the global stage. This continues to provide national specificity to the engagement with the concept of race in Russia.

Racialization can be studied, first, as a category of practice in political life; secondly, as a process of establishing the basis for racial discourse;

and, thirdly, as a category that assists sociological analysis. Race cannot be regarded only as a group marker that serves to initiate the drawing of boundaries and group mobilization. Since race is also a shared belief, racialization is consequently a belief formation. Races as such are not actual corporeal entities, as many Marxists or sociobiologists might claim, the former with reference to asymmetric power relations between actual groups, the latter with reference to the supposed genetic pools of human beings. Race is instead a category that relies on the individual application of a belief and is maintained through the available cultural codes. However, while politics is one of the main sources of social action, the instrumentalization of differences leads to group formation. Race may thus become a semi-autonomous subject of action not only as a historically bounded group, but also as a particular subculture, as Chapter 5 shows in respect to how some members of far-right subcultures have turned into a social movement. Racism can also be regarded as a social agency organized as a group or community that makes claims upon the basis of a culture which it has defined as its own.

Racialization proceeds from social categorization and social identification to develop a racial identity. 'Making' race demands that the person who is racialized 'becomes' racial, and any such activity inevitably involves 'doing' race as well. Racialization should thus be studied sociologically as, *inter alia*, the utilization of differences in physical appearance in order to draw boundaries within society. Insofar as reproducing inequalities on the basis of social categories is linked to the differences that these categories designate, it is necessary to distinguish between phenotypical and social race-thinking. 'Race' in the sense of observed corporeal differences operates as a role sign that guides these processes. This study endeavored to show that visual differences and racial knowledge, as the only unreduced manifestations of race that are meaningful in social encounters, can be analyzed in respect to: (a) the terrain of class inequalities; (b) the search for a new identity; and (c) geopolitical conflicts in the light of the post-colonial divisions between North and South.

The analytical autonomy of race as a 'social race-thinking' should be reasserted in respect to the primacy of the 'idea of race' as it was first formulated in the terms of modern science during the late eighteenth century. This formulation continues to exert a certain impact on both scientific and folk representations of diversity and conceptions of race. This raises the question of whether race is reducible to such 'second-order' constructs as ethnicity. The analytical distinction between race and ethnicity as it is utilized in this study is based on the three following

premises: (1) the phenomenological premise that the phenotypical definition of membership is more stigmatizing; (2) the epistemological premise of there being a conventional division between nature and culture in the social sciences; and (3) the ontological premise that there are both 'innate' (appearance, endowments) and 'acquired' (language) properties.

'Race' should thus be defined in a way that departs from the quasi-scientific anthropological discourse that has long been current in situations of 'everyday racism'. It is important to note, however, that this does not involve race as it is sociopolitically institutionalized, which is not an epistemological issue. This departure from quasi-anthropological notions of race will enable us to adopt a pluralistic stance concerning the study of racialization processes that makes it possible to examine the social phenomenon of racialization from the point of view of the social agent but also give due consideration to causal influences exerted by the environment. Moreover, an approach which insists that the materiality of body has no significance for the idea of race is of little use in efforts to understand how negotiating meanings that are attributed to differences may take place in the process of everyday interactions. Race and ethnicity may operate interconnectedly in different settings – this is true for folk concepts, for the use of terms in state policies and academic scholarship, and also for the phenomena they seek to name in the world of social reality. In addition, the biologization of ethnicity has not necessarily led to a racial perspective in all circumstances. However, the dissemination of racial knowledge, the imbuing of cultural and biological notions of ethnicity with racial connotations, and the institutional practices of ascribing ethnicity have contributed to processes of racialization.

An imposed racial, ethnic, cultural, or sexual belonging directly and explicitly hinders the realization of the self taken as a project designed not by tradition, but by the individual. While negotiating cultural or sexual belonging has become easier today and class boundaries are becoming more permeable, the process of negotiating or overcoming the operations of racial identity appear to be growing ever more difficult. Furthermore, the racialization of the globe has been promoted by the gradual universalization of racist belief systems as an aspect of globalization. Taking a closer look at the Russian case has revealed that it is becoming more difficult to reproduce local racisms which are based on the idea that the biological type prevalent in a particular region is the most 'elevated'. Racial boundaries do not lie along the course of rivers and mountains, nor do they consist of systems of symbols that

define sovereignty and political affiliation – they instead run through communities, cutting through the life of each individual and her personal history. Such an understanding of race – fluid on the one hand and essentially reproducible on the other – are well suited to our times of globalization and the development of biotechnology.

By challenging the widespread understanding that ‘nation’ and ‘nationality’ serve as substitutes for the notion of race in Russia this book claims that it is possible to understand racialization as a process that is partially decoupled from nation-building. It is necessary to keep in mind that nation-building processes may vary in prominence and significance in different European societies – ethnicity and nation can be represented in terms of race, while gender and class can be ethnicized or racialized (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). Furthermore, although racial discourses clearly provide a new ideology of social cohesion in post-Soviet Russia, they can also inform strategies for individual self-formation and promote a ‘personal racialism’. This is evident in the search for the descendants of privileged estates that has become typical for the now popular genealogical research, in the genetic diagnostics of ‘ethnic origins’, in genetic engineering, and in cosmetic surgery taken as an attempt to change ‘nature’ through individual agency (Schramm et al. 2012).

Certain social conditions underlie the emergence of racialization and its discursive objects. Although race serves to rationalize and order social relations, as do many other concepts and practices, reducing systems of exclusion to the lowest common denominator of racism only hinders theoretical development in the sociology of race. A closer examination of the Soviet case has assisted us in reconsidering the well-known Marxist and functionalist thesis that ‘although race is the master constituent for organizing labor and national belonging in the United States, it need not be so elsewhere where ethnicity, religion, or other forms of “cultural fundamentalism” may function in similar ways’ (Brodkin 2000, p. 248). The peculiarity of structures that organize social relations resides in the fact that they cannot be reduced to their results, even though they are represented in them. Conceptions and practices of racism should not be equated with ‘cultural fundamentalism’ or essentialism. Nevertheless, all of this does not exclude the possibility that negotiating the identity of Russia as a nation can involve the use of such notions as ‘purity and contamination’, ‘blood as a carrier of culture’, and ‘racial pollution’, which, as Verdery (1993, p. 42) has demonstrated, have been fundamental to the projects of nation-making in Eastern Europe. Consequently, nations or ethnicities understood in

commonsense terms as groups may both serve as objects of racialization, and be constructed through clear references to the various ideas of race that are prevalent at a given time.

While the processes of racial modernization in the West were, in many ways, successfully challenged by religious thinking, the cult of science and forcible secularization within the alternative communist project of modernity led to idiosyncratic interpretations of the idea of race. Slavery, which was racialized during the Enlightenment era, was abolished in Europe literally by compulsion, first and foremost on a religious basis. The denial of the very idea of race, as well as racial hierarchy, was also characteristic of Russian religious philosophy, along with its denial of the 'positivist spirit of sociology'. But the communist builders of the new modernity, who placed at the heart of their program the education of a new man, free from alienation through the abolition of property – who would thereby become the happy man-god – declared religious philosophy to be their main enemy. It could thus be argued that the Soviet model, by absolutizing the ideology of reason, took up the notion of abstract reason in the spirit of the French Revolution rather than in the Hegelian sense of rational society. The groups that dogmatic Soviet ideology defined as the 'progressive forces' of the world began to change from transnational class allies, understood in the spirit of Marxist internationalism, to ethnonationalistic groups that possesses a certain character, values, and goals. This discourse was also successfully inherited by post-Soviet Russia, as will be shown below.

The Soviet example serves to once again confirm the thesis that the aims for which the idea of race can be used vary depending on the subject matter of debates, the historical context, and even the personal preferences of the agent. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to maintain that the official discourse of the nationalities policy in the Soviet Union was racist. On the contrary, the development of *ethnos* and its transformation into a nation was theorized as a sociopolitical process that took place within the course of historical progress. Antibiology and an emphasis on the social was crucial to the Soviet plan for reshaping the western project of modernity for the purposes of creating a new set of social structures that would, in turn, create a new human being. Of course, we can in no way claim that history was understood in official Soviet discourse as a racial struggle – on the contrary, such conceptions were obstinately ascribed to the reactionaries in capitalist societies. However, they were then actively retranslated and put before a mass audience through the media and the educational system. The ideal of the party-minded Soviet citizen who could rise above 'bourgeois'

loyalties to the community was replaced in the dogmatic rhetoric of the late Soviet period by the figure of an ethnically Russian male Soviet patriot.

Studying the Soviet case contributes to gaining a better understanding of the fact that the social order is maintained through the mobility and fluidity of identifications. This is why specific positions should not be inscribed into an antithesis of 'us' and 'them' that has in fact been coded by various changing sociopolitical configurations. The well-known Soviet formula of 'socialist in content, national in form', as if national identities were self-evident, cannot do justice to the character of Soviet identifications. Even so, anti-racism dominated Soviet discourse on the 'nationalities question'. But in respect to the unexpected and paradoxical changes that have taken place in national, ethnic, and racial identities during the post-Soviet period, perhaps the formula of 'partisan in content, werewolf in form' would cast more light on racialization processes now underway in the Russian Federation.

Frank Reeves correctly claims (1983, p. 58) that 'ideology neither accurately reflects the underlying patterns of economic interest, nor exists entirely independently from it in a "free-floating" capacity'. Diverse racial discourses have been activated in post-Soviet Russia because of weakened ideological control, emasculated ideology, and the lifting of taboos in public discussion on a whole range of topics that include racism, exclusion, and inequality. My study has demonstrated that this discursive level was reinforced by persisting inequalities in the access which different groups, classified by the state as nationalities, have had to various resources. This had had a decisive and formative effect upon the rise of racialization in Russia, the specific ways in which it has unfolded, and the particular identities that have been negotiated by and/or imposed on various groups in the population.

In this study the following factors that have facilitated racialization processes in the Russian Federation have been identified and studied:

First, the patterns of intra-Russia migration, immigration, and incorporation into labor markets that have been activated by the transition from state socialism to capitalism. This is not to say that the influx of newcomers has inevitably led to their racialization. As Turner (2010, p. 27) argues, 'encounters are almost always nested inside corporate and categorical units which, in turn, are lodged respectively, inside institutional domains and stratification systems'. These processes have not invented a new social boundary, but have rather installed 'a familiar sort of boundary in a new location' (Tilly 2004, p. 219), namely, between locals and visually recognizable labor migrants. However, this

boundary has acquired striking significance because it categorically reifies and labels newcomers with such racial terms as 'blacks'.

Secondly, the search for new identifications. This has, in many ways, been generated by the traumatic reaction to the break-up of the Soviet Union and the conventional Soviet way of life, which gave rise to the post-Soviet identity flux.

Thirdly, the liberalization of academic and public discussion of topics linked to the idea of race within the framework of racial discourse. In this regard, this study sought to demonstrate the importance of those recent publications that regard 'Russianness' as a quality that has been passed down from generation to generation, as if it were a particular physical trait. This view has shaped and reinforced the racialization processes in contemporary Russia.

All of these factors, which are inscribed in and also constantly remold the racial discourse that has been inherited from the Russian past, have been underpinned by nationalist mobilizations in the periods of armed conflict in the Caucasus. These factors both determine those situations in which social structures interrelate with how actors understand racial discourse, and also serve to create a racialized social reality. It is precisely these patterns that we must take into consideration in order to analyze the role and dynamics of racialization in the nation-building process in the Russian Federation, which has proceeded in the conditions of post-Soviet change for the purpose of creating a new social and political system. This itself has brought forth new social movements and political parties.

Racial discourse concerning labor migrants in Russia has been shaped by economic relations and the realization of a nationhood project that are hidden within the process of the racialization of 'undesirable human material'. Construction of the 'migration issue' as a social problem in Russia is, in many ways, embedded in the tensions obtaining between the demands of the state for social cohesion and the demands of enterprises for socially disunited labor. The corresponding ideological work, conducted mainly by the state and the elites, operates as securitization and crisis management, which draws comparisons with Robert Miles's (1988) conclusions concerning the British case. However, these racialization processes, like many facets of Russian society and politics, need to be viewed within their global contexts. As Sivanandan (2009, p. 97) argues, 'the national racisms of industrial capitalism have yielded to the common, market racism of global capital'. In particular, it is useful to regard discrimination and violence against migrant workers from the former outposts of imperial Russia and the Soviet Union as part

of a larger post-imperial hangover that is comparable to, though not identical with, the development of racist practices against migrants in London or Paris. The racialization of labor migrants in today's Russian Federation should not be regarded as somehow disentangled from the story of racialized modernity.

It is hardly plausible that the imagery of race could have been activated solely by the operation new impersonal historical conditions. In all of the years that the Soviet state was in power, unofficial intellectual circles continued to produce a response from below (Joo 2008). Nevertheless, it was only following the fall of the totalitarian regime that social movements gained their present strength. With the start of *Perestroika*, all this was reinforced by the opening of the information floodgates and the intensification of mobilization from below. The anti-immigration movement and the subcultures of skinheads and football fans, which have also become mass movements, are paradoxically some of the few manifestations of civil society in Russia today. This racist youth subculture, in fact, possesses the clear hallmarks of a grassroots social movement. In contrast to the many *Komsomol*-like youth organizations that had been established and financed by the government, skinheads and certain other racist movements are entirely comparable to analogous movements in the world of western modernity.

If we place racialization within the framework of 'game' and 'strategy' theories, or search only for political interests connected with the definition of 'nation' in Russia, we will overlook the crucial question concerning why racial knowledge is still useful and retains its key elements. Why have 'entrepreneurs of whiteness' been so successful? Why do ethnic or racial identities belonging to the 'civilized world' constitute social and cultural capital? I argue that race as a mode of making sense of the world requires both cognitive and normative activity. What is crucial is to look beyond the instrumental patterns of social action and direct more attention to symbolic systems. Both the new Russian capitalism as well as the left resistance to it use racial knowledge in their narratives and discourses in one way or another. This is also the case concerning the outspokenness and cynicism of the representatives of the ruling elite, who are located within the framework of the struggle against political correctness. 'Political correctness' is, above all, a limitation upon power that cannot be inscribed into the logic of development of post-Soviet Russia. The economic situation itself has also been racialized in terms of a 'white [legal] salary' that enables one to afford the lifestyle of a 'white man' instead of having to 'work like a Negro' to get by. Those who have not been 'integrated into the market' are represented as being

'off-white', but they can set off on the path of 'doing' race and 'becoming' white by racializing labor migrants as 'black'. Perhaps even former 'reds' – now bleached and colorless *sovki* – can also be channeled into pursuing 'whiteness'.

This study has facilitated charting how the dynamics and logic of processes of racialization in Russia have changed over the last 20–25 years. At the beginning of the 1990s, for example, public discourse interpreted the Soviet period as an historical anomaly which had diverted the country from the main path of progress down which western societies had been proceeding. Moshe Lewin (1995, p. 306–7) describes what he terms the moral-ideological deficit of the early 1990s as follows:

By rejecting socialism and by equating it with the Soviet regime – and, moreover, by expressing this criticism in old-fashioned anti-communist terms – many intellectuals automatically came to endorse Western practices already long discredited in the West and disdainfully discredited some of their country's own achievements and valuable experiences, which they may now badly need... [W]hat many of them were adopting was, at best, an already outdated neo-liberalism that leaned more to its right-wing versions.

Beginning with the end of the 1990s, however, the theme of the twilight and decadence of the West, coupled with the conception that Russia is the 'true Europe', has become dominant in both public and official discourse. In light of the ongoing expansion of the EU and NATO, such sentiments are quite in line with the logic of political hostility and need to be addressed by specialists in international politics. However, after closer examination, I have interpreted the content of this discourse as racial – with the exception of those discussions that concern the immediate military threat to Russia posed by the positioning of new bases close to its borders. I have identified racial themes in the Russian discussions of: (a) Europe being washed over by a flood of 'black' migrants, including those arriving from the new, 'undercivilized' European Union member states; and (b) physical degradation as a result of the demographic crisis and the legitimization of political correctness.

The paradox is that anti-racist rhetoric continues to remain the social norm, and that racism within the context of political polemics is always normatively labeled as fascism. Competitors in the 'battle for discourse', in fact, began accusing each other of racism during the period of *Perestroika*, when the division between pro-western liberals and

nationalists became obvious and significant. Even today, policy makers and intellectuals on both sides of the discourse divide view personhood and social relations through the racial lens and discuss the value of nations as a whole, socioeconomic groups, ethnic communities, status groups, and so forth, in general terms.

Although internal colonial domination operated in the Soviet Union through the extension of invitations to all minority subjects to attain socialist modernity and thus become Russified, such inducements would weaken the hegemonic understanding of Russianness and challenge racialized boundaries in the Russian Federation today. Insofar as racial classification contributes to the codification of difference, the adoption of western theories and practices of racialization constitutes an attempt on the part of Russians to transcend the trap of the East/West dichotomy. By inscribing 'modern' or 'civilized' racialization into already available discourses of difference that include the idea of race, agents of racialization have sought to elaborate new logics of identification that will facilitate social cohesion under very specific premises that relate to Russia's position in the world and to power relations at home. The new identifications being created are to serve and reflect Russia's place among the 'civilized' nations and ensure the dominance within the Russian Federation of the Russian majority of the population.

The resentment was directed at the representatives of minority diaspora groups who had become successful entrepreneurs. While many Russians lost status as heavy industry and the state sector were restructured, members of certain ethnic groups traditionally employed in the service sector and in trade became successful capitalists and made a triumphant transition to the modern order – they were, in fact, the first to do so in the post-Soviet Russian space. Typically ethnic minorities in the Russian Federation have utilized the idea of race in the search for roots, to justify their ethnic primordality, to emphasize the 'genetic' character of cultural traditions, to legitimize their ethnic identity, and to safeguard and reproduce their ethnic community. For them, the idea of race has provided the answer to the challenges of modernity, the absence of political freedoms, the non-existence of a civic nation, and discrimination on the labor market. For Russians, embracing the racial outlook has provided the answer to globalizing imperatives, but it has done so from the position of the former Soviet socialist nation that constituted an alternative modernity. Investing in 'whiteness' has represented a western modernist approach for guaranteeing that 'Russian civilization' will find its own proper place in the dominant discourses of the developed and civilized First World.

The assertion of racial privilege can nuance the post-colonial gaze insofar as the Russian leadership seeks to elaborate an 'authentic' strategy to challenge western domination. This does not constitute simply an inversion of the symbolical instruments of domination. It is instead an attempt to reconstruct the Russian nation as 'true Europe', as a 'true' civilizational center that will boldly dare to carry the 'white man's burden'. Since the search for an 'authentic voice' within the framework of the dominant discourses is problematic, the language of race may be represented in the Russian context not only as the language of the colonizer, but, more importantly, as the language of the nation that will liberate the genuine spirit of the West from the allegedly degenerate state into which it has fallen. The strategies described above aim at the transformation of the western system of knowledge in the post-socialist space, and they imitate to differing degrees the master discourses of the 'colonizer'. This nevertheless leads, as Homi Bhabha (1994) argues, to a creative processing of the original discourse that activates the strategies of racialization. As I have demonstrated in the discussion above, self-racialization can be understood as an attempt to rediscover the authenticity that has been lost – or stolen.

This book emphasizes that the contradictory composition of the discourses of race today – whereby race is presented both as breed (or lineage), which is supported by the discourses of patriotism, and as type (or phenotype), which is supported by folk conceptions – obstruct any non-contradictory formation of the racial order. The logic of racialization demands both internal and external 'others', which leads to contradictions within the available intellectual programs of racialization under the conditions of striving to legitimize inequality. I propose that the racialization processes in contemporary Russia should be understood as a component of a new nationhood project – a component that is self-contradictory in its two functions of responding to the traumatic challenges of the imagined West and of naturalizing social differences at home. The weakness of civil society and of institutions endeavoring to apply transparency and meritocracy as their operating principles has resulted in a situation in which Russia has not succeeded in overcoming the institutionalized ascription of a variety of social markers, one of which is ethnic belonging. Thus, racialization in Russia operates in a peculiar fashion. On the one hand, it serves in molding a new nation and is the constitutive process of modernity. On the other, racialization processes are in direct conflict both with the post-Soviet definition of Russia as a civic nation of Russians, and with the idea, which became

firmly established during 70 years of communist power, that the 'Soviet people' are a nation created as part of an 'alternative modernity'.

Consequently, we still are awaiting answers to such specific and important questions as: What makes certain Russian citizens, but not others, construct their identity around race? Which groups are most susceptible to racial discourse? Which groups reject it – and in what situations and under what historical conditions? What is needed is a complex undertaking in order to avoid the pitfalls of making generalizations on the basis of the Russian case, just as we must avoid generalization made solely on the basis of West European and North American standpoints. This undertaking must be accompanied by the effort to present a more general, global framework for how racialization processes operate.

Notes

1 Global Racisms and Racism in Russia: An Introduction

1. All translations from Russian and German are by the author unless otherwise indicated.
2. Sik became a prisoner of war of the Russians during World War One. He chose to stay in Russia after being released, joined the Soviet Communist Party in 1920, and lived as an Hungarian émigré in the Soviet Union until 1945, when he returned to Hungary. He later served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary from 1958 to 1961.
3. <http://www.sova-center.ru/en/>.

2 Race and Racism in the Russian Past

1. The film featured the following song by Pavel German: 'Before all enemies are known / While at least one of them is still alive / Every honest and simple Soviet citizen / Has to be an NKVD officer (*chekist*). / Our fortresses are ever stronger / The *chekists* of today / Are all the 170 million / Of my Fatherland's Patriots!'
2. Stalin composed his *Marksizm i natsional'nyi vopros* [Marxism and the Nationalities Question] in opposition to Otto Bauer's *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie*. Bauer emphasized that 'commonality of destiny' defines national character (*aus Schicksalsgemeinschaft erwachsende Charaktergemeinschaft*), and he pointed to 'commonality of origin' and 'natural heredity' as the important factors in this regard. He nevertheless maintained that 'cultural commonality' is the factor which defines the reproduction of national differences. Bauer's position may be defined as cultural racism in the language used by some contemporary scholars of racism.

3 Race, Racialization and Racism: A New Theoretical Framework

1. Although only Kant's *Kritik der Urteilskraft* is cited here, two different English translations are chosen to use, namely, Pluhar's and the most recent Cambridge University Press edition.

4 Making Race in the Russian Academia

1. Valery Tishkov, former nationalities minister in Gaydar's liberal government, is now the head of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Victor Shnirelman, the leading Russian specialist on racism, is employed at this Institute.

5 Rioting for Whiteness: *Doing Race on the Squares of Moscow*

1. Patriarch Kiril's address is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=Hss82_YfpVM.
2. Chairman of the Synodal Department for Church and Society Interaction of the Moscow Patriarchate.

6 *Becoming Racial: Race as a New Form of Inequality*

1. In the late Soviet period, this identified a category of temporary residents without permanent *propiska* (right to housing allocation) who worked in manual and low-skilled jobs.

7 Geopolitics of Racism and the Nation-Building Processes

1. Sergey Sergeev (2010, p. 250), one of the ideologists of Russian nationalism, justifies the necessity of using the work of 'non-Russian' thinkers by the need for 'national pragmatism'. He states that

'National pragmatism', whether we want it or not, is not someone's evil 'intellectual subversion', but rather the imperative of our times. That is why 'blood', 'power', and 'money' come to the fore. Who knows, perhaps one day we will return to Aleksei Khomiakov and Nikolai Losskiy, but now Carl Schmitt and Pierre Bourdieu are more important for us. Among our own authors, perhaps only Danilevsky and Leontiev in their most ruthless and anti-Romantic fragments are now important.

One of the most famous sayings of Nikolay Danilevsky – 'Neither true modesty, nor true pride can allow Russia to consider itself European'. – could serve as the epigraph for this book. The Slavophil Konstantin Aksakov wrote that 'The Russian people is not a people; it is humanity; it is a people only because it is surrounded by peoples with exclusively national essences, and its humanity is therefore represented by nationality' (as quoted in Riasanovsky 2005, p. 252).

2. Putin (2012a) writes that '[E]thnic Russians have never, not in any emigration, formed stable national diasporas, despite having a significant quantitative and qualitative presence, because our identity has a different cultural code. Russian people are nation-forming – on the basis of Russia's existence. The great mission of Russians is to unite and bind our civilization. Language, culture and "universal kind-heartedness," according to Fyodor Dostoevsky, are what bring together Russian Armenians, Russian Azerbaijanis, Russians Germans, Russian Tatars... Bring them together to form a type of state-civilization that does not have "ethnic persons" and where differentiation between "us and them" is determined by a common culture and shared values. This civilizational identity is based on the preservation of a Russian

cultural dominance, which flows not only from ethnic Russians, but all carriers of this identity regardless of nationality. This is the cultural code that has, in recent years, been subject to some serious trials, which people have tried and continue to try to break. And it has, nevertheless, prevailed. At the same time, it needs to be nourished, strengthened, and protected.'

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